







Title of Document: STUDYING EPISTEMIC COGNITION IN THE 
HISTORY CLASSROOM: CASES OF TEACHING 
AND LEARNING TO THINK HISTORICALLY 
  




Professor Patricia A. Alexander 
Department of Human Development,  
University of Maryland 
 
Professor Bruce VanSledright 
Department of Curriculum and Instruction, 
University of Maryland 
 
 
Building on the literature on epistemic cognition, epistemic beliefs, and historical 
thinking, three class-level case studies were conducted to investigate featur s of 
historical thinking and history-specific epistemic beliefs of high-school students and 
their teachers.   These cases also considered teachers’ pedagogical practi es and the 
potential effects of those practices on students’ historical thinking and epistemic 
beliefs.  Two junior honors and one freshman US History classes were selected from 
a school system that fostered the preparation of students for AP History courses by 
encouraging the use of a variety of primary sources and analysis of documents in 
teaching history.  Preliminary visits indicated that these classes’ teachers used 
different pedagogical practices.  Class observations spanned one semester of 
instruction.  History-specific epistemic beliefs were explored using interv ews 
structured around the items of the Beliefs about History Questionnaire (BHQ) and 
  
  
historical thinking was assessed through analysis of think-alouds collected whil  
student informants (4 from each class) and their teachers read a set of 6 documents 
and responded to a constructed response task (CRT).  Specifically, student data were 
collected at the middle and end of the semester, while teachers were interviewed only 
once, at the end of the semester.  In one of the junior classes, 27 additional juniors 
responded in writing to the BHQ and to the CRTs.  Additional questionnaires and 
interviews explored teachers’ goals, rationales for their practice, and interest in 
history.  In regard to history-specific epistemic beliefs, results indicated that students 
and teachers manifested ideas indicative of different developmental levels, suggesting 
that their epistemic beliefs are a complex system, not necessarily chracterized by a 
high level of integration.  Differences across students tended to be greater in regard to 
epistemic beliefs than to historical thinking.  In addition, comparison of initial and 
follow-up data suggested different trajectories of change in regard to students’ 
epistemic beliefs while changes in historical thinking were modest and not 
consistently suggesting progression in competence.  These trends were confirmed by 
the analysis of students’ written responses to the BHQ and the CRTs.  The study 
identified a set of ideas and behaviors that tended to produce cognitive impasse and 
hindered the development of historical thinking and a series of pedagogical practices, 
mostly aligned with teachers’ goals and beliefs, which might have fostered such 
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Is the Renaissance a fact or a concept?  The reality is that the 
Renaissance did not exist until Jules Michelet invented it. 
And Michelet created that great fact that is the Renaissance in 1840. 
                                                               (Dario Antiseri, 2001) 
 
 
What is the nature of human knowledge in general and of historical 
knowledge in particular?  Can beliefs and opinions be justified?  Is history just 
another word to indicate the past?  What is the boundary, if any, between facts and 
interpretations?  These are just a few of the questions that philosophers, and in 
particular gnoseologists, epistemologists, and hermeneuticists, have discussed 
throughout human history.  In our time, Descartes’s doubt about the grounds of one’s 
beliefs still echoes in these questions, since the relation between knowledge and 
reality has become especially problematic in the modern and post-modern cultural
landscape.    
In psychology, the cognitive revolution (Phillips, 1995) emphasized the 
constructed nature of knowledge, questioning, in its most radical expressions, the 
very existence of a knowable reality external to the individual, and thus theorizing the 
exclusively subjective nature of knowledge (von Glasersfeld, 1991).  The issue of 
objectivity has also been frequently discussed in history, prompting Peter Novick 
(1988) to provocatively title the introduction to his review of American 





Statement of the Problem and Its Significance 
Are the answers to these questions relevant only for perspective philosophers 
or do they also matter to researchers investigating the cognitive and social 
development of individuals (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002)?  More particularly, do these 
questions and their answers affect the processes of teaching and learning that happen 
in schools and thus the outcome of education?  A few examples from the political and 
educational debates suggest they do.  For instance, the seemingly never-ending 
American controversy about the teaching of evolution in schools keeps begging the 
eminently epistemic question about the definition and the status of scientific theories 
and, more generally, about the warrants for beliefs.    
In history education, recurrently disappointing test results of students’ ability 
to recall traditional milestones of American history is usually met by a renewed 
commitment to foster students’ memorization of curricula that have become 
increasingly vast, in the attempt to conciliate the goal of introducing new generatio s 
of Americans to a common narrative of the nation’s past while paying at least some 
attention to all the different voices characterizing American society (VanSledright, 
2008).  Such move also implies an essentially epistemic choice since it entails a 
definition of what is the nature of history (i.e., factual) and of the grounds on which 
historical knowledge rests.  In both cases, the debates that ensue usually decay into 
partisan discussions, with more or less high political overtones, and epistemic 
questions are left in the background, leaving the question about the nature, the 
warrants, and thus the limits of what one knows as the result of learning science or 





Yet, the consequences for the educational process of this oversight cannot be 
lightly dismissed, since students’ epistemic beliefs have been related to key 
components of the learning process such as comprehension (Schommer, 1990), 
strategic processing (Davis, 2003; Kardash & Howell, 2000), interpretation of 
controversial issues (Kardash & Scholes, 1996), evaluation of arguments (Stanovich 
& West, 1997), and understanding of multiple texts (Bråten, 2008; Bråten, & 
Strømsø, 2006).  In addition, research found that teachers’ beliefs about knowing and 
learning specific subject matters influence teachers’ pedagogical choices and the kind 
of discourse they foster in their classrooms (Maggioni & Parkinson, 2008).  
Considered together, these results point to the role that the answers to the questions 
that opened this chapter play in the ability of individuals to critically evaluate and 
profit from the flow of information and ideas they encounter in the classroom, but, 
more generally, in their daily lives. 
Thus, for educational psychologists, it becomes important to understand how 
teachers and learners navigate the epistemic terrain, in the current sociocultural 
landscape.  Specifically, what do teachers and students mean when they say that they 
know something?  How do they conceptualize the relation between the knower and 
the object of knowledge?  How do they form their conceptions about knowledge?  In 
other words, educational psychologists are interested in epistemic cognition (i.e., in 
the processes in which people engage in order to consider the criteria, limits, and 
certainty of knowing; Kitchener, 1983) and in epistemic beliefs (i.e., in the ideas that 





Building mainly on the work of Perry (1970), the study of epistemic cognition 
historically has followed two main paths.  On one hand, research has focused on 
tracing the development of epistemic cognition across the life span, with particular 
attention reserved to the passage from adolescence to adulthood (King & Kitchener, 
2002; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002).  In effect, researchers following this path have 
studied the processes activated as individuals face complex, ill-structured problems 
(i.e., problems not solvable by the direct application of an algorithm).  Based on the 
processes that emerged during the engagement with such ill-structured problems, 
researchers developed definitions of epistemic cognition and individuated the featurs 
characterizing different stages of epistemic development.    
Kitchener’s (1983) definition has been alluded to.  Focusing mainly on the 
characteristics of the knower, she defined epistemic cognition as a level of cognition 
at which individuals consider the limits, the certainty, and the criteria of knowing.  By 
comparison, Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) specifically considered the coordination of 
the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing.  Building on the latter approach, 
Hofer (2004) forwarded a conception of epistemic cognition as a metacognitive 
process that influences learning and knowledge building.  As such, epistemic 
cognition stays in a dynamic relation with the learning environment, that comprises 
the teacher-student relationship, the specific task at hand, and, more generally, th  
academic setting. 
On the other hand, researchers following the second path have strived to 
individuate precise relations between particular sets of students’ beliefs and specific, 





personal epistemology and on the role that it plays in cognition.  In their work, they 
referred to the construct of personal epistemology, testing the hypothesis that it could 
be represented as “a system of more or less independent beliefs” (Schommer-Aikins, 
2002, p. 104) regarding the stability, structure, and source of knowledge and aspects 
of learning, such as speed and control of knowledge acquisition.  Researchers also 
explored the consistency of these components across different student populations 
(Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002).    
The next step in this line of research consisted in the investigation of relations 
between specific epistemic beliefs and particular learning outcomes.  For example, 
researchers investigated whether students who believed that learning occurred quickly 
or not at all tended to differ in terms of GPA from students who believed that learning 
was a gradual process (Schommer, 1993; Schommer & Dunnell, 1994).  More 
generally, researchers studied relations between the facets of personal pistemology, 
identified through the analysis of questionnaires, and significant learning outcomes, 
such as students learning strategies, comprehension of complex text (Schommer, 
Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992) and student ability to solve ill-structured problems (Schraw, 
Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995). 
 Clarifications 
Before proceeding, a couple of clarifications may be helpful.  The first regards 
the issue about the domain-general or domain-specific nature of epistemic cognition 
and epistemic beliefs.  Although I believe that studying these constructs within a 
specific domain facilitates their investigation, I do not intend to imply that people do 





knowledge in general.  Yet, the investigation of the relation between domain-general 
and domain-specific epistemic cognition is not the focus of this study, although I 
believe it can address very interesting research questions.  I discuss the rationales for 
my preference for studying epistemic cognition and epistemic beliefs in thedomain of 
history in the next section, in the context of the purpose of this study.      
A second note about terminology may also be useful.  The term epistemic 
cognition has already been defined as the cognitive process in which people engage 
while considering the nature and the justification of knowledge.  Thus, it suggests 
something that people do when they are prompted to reflect on the nature of what 
they regard as knowledge and on the warrants for calling these ideas about the world 
knowledge.  According to Kitchener (1983), this process is activated when 
individuals are faced by a problem that cannot be solved by the simple application of 
an algorithm.    
I will instead use the term epistemic stance to refer to the system of beliefs 
about the nature and justification of knowledge that people entertain at a certain 
moment in time.  I conceive this stance as a sort of “epistemic gaze” (or epistemic 
attitude) that characterizes the way in which people look at the world (the external, 
physical reality, themselves, or ideas) in order to gain knowledge.  From this 
perspective, the relation between epistemic cognition and epistemic stance appears a 
dynamic relation.  On one hand, current epistemic stances may influence the kind of 
processes activated once people are prompted to consider the nature and warrants of 
what they know.  On the other hand, the way in which people wrestle with epistemic 





Epistemological beliefs is another term widely used in the literature and 
encompasses different beliefs about knowledge and learning.  Even if I agree with 
Hofer’s (2004, p. 47) remark that the term epistemic beliefs would better reflect the 
beliefs investigated (i.e., beliefs about knowledge and not about epistemology), in 
referring to results of specific studies, I maintain the terminology originally used by 
the investigators.  In this way, the theoretical framework of the research project 
included in the review should be more transparent and the correspondence between 
original studies and the contributions summarized in the review more accurate.  In 
addition, whenever possible, I try to specify the content of the beliefs investigated n 
the studies.   In this way, I hope to facilitate corroboration across the investigations 
considered in the review. 
Purpose of the Study 
Both paths of research in epistemic cognition and epistemic beliefs have 
suggested the existence of a relation between epistemic beliefs, epistemic cognition, 
and learning.  Both traditions have also supported the hypothesis that formal 
instruction plays a role in epistemic development (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002).  
However, the investigation of how specific beliefs mature and epistemic cognition 
develops has been far from systematic, even though a clearer understanding of these 
processes seems crucial for the design of educational interventions aiming t 
facilitating meaningful and successful learning.    
In 2002, summarizing future challenges for research on personal 
epistemology, Paul Pintrich addressed this issue, pointing to the need of studies 





“epistemological development is a function of both internal psychological mechanism 
as well as contextual facilitators and constraints” (2002, p. 403).  The relationship 
between teachers and students is core to the educational process and the locus in 
which individual characteristics interact and create a powerful context that affec s in 
turn its participants (Létourneau & Moisan, 2004; Rosenzweig, 2000).  Hence, 
focusing attention on these interactions and trying to understand the processes at work 
seems a promising strategy to further the exploration of what affects epistemic 
development and, in turn, of what is affected by it.  In other words, I believe it is 
important to explore whether and how, in schools, students are learning not only a set 
of contents but also a way of thinking about the nature and the process of knowing, 
knowing that regards both the world and themselves.    
This focus on the teacher/student interaction does not discount the influences 
that other agents and the culture at large may have on the development of students’ 
belief systems (Alexander & Dochy, 1995; Khine, 2008; Maggioni, Riconscente, & 
Alexander, 2006; Tabak & Weinstock, 2008).  However, by centering the attention on 
the relation between teachers and students that takes place in the classroom, this 
investigation acknowledges the effects that schooling has repeatedly shown to exert 
on cognitive development in general and on epistemic development in particular 
(Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993; King & Kitchener, 2002; Kuhn & Weinstock, 
2002; Paulsen & Wells, 1998; Perry, 1970).  I also believe that this focus on the 
teacher/student relationship may foster a deeper understanding of the process of 





contribute to bridging the lamented gap between educational research and 
pedagogical practice (Schraw, 2001).    
A survey of the literature showed that very little research directly addresses 
the relation between teachers’ and students’ epistemic stances and teachers’ and 
students’ epistemic cognition.  Further, while students’ beliefs have been repeatedly 
studied within various theoretical frameworks (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002), teachers’ 
epistemic stances have been more rarely addressed.  Therefore, in select g th  
articles to review for this study, I principally referred to the potential of the research 
to shed light on some facets of the processes that link teachers’ epistemic stances to 
students’ learning outcomes.    
The review of the literature highlighted that researchers are still struggling 
with theoretical and methodological problems in the study of epistemic cognition and 
epistemic beliefs in school settings.  Given their complexity, the operationalization of 
epistemological constructs has proven difficult, leaving many issues of validity nd 
generalizability open to debate (Wood & Kardash, 2002).  Yet, the review of the 
literature also individuated a set of qualitative studies that provide rich descriptions of 
teachers’ and students’ reasoning about knowledge and knowing in specific domains, 
exemplifying how epistemic cognition can manifest itself during the learning process 
(e.g., Elby, 2001; Lyons, 1990; Radigan, 2002; Rosenberg, Hammer, & Phelan, 2006; 
VanSledright, 2002, Wineburg, 2001a).    
Studies on expertise have also furthered my understanding of epistemic 
reasoning within specific domains, offering insights into the characteristics of 





the relation between an expert knower and its object of knowledge (Alexander, 2003; 
Stevens, Wineburg, Herrenkohl, & Bell, 2005; Wineburg, 2001c).  In particular, 
studies on the development of expertise indicate that differences in epistemic 
reasoning and epistemic beliefs characterize different levels of expertise in a specific 
field, such as those found among students, K-12 teachers, and scientists or historians 
(Blanco & Niaz, 1997; Brickhouse, 1990; Radigan, 2002; Wineburg, 1991; Yeager & 
Davis, 1996).  Thus, by nesting the study of epistemic cognition and epistemic beliefs 
within a specific discipline, I intend to profit from the insights provided by these 
bodies of knowledge about the characteristics of these constructs, the description of 
their development, and the modality of their potential influence on the teaching and 
learning processes. 
Beside the review of the literature, another set of reasons made the decision to 
study the role of epistemic cognition and epistemic beliefs in teaching and le rning 
within a specific domain particularly reasonable and appealing to me.  The first 
relates to the instance that, at least in the Western tradition, knowledge has been 
organized in disciplines, each of them dealing with a particular object, and following 
a specific method (Maggioni & Alexander, in press).  Although disciplinary 
boundaries currently tend to be perceived as fuzzy and borders between disciplines 
are often blurred, differences in the methods and in the standards of justifications still 
characterize different areas of knowledge (VanSledright & Limon, 2006).  The use of 
these methods and the reference to these standards of justification may suggest how 
experts’ epistemic cognition looks like in a specific field, serve as useful indicators of 





The second reason is grounded in the acknowledgment that classroom work is 
articulated within specific subject areas, with specialization increasing in the higher 
grades.  In other words, the knowledge that students develop in schools tends to be 
referred to specific subjects, such as science, literature, mathematics, or history.  
Thus, it seems plausible to hypothesize that the encounter with problems potentially 
eliciting epistemic cognition in the academic world also happens within specific 
disciplinary fields and is shaped by their particular characteristics (i.e., inv stigating 
the past poses epistemic challenges that, in some measure, differ from those posed by 
the investigation of the physical reality).  Although the relation between academic 
disciplines and school subjects has been discussed in the educational literature and 
deemed problematic (VanSledright & Limon, 2006), the influence of the subject 
matter on the processes of teaching and learning has also been acknowledged by a 
large body of educational research in the past decades (Schwab, 1978; Shulman, 
1987) and inspired cognitive psychologists to study the development of cognition 
within specific domains (Alexander, 2000).  Researchers have also found that 
students’ epistemic beliefs tend to differ across domains (Buehl, Alexander, & 
Murphy, 2002; Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006). 
The Case for History 
Although the specific choice of history for this study was initially prompted 
by a personal interest in this discipline, there are several reasons that make history an 
especially appealing domain for furthering understanding of epistemic cognition and 
epistemic beliefs.  From a research perspective, there is a potentially helpful 





historically, as suggested by the literature on historical thinking (Lee & Shemilt, 
2003; VanSledright, 2002; Wineburg, 2001a).  Among other attitudes, historical 
thinking requires people to be aware of the nature of history, to generate historical 
arguments based on the evidence available, and to evaluate the strength of such 
arguments.  To parallel Kitchener’s definition of epistemic cognition, we may say that 
historical thinking necessarily includes the processes in which people engage in order
to consider the criteria necessary to generate and evaluate historical arguments, the 
limits of historical knowledge, and the certainty of that knowledge.    
As such, historical thinking can be conceived as a valid descriptor of 
epistemic cognition within the specific domain of history, with the additional benefit 
that results of qualitative studies done within this domain have offered an articulated 
depiction of it (Wineburg, 2001a).  This contribution is particularly remarkable, 
especially when considering the problems of validity lamented by epistemological 
researchers.  Specifically, corroboration of the findings supports the emergence of a 
few consistent historical thinking traits, an occurrence that counterweights the low 
generalizability deriving from the mainly qualitative nature of this research.  In 
addition, research on the development of historical thinking in Great Britain further 
sharpened the understanding of how historical thinking develops across different 
levels of expertise (Lee, 2004).  This research supported the evidence provided by 
qualitative studies and involved a large number of elementary and middle school 
students.  Thus, it increased confidence in its potential generalizability. 
In terms of its educational implication, furthering understanding of what 





especially crucial, since a few history educators actually contend that opening to 
students the possibility to understand and experience how historical knowledge is 
generated is a necessary step in enabling them to develop a critical attitude, 
fundamental in a democratic society (Wineburg, 2007).  Some also contend that this 
work is necessary if students are to move beyond getting familiar with some for  of 
collective memory and develop an understanding of the past that takes into account 
all its complexities, nuances, and dissonances (Lee, 2004; Létourneau & Moisan, 
2004; Seixas, 2000; VanSledright, 2002). 
In addition, some of the materials and tasks included in current history 
curricula may have a particular potential for eliciting discussion of epistemic issues 
and consideration of how knowledge is generated and thus for fostering that kind of 
critical literacy necessary to gain understanding within information-rich contexts.  As 
suggested by extant research, several components that characterize reading expertise 
in history are also at the core of that process that makes possible the building of 
meaningful knowledge out of the multiplicity of sources increasingly available by 
advances in information technology (Rouet, Britt, Mason, & Perfetti, 1996; 
Shanahan, 2009; VanSledright, 2004).  Thus, history may provide a particularly apt 
domain for gaining useful insights about how well equipped are students to navigate 
this terrain.     
For example, History Advanced Placement Exams contain a Document Based 
Question (DBQ) that asks students to take a position on a particular historical issue 
based on documents provided and using knowledge of the historical context.  This 





focus on how historical sources are analyzed and evaluated in order to build historical 
arguments, an endeavor that is epistemic in nature, since it considers how historical 
knowledge is generated and the warrants for historical claims.  Increasingly, chool 
systems are pushing for increasing the number of students taking AP courses (Uy, 
2009); in order to put as many students as possible in the position to attend such 
courses, they are thus promoting the inclusion in the lower grades of goals that may 
prepare students to read, analyze, and evaluate sources.  
Responding in part to this trend, textbooks are increasingly adding primary 
sources, and perspectives that may differ from the one adopted by the main narratve 
(e.g., women, different ethnic groups).  They are also introducing personal stories that 
may illustrate a specific topic.  Though the traditional view of American history as 
the narrative of expanding liberties is not challenged and the voices of textbooks’ 
authors are still concealed behind the tone of impersonal, factual narratives 
(VanSledright, 2008), textbooks are usually embedding different kinds of texts, such 
as pictures, newspapers’ excerpts, broadsides, personal diaries, letters, maps, and 
graphic representations of data related to the topics addressed (Afflerbach & 
VanSledright, 2001). 
This particular text structure constitutes a relevant challenge in terms of 
reading comprehension, because students would need to move from an approach to 
the textbook as a single text to a reading that considers its parts as multiple tex s that 
need to be integrated by the reader (Afflerbach & VanSledright, 2001), a feat that is 
clearly not facilitated by the fact that these additional features are usually not referred 





concept of the relation between a text and a reader that has a strong epistemic 
connotation, too.  For example, does the text simply convey an objective state of 
affairs or does it argue for a certain view of the past? The answer to this question sets 
different reading goals and thus makes the use of certain strategies (e. ., 
summarizing, repeating, analyzing, or elaborating) more or less adaptive for th task 
so envisioned. 
In fact, research on reading multiple texts suggests that beliefs about 
knowledge and knowing play a particularly important role in the strategies readers 
use for processing the texts (especially with regard to elaboration and monitoring 
strategies), in their standards for understanding, and in the level of understanding they 
are able to achieve (Bråten, 2008; Hofer, 2004; Muis, 2007; Ryan, 1984).  Similarly, 
the literature on historical thinking documents that understanding of concepts central
to the development of historical knowledge (e.g., evidence) and familiarity with the 
procedures employed by historical investigators to research and interpret the past 
(e.g., contextualization, sourcing, and corroboration) are crucial in achieving 
understanding from the reading of multiple texts in history (Hynd, Holschuh, & 
Hubbard, 2004).  In turn, these concepts and procedures presuppose particular 
epistemological ideas regarding the nature of historical knowledge and how its 
knowledge claims may be justified (Lee & Shemilt, 2003; VanSledright, 2002; 
Wineburg, 2001a). 
Does the introduction of tasks such as the DBQ, the use of textbooks with a 
variety of embedded historical texts, and, more generally, the consideration of 





view historical knowledge?  A review of the literature does not provide a clear-cut 
answer to this question, although it does caution from assuming the effectiveness of 
“teacher-proof” curricular intervention (Pajares & Graham, 1998).  In particular, 
research suggests that teachers’ beliefs influence their specific pedagogical moves, 
which, in turn, tend to influence students’ epistemic views of history (Bain, 2000, 
2005; Husbands, Kitson, & Pendry, 2003; Lee & Ashby, 2000; Lee & Shemilt, 2003; 
Maggioni, VanSledright, & Reddy, 2009; VanSledright, 2002).   
Research also indicates that effective teaching practices require the 
involvement of students in knowledge-building activities, accompanied by explicit 
reflection on the reasons for the actions performed and the results obtained, reflection 
guided by the teacher and supporting epistemic awareness (McRobbie & Thomas, 
2001; McNeal, 1995; Ryder, Leach & Driver, 1999; Simpson & Rush, 2003).  
Further, it suggests that the work necessary to affect students’ beliefs is very subtle 
and necessitates time, repeated exposure, and modeling of the kind of epistemic 
reasoning that the teacher strives to foster (Dagher, Brickhouse, Shipman, & Letts, 
2004; Elby, 2001; Windschitl & Andre, 1998).   
Yet, studies reporting success in fostering student epistemic development in 
the United States have mostly focused on classes taught by teachers who were 
atypical in many respects (e.g., Bain, 2000, 2005; VanSledright, 2002).  Besides 
bringing to the classroom a wealth of content and pedagogical knowledge, these 
teachers also espoused the clear goal of fostering epistemic development in th ir 





systems, where history curricula and pacing guides tend to embody the push for 
“coverage” more than an understanding of the nature of historical knowledge.   
As a result, I believe that our knowledge of the processes that foster the 
development of certain epistemic stances in teachers and in students in general and 
within the history domain in particular is still limited.  More precisely, we know little 
about how the daily interactions that take place in the history classroom contribute to 
foster or hinder epistemic development in history, and about how teachers’ epistemic 
stances interact with students’ epistemic stances in promoting or hindering historical 
thinking for individual students. 
Previous studies tended to investigate only specific facets of history-specific 
epistemic beliefs and of students’ and teachers’ ability to think historically, leaving 
the processes that may concur to the development of these constructs unchartered, for 
the most part.  This study aims to enrich the description of these constructs and of the 
processes that, within the classroom context, may contribute to their development.  In 
so doing, I hope that an increased understanding of students’ and teachers’ ability to 
think historically and of their epistemic beliefs in regard to history together with a 
sharpened awareness of what can influence them may help making informed 
pedagogical choices in the history classrooms, in teachers’ education and professional 
development programs, and in curriculum development.    
Focus of the Study 
The study focuses on exploring the students’ and teachers’ epistemic beliefs in 
history and their ability to think historically.  My interest in these constructs is 





be one of its fundamental components, namely criticism.  With this term I refer to the
attitude of examining what one has received from others (e.g., parents, teachers, 
community) as a viable hypothesis for understanding oneself, the world, and one’s 
place in it in order to verify whether one is justified to believe it.  While I certainly 
find it irrational to ask each generation to reinvent the wheel, I also believe that 
handing over an interpretation of the world without providing at the same time the 
tools to evaluate it falls short of educating free human beings.  Especially in 
democratic societies, where key decisions (e.g., electing the government and voting in 
a jury) are entrusted into the hands of the citizens, the social implications of such 
failure are vast, threatening the root of that very freedom that those societies vowed to 
protect.   
I believe that the capacity to think historically and a familiarity with the 
criteria used by historians to develop and evaluate historical knowledge can greatly
contribute to such education in criticism.  Understanding how the history classroom 
can foster such development is therefore particularly important.  For this reason, this 
study pays particular attention to teachers’ pedagogical moves that may influence 
students’ epistemic stances and concur to the development of students’ historical 
thinking.  With the term pedagogical moves, I refer to all those acts and attitudes that 
inform the teachers’ relationship with the students.  In particular, I include those 
pedagogical choices that teachers purposefully make to reach particular goals and 
also those acts that do not imply metacognitive awareness or explicitly stated purpose 





influence of teachers’ goals and teachers’ interest, and the relation between teachers’ 
epistemic stances and teachers’ goals. 
The choice to focus on high-school history classrooms is related, in part, to 
the desire to extend to this age group the exploration of history-specific epistemic 
beliefs and of the progression in historical thinking traced by Lee and his colleagues 
for the younger students participating in the Project Chata (7-14 years old).  
Compared to their younger counterparts, adolescents should be better equipped to 
handle the challenges that thinking historically entails (Foster, Hoge, & Rosch, 1999; 
Lee & Ashby, 2000; Lee & Shemilt, 2003; Levstik & Barton, 1996; Thornton & 
Vukelich, 1988).  For example, their capacity to consider multiple points of views and 
to empathize with experiences different from their own should increase with their age 
(Lee, Dickinson, & Ashby, 1997; VanSledright, 2001).  Their increased capacity to 
think abstractly should also facilitate the development of secondary substantive 
concepts (i.e, government, revolution) and thus foster a more efficient structuring of 
historical knowledge (Alexander, 2003).  In addition, the choice of this age-group is 
also motivated by a commitment of the specific school system in which I ran the 
study to encourage the use and the analysis of primary sources in the curriculum and 
to support their teachers with professional development specifically targeting this 
objective.  This occurrence offered a promising setting for the emergence of 
epistemological questions and for the development of historical thinking.  Further 





Research Questions    
The study addresses the following research questions, with reference to 
teachers and students in three high-school history classrooms: 
• How do teachers and students conceptualize the relation between historical 
knowledge and the past? 
• What do teachers and students mean when they say that they know 
something about the past? 
• How do teachers and students justify that they know something about the 
past? 
• How do teachers’ epistemic stances affect their pedagogical moves? 
• How do teachers’ epistemic stances affect their goals? 
• How do teachers’ goals and interest affect their pedagogical moves? 
• What teacher pedagogical moves seem to affect student historical thinking 
and epistemic beliefs? 
• What student attitudes and responses seem to affect teacher pedagogical 
moves and epistemic stances? 
Theoretical Model    
The aspects of the theoretical model investigated by the study are summarized 
in Figure 1.  In this section, I offer a definition of these elements; the description of 
how I assessed them is included in Chapter 3.   
Teacher and Student History-specific Epistemic Stances   
Epistemic stances refer to the system of beliefs about the nature and 












































    Figure 1: Aspects of the theoretical model investigated in the study. 
 
moment in time.  In other words, I use this term to identify a particular set of domain-
specific epistemic beliefs.    
Teacher Interest    
Teacher interest in history is defined as personal engagement in history related
activities.  These activities include participation in acts or events appealing to the 
general public and also participation in acts or events involving the professional 





Teacher Goals   
Teacher goals comprise general educational goals (e.g., fostering student 
analysis skills) and specific goals in teaching history (e.g., fostering co textualization 
of historical events).   
Teacher and Student Historical Thinking   
Historical thinking encompasses a set of disciplinary heuristics and attitudes 
that individuals use in the process of generating historical knowledge.  It includes the 
processes in which individuals engage in order to consider the criteria necessary to 
generate and evaluate historical arguments, the limits of historical knowledge, and the 
certainty of that knowledge.  As such, it represents the enactment of epistemic 
cognition (i.e., the cognitive processes in which individuals engage while considering 
the nature and justification of knowledge) in the history domain.    
Teacher Pedagogical Moves and Student Attitudes and Responses 
The space enclosed within the double arrow symbolizes the processes taking 
place within the classroom that may concur to explain the relation between teacher 
epistemic stances and historical thinking and student epistemic stances and historical 
thinking and their changes during the course of a semester.  I am using the term 
“moves” to indicate the choices and the decisions that teachers made in respect to th  
teaching of history; thus, I am using these terms interchangeably.  I symbolize the 
process with a double arrow because I hypothesize that teachers’ pedagogical m ves 
influence student ability to think historically and the development of domain-specific 
epistemic beliefs; I also hypothesize that feedback from students contribute o the 





analyzes empirical studies that address one or more of the relations posited in the 







REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
Following the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 1, this chapter reviews 
empirical studies investigating epistemic cognition in teaching and learning.  Studies 
were grouped into four main sections, each exploring a specific relation hypthesized 
in the theoretical model.  Within each section, studies concerning the history domain 
and studies nested in other domains are grouped in two different subsections.  Each 
section addresses several critical questions.  First, are the results of studies reported in 
the educational literature compatible with the relation hypothesized?  Do these 
findings suggest any plausible process that may help to explain the relations 
observed?  What do these constructs and their relations look like within the history 
domain? 
The first section considers studies examining the relation between teachers’ 
beliefs about knowledge and knowing (in general and in the specific discipline 
taught) and pedagogical moves (preferred and implemented).  Within this section, I 
also included a few studies that investigated factors that may influence the formation 
of teachers’ beliefs and their pedagogical preferences.  The second section
summarizes the contributions of studies examining the relations between teachers’ 
pedagogical moves and students’ epistemic beliefs.  The third consists of studies
exploring the relation between students’ epistemic beliefs and learning outcomes.  
Finally, the last section considers research projects that investigated the relation 
between teachers’ pedagogical moves targeting epistemic cognition and students’ 





Four tables summarizing the studies included in each section may be found at the end 
of Chapter 2.  
Initially, I identified studies through three online databases (PsycINFO, ERIC, 
and Education Abstract).  Searched keywords included epistem* beliefs, epistemic 
cognition, student* and epistemic cognition, teacher* and epistemic cognition, 
student* and epistem* beliefs, teacher* and epistem* beliefs, student* and teacher* 
and epistem* beliefs, “teacher* epistem* beliefs and teaching, historical th nking, and 
history teaching.  I examined the abstracts to identify studies relevant to the topic; I 
also reviewed the reference sections of the selected articles to identify further studies.  
Finally, I conducted an additional search of the aforementioned databases to identify
additional articles published by researchers whose studies closely addresse  the 
questions explored by this review.  I also used the review of cognitive research in 
history and geography included in the Handbook of Education Psychology to 
individuate additional studies (VanSledright & Limon, 2006).  
Given the diversity of the literature included in the review, it is important to 
note that some works targeted only one of the relation illustrated in the model, whil  
others attempted to capture the entire process, from teachers’ beliefs to student ’ 
outcomes.  The designs of these research projects were also diverse, including several 
examples of qualitative research as well as some experimental and quasi-experim ntal 
studies.  For the most part, these investigations were carried out in naturalistic 
settings, being sometimes nested in intervention monitoring activities (Miflin, 





Some of the referenced studies targeted beliefs about learning as well  
beliefs about knowledge.  The distinction between epistemic beliefs and beliefs about 
learning has been debated in the literature, especially with regard to the factor 
structure emerging from data obtained from questionnaires such as the 
Epistemological Questionnaire (Schommer, 1990), the Beliefs About Knowledge and 
Learning (Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993), and the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory 
(Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995).  In particular, the epistemic nature of beliefs 
about the speed of learning and about the fixed or developing character of the ability 
to learn has been repeatedly challenged.  
For the sake of clarity, since this review targets epistemic cognition, its main 
interest lays with beliefs about the nature, representation, and justification of 
knowledge.  These beliefs would be considered fully epistemic by most researchers 
(Hofer, 2008; Muis, 2004).  Nevertheless, I also included results regarding the 
relation between beliefs about learning and students’ outcomes whenever these 
beliefs had been investigated together with beliefs about the nature of knowledge.  
Yet, I tried to clearly identify which beliefs were related to particular outcomes.  For 
the same reason, I indicated what measures were used in the various studies to tap 
epistemological beliefs, since different questionnaires target different dimensions of 
personal epistemology.  A complete review of different frameworks and general 
issues related to the study of epistemic cognition and epistemic beliefs exceeds the 






Teachers’ Epistemic Stances―Teachers’ Pedagogical Moves 
         Figure 2: Aspects of the theoretical model addressed in this section 
Contributions from Various Domains 
The influence that the epistemic stance of teachers has on instruction was 
addressed by all the studies summarized in Table 2.1.  For the most part, studies 
addressing teachers’ epistemic stances are nested in specific discipline , with a 
decisive preponderance in the sciences.  Such a pattern underscores the importance of 
considering the domain-specific component of epistemic beliefs.  In general, results 
stress the close relation between teachers’ beliefs about the nature and the process of 
knowing and the teaching strategies implemented in the classroom (e.g., Brickhouse, 
1990; Hashweh, 1996; Zohar, Degani, & Vaaknin, 2001).  The terminology used to 
identify a particular set of beliefs varies across studies, even if the descriptions are 
often overlapping.  Some researchers, for example, have adopted a constructivist 
versus empiricist (or positivist) classification (Hashweh, 1996; Tsai, 2006). 















































learner in the construction of knowledge, acknowledgment of the need of conceptual 
change and knowledge restructuring, and stress of the role of theory in the purpose 
and development of science.  Empiricist beliefs underscored the need of 
reinforcement in learning and a view of scientific knowledge as objective, permanent, 
and consisting in the accumulation of discovered facts.  
Other researchers contrasted perspectives reflecting the philosophical postion 
of Kuhn and Lakatos to views more consistent with logical positivism and logical 
empiricism (Brickhouse, 1990).  In this case, the researchers focused on teachers’ 
characterizations of scientific theories.  Teachers consistent with the first 
philosophical perspective tended to conceive theories as tools to solve problems, 
viewed the scientific progress as theory-driven, and believed that scientific progress 
consisted more in changes in theories than in accumulation of facts.  On the other 
hand, teachers consistent with the second philosophical perspective tended to describe 
theories as truth uncovered through rigorous experimentation, viewed the scientific 
process as purely inductive, and considered the progress in science mainly as the 
accumulation of facts.   
Finally, other researchers cast the difference in epistemic beliefs among 
teachers in terms of viewing learning and teaching as a transmission or a construction 
of knowledge (Zohar, Degani, & Vaaknin, 2001).  Given such variety, I have tried to 
go beyond the label of the beliefs investigated and to refer, as much as possible, to the 
content of the beliefs described by the various studies.  In so doing, I aim at 





Assessment methods varied similarly, ranging from paper-and-pencil 
measures of epistemic beliefs (Hashweh, 1996) to extensive observations and analysis
of interview protocols (Brickhouse, 1990) and self-case studies (Elby, 2001).  These 
differences notwithstanding, the studies identified a consistent relation between 
clusters of particular beliefs and particular teaching practices.  
For example, based on responses to an interview probing syntactical 
knowledge of science, Brickhouse (1990) purposefully selected three pre-college 
science teachers for her study.  The selection was intended to highlight differences 
among the participants.  Two of the participants were teaching at the middle-school 
level, while one was a high-school teacher.  Further, two participants had a long 
history in teaching, while one, even if of comparable age, was only in his second year 
of teaching.  Teachers were observed for an extensive period and repeatedly 
interviewed.  
The Brickhouse (1990) study showed that conceiving theories as tools to solve 
problems, viewing the scientific process as theory-driven, and believing that scientific 
progress consists more in changes in theories than in accumulation of facts correlated 
with a problem-based teaching approach, centrality of prediction in experimental 
activities, and continuous reinterpretation of laws and concepts previously 
encountered.  These practices, in turn, fostered the integration of knowledge among 
students.  Conversely, conceiving of theories as truth uncovered through rigorous 
experimentation, viewing the scientific process as purely inductive, and consideri g 
the progress in science mainly as the accumulation of facts correlated with teaching 





potentially contradicting religious beliefs (e.g., evolution), stress of procedural 
precision in experimental activities, and scarce attention given to the integration of 
knowledge.  
Moreover, the teacher expressing the “theories as tools” beliefs and 
implementing the correlated methods had the strongest academic preparation in 
science and had been teaching at the high-school level.  Therefore, she coupled her 
beliefs about the nature of science with a stronger content knowledge of the discipline 
and a different teaching environment.  Given the nature of the study, the possible 
impact of these factors on her epistemic beliefs and pedagogical movescannot be 
known.  
Teachers’ beliefs also influenced their interpretation and consequent respons  
to students’ “wrong answers.”  For example, Hashweh (1996) found that teachers 
holding constructivist beliefs (described as beliefs emphasizing the activerole of 
learners, the role of theory, and the need for knowledge restructuring) tended to be 
more sensitive in detecting the presence of alternative conceptions in students’ 
answers than teachers holding empiricist beliefs (characterized as belief in the need 
of reinforcement in learning and a view of knowledge as objective, permanent, and 
cumulative of discovered facts).  Constructivist teachers were therefore more likely to 
address the misconceptions, facilitating the overall integration of knowledge.  They 
also tended to use a wider array of teaching strategies, such as refutation (se f 
counterexamples or anomalies), persuasion (using representations aiming at 
convincing the student), and solicitation of further questioning.  Empiricist teachers 





Brickhouse (1990) also had noted that teachers who viewed scientific progress 
as purely inductive tended to interpret students’ “wrong answers” as procedural 
failings, and reacted by encouraging students to follow directions better in order to 
obtain the “right answers.”  Conversely, constructivist teachers in Hashweh’s (1996) 
study tended to be more sensitive to the presence of misconceptions and responded to 
them with multiple and more effective teaching strategies.  
It is also interesting to note a further implication of teachers’ beliefs emerged 
from the Hashweh’s (1996) study.  The responses of four teachers, two classified as 
constructivists and two classified as empiricists, were compared.  Interestingly, both 
the academic background and instructional contexts of these teachers differed.  In 
particular, one constructivist teacher held a bachelor’s in science while the other 
graduated from a two-year college-level teacher training institute.  Further, even 
though both were teaching at the high-school level, a private school in Jerusalem 
employed one of them, while the other was teaching in a Palestinian refugee camp.  
The same was true for the empiricist teachers.  The comparison of their 
responses did not support the hypothesis that their academic backgrounds or their 
instructional contexts were responsible for their teaching strategies.  Rather, the 
difference in their beliefs seemed to account for the different pedagogicl moves they 
made.  The limited number of cases in the Hashweh’s study restricts generalizations.  
In fact, other studies have suggested a correlation between teachers’ disciplinary 
knowledge and their teaching strategies (Gillaspie & Davis, 1998).  Moreover, in 





paper-and-pencil instrument, consisting of both open-ended and closed-ended 
questions.  There were no direct observations of teachers’ behavior in the classroom.  
 Influences of teachers’ beliefs about teaching and learning were also found 
to correlate with the characteristics of the writing programs implemented for fifth 
graders (Lipson, Mosenthal, Daniels, & Woodside-Jiron, 2000).  In particular, 
teachers who tended to view students as recipients of instruction and gave more 
centrality to the curriculum than to individual children’s needs also tended to move 
all students through the phases of writing at the same time, operated within a more
rigid timeframe, and kept a tighter control over topic selection.  Writing was 
conceived as a separate period, and students were expected to complete relatively 
short assignments within the timeframe set by the teacher.  These teach rs strongly 
underscored the phases of the writing process (e.g., drafting or editing), focused often 
on the mechanics of writing (grammar), but provided little guidance about how to 
improve writing.  They also tended to teach writing as a preparation for the futur .  
Teachers who tended to agree with an interactionist view of learning (i.e., a 
view that considers the active participation of the students to the various phases of 
instruction fundamental) accorded a greater centrality to the children in the learning 
process, tended to involve the students in authentic and more varied writing practices, 
organized the writing process in a more flexible and recursive fashion, and 
acknowledged greater ownership to the students on their own writing process.  
Explicit instruction on how to improve particular aspects of writing was provided 





constituted the core of the instructional program.  Peer revision and peer conferences 
were also encouraged.  
Unfortunately, a detailed description of the beliefs tested by Lipson et al. 
(2000) was not provided; references were made only to an unpublished manuscript.  It 
is difficult, therefore, to evaluate the epistemic nature of the beliefs investigated by 
the study.  Nevertheless, given the centrality and cross-disciplinary nature of w iting 
in schooling, this study offers important insights for further inquiry. 
Zohar, Degani, and Vaaknin (2001) focused their research on the influence 
that teachers’ beliefs about learning have on the inclusion (or exclusion) of low-
achieving students in learning activities targeting higher-order thinking.  Zohar et al. 
(2001) found that many of the high-school and junior-high teachers participating in 
their study believed that higher-order thinking was inappropriate for low-achieving 
students.  The teachers perceived the cognitive demands of these tasks above these 
students’ capabilities.  This view correlated to a view of learning as linear and 
sequential, following a hierarchical path in which complex understanding could occur 
only after accumulation and mastering of prerequisite learning.  Conceiving lear ing 
as a progression from more simple, lower-order cognitive tasks, to higher-order 
thinking tended to imply the setting of different instructional goals for low and high 
achievers.  These results may offer further elements for a critical consideration of 
practices such as tracking.  Unfortunately, Zohar et al. also found that the 
participation in professional development classes did not influence teachers’ practices 
toward low-achievers, since that participation failed to challenge beli fs about 





In the domain of physics, Elby (2001) offered a powerful example of how 
epistemic cognition development can be directly targeted by a teacher who lists it as a 
preeminent goal of instruction.  In this case, the researcher is simultaneously the 
teacher of two physics classes.  Elby defined epistemological beliefs as the “views 
about what it means to learn and understand physics” (p. 54).  In particular, he tried to 
develop in the students a view of physics as a connected web of ideas, and of learning
physics as a process aiming at “relating fundamental concepts to problem-solving 
techniques” (p. 54).  
To reach this goal, Elby embedded epistemological lessons, such as Einstein’s 
view that science is the refinement of everyday thinking, within the labs, problems, 
and class discussions designed to foster conceptual development.  He carefully chose 
and sequenced both the experiments and the follow-up reflections on the experience 
to push students’ epistemic thinking, continuously challenging the students to 
reconcile their intuitions with their conceptual understanding.  He was also ready to 
capitalize on students’ reactions to foster both conceptual and epistemic reasoning.  
Elby also pointed out that the role of the instructor, especially during the follow-up 
discussions, was extensive.  
Further, the focus on epistemic development required that all aspects of 
instruction, from the choice and sequence of materials and learning experiences, to 
homework and evaluation formats, were informed by such perspective and carefully 
planned.  For example, homework often included questions fostering reflection about 
learning.  In order to encourage personal and honest reflection, Elby’s grading was 





students’ responses.  To encourage a true engagement with the material, Elby handed 
out detailed solutions of the homework.  Mini-quiz and comprehensive tests evaluated 
conceptual understanding.  
Finally, Elby noted that, in order to be successful, the implementation of the 
plan required the active and watchful presence of the teacher throughout all the steps 
and the building of a classroom climate in which reflection about learning was as 
nurtured and praised as conceptual understanding.  This open commitment to 
epistemic development provided the rationale for accepting inevitable trade-offs in 
terms of student learning outcomes.  Content coverage was in fact reduced and 
students’ final school-based exam had to be adjusted. 
Focusing on History 
Because epistemic cognition presumably varies with the degree of individual 
expertise in a particular domain (Alexander, 2003; Wineburg, 1991), it is likely that 
knowledge of the specific subject-matter also affects the instructional choices made 
by teachers.  One example is provided by Gillaspie and Davis (1998).  The 
researchers asked three elementary student teachers to read a series ofaccounts about 
the bombing of Hiroshima and to write a historical narrative about the event.  Primary 
and secondary sources were provided.  Students’ think aloud protocols, together with 
their compositions, were examined to infer the ability of these prospective teachers to 
think historically.  
The historical narratives of two student teachers did not refer to any of the
sources provided, and even if the think-aloud protocols registered an emotional 





evaluated.  The narrative of the third student teacher reflected his awareness of a 
conflict among the accounts, but no evaluation criteria emerged.  In the end, the 
narrative referred only to those sources that better fit the student’s conclusi s.  After 
completion of the task, these prospective teachers were asked whether they would 
have used source documents in their own teaching and how.  They referred to the 
different perspectives afforded by the plurality of sources and to their emotional 
impact; two strategies that per se do not foster an awareness in pupils of the nature of 
historical narratives nor the development of criteria for dealing with historical 
evidence. 
A similar study focused on three secondary social studies student teachers 
(Bohan & Davis, Jr., 1998).  Also in this case, multiple sources dealing with the 
dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima were used.  The relations between student 
teachers’ reading of historical sources, their writing of a historical narrative based on 
the documents, and their ideas about how to use this material in the classroom are 
similar to what Gillaspie and Davis found (1998).  Only one of the student teacher, 
Rebecca, used heuristics aiming at identifying the author’s perspective and the 
general historical context, paying attention to nuances in language and integrati g her 
background knowledge.  Acknowledging that the sources offered different points of 
view, Rebecca concluded that she could use the documents in class to discuss 
historical judgment.  It is important to note that Rebecca was the only student teacher 
in the study who reported to have used primary sources in her history class and wrote 
research papers based on these documents.  Compared with the other teachers 





The other two participants, Alexa and Julie, did not pay attention to issues of 
perspective and context, limiting themselves at summarizing the information provided 
in the historical sources and expressing their agreement or disagreement with the 
point of view conveyed by the documents.  Thus, they tended to build a two-sided 
view of the events surrounding the dropping of the bomb, but were unable to go 
beyond the dichotomy.  Although their reading of the documents was similar in many 
respects, their written narrative differed.  Alexa wrote a persuasive essay, advocating 
her own point of view and implicitly referring to sources that could support it.  Julie
chose not to commit herself to any side, even if she implied that there was a true story 
to be known.  Both essays lacked explicit reference to and discussion of the evidence 
provided by the sources.  Yet, both Alexa and Julie concluded that they would use the 
documents to show that there can be different sides to a story and that students should 
be encouraged to form their own opinions.   
In contrast, the interpretive nature of history and the use of disciplinary tools, 
such as sourcing, corroboration, and evaluation of reliability of evidence, were at the 
very core of VanSledright’s (2002) teaching to a fifth-grade class.  This study, in 
which the teacher and the researcher were the same person, affords a rich desciption 
of how beliefs drive pedagogical choices.  Convinced of the power of thinking 
historically, VanSledright questioned the nature of historical accounts with his 
students.  He involved the children in historical investigations, which provided the 
occasion to experience some of the problems that historians face in their inquiries 
about the past.  His use of a variety of sources highlighting different perspectives of 





narrative about the past and teaching, at the same time, heuristics useful to construct 
arguments based on evidence.  
The preference accorded to group work and the way in which children were 
occasionally assigned to particular roles aimed at the same goals.  For exampl , 
students who seemed unable to consider the British point of view during the 
Revolutionary War were assigned the role of journalists for a British newspaper.  The 
same rationale supported the choice of sacrificing some breadth in coverage in ord r 
to provide the time for exposing students to the process of historical investigation.  
Such clarity of intentions did not dispel the tension coming from time constraints, 
although it supplied pedagogical consistency to the educational intervention.  During 
whole class discussions, as on a more individual level throughout the group work, the 
role of the teacher remained fundamental in fostering epistemic awareness and the 
development of historical thinking, challenging the students to accept the discomfort 
of uncertainty without giving into helpless suspicion.  Finally, assessment was 
construed to test students’ progression in the ability to think historically. 
Building on a similar view of history as a unique way of knowing the world 
through a process of inquiry shared by a community of professionals, Bain (2000, 
2005) designed a series of activities explicitly targeting students’ beliefs about the 
nature of history, and challenging the traditional view of history as a bundle of past 
facts.  For example, high-school students were asked to write an account of their first 
day of school and read it aloud.  The discussion that followed underscored the great 
variance in terms of details chosen and perspective adopted and provided the teacher 





developed linguistic tools (in this particular case, he introduced the use of the terms 
history-as-event and history-as-account) to assist students’ thinking.  He used the  
terms regularly, convinced that changing habits of thinking requires repeated 
exposure. 
In terms of general planning, Bain organized the curriculum around 
meaningful historical problems.  Then, he used a variety of materials and techniques 
to foster learning of history and of historical thinking, underscoring the indivisible 
nature of these processes.  In his class, there was space for primary and secondary 
sources, textbooks, lecturing, and individual and group work.  The overarching goal 
of involving students in the study of historical problems while teaching them how to 
manage the task generated a broad array of pedagogical tools that supported students’
learning.   
Bain used journal writing to make student thinking as visible as possible and 
encouraged their questioning.  However, he went beyond the usual KWL (what do 
you know, what do you want to know, what did you learn) prompting students to 
assess how new evidence and accounts supported, extended, or contested their 
previous understanding of the historical event investigated.  He also introduced the 
students to the vocabulary shared by the professional community.  Issues of evidenc , 
significance, validity, and form of accounts were examined through journal writing, 
readings, and class discussion.  
Throughout the year, students were also asked to create narratives from the 
events recalled in the units of study, to externalize their initial thoughts and 





monitor their own thinking by keeping journals.  The classroom environment 
supported students’ work providing a forum for discussion and exchange and letting 
students experience the complexities of historical thinking by making each one of
them responsible for the employment of a particular heuristic (e.g., sourcing, 
perspective, corroboration of evidence, and reliability).  
Yet, one may object that VanSledright and Bain are not typical history 
teachers.  They are both professional history educators, with degrees in history, and 
extensive teaching experience.  Would teachers with more limited academic and 
professional background suggest similar relations between epistemic stances and 
pedagogical choices?  An exploratory study of how high school teachers think about 
historical text offered a further glimpse into the relation between teachers’ vi ws of 
history and their planned pedagogical approaches (Yeager & Davis, 1996).  
Replicating Wineburg’s (1991) study on the reading of historical texts by novices and 
experts, the researchers found that Meredith, a teacher who tended to conceive history 
as constructed, approached the documents looking for the author’s voice.  Similarly to 
the historians in Wineburg’s study, Meredith looked for author’s perspective, context 
in which the document originated, audience, and nuances in language.  She repeatedly 
spoke about how she would use those documents in her classroom to foster historical 
thinking, encouraging students to pay attention to details and context, to compare and 
contrast different sources, and to be sensitive to instances of bias even when 
embedded in the seemingly objective tone of textbooks.  
In contrast, Julie, who tended to view history as a “story to be brought to life” 





attention, clear, and entertaining.  In examining the comments made by Julie while 
she was reading the documents provided, the researchers found little evidence that 
she was using any of the heuristics typical of expertise.  For example, Julie’s
dismissal of the textbook was motivated by its lack of “soap-opera-ish” appeal ( . 
157);  yet, she perceived it as the source reporting “fact, fact, fact, just tells you what 
happened” (p. 157), and concluded that she would use the textbook as a reliable tool 
to supply facts and information, adding more spicy sources to enliven the narrative.  
Like Julie, Jordan seemed to locate historical knowledge directly in the 
sources.  However, while Julie was looking for appeal, Jordan focused on accuracy.  
Pedagogically, this view prompted an emphasis on the analysis of historical text in 
order to identify what information was “correct” and what information was not (p. 
159).  In addition, Jordan tended to define context as an outline of events relevant for 
the documents to be provided to students in order to facilitate understanding.  Yet, he 
did not consider contextual factors during his own reading of the documents.  Jordan 
was aware that sources have a specific point of view, but he seemed to understand the 
issue of perspective in term of ability of taking sides.  In the end, believing that 
analyzing historical documents was a task too difficult for his students, and that it 
would have required too much time, he concluded that teaching historical thinking 
was impractical. 
The conclusions one can draw from this study are tempered by the fact that 
teachers were only prompted to talk about the pedagogical use of historical 
documents and not observed during their work in the classrooms.  However, the 





and Davis (1998) studies, as in a few other projects summarized in a recent review of 
cognitive research in history (VanSledright & Limon, 2006).  Considered together, 
these studies indicate that the influence of teachers’ epistemic stances on th ir goals 
and their teaching may actually be pervasive.   
The same trend emerges also from the multiple case studies research 
conducted in Britain by Husbands, Kitson, and Pendry (2003), although the view of 
history that seems to prevail among these British teachers differs from the one 
surfacing from studies of their American colleagues.  For their studies, Husbands and 
his colleagues selected eight heads of history departments in British high schools.  
The research tried to capture the relation between teachers’ classroom skills, teachers’ 
knowledge, and pedagogy. Even if teachers’ epistemic cognition was not an explicit 
focus of the study, it emerged as a dimension of subject knowledge, influencing not 
only what pedagogical approaches were chosen, but also the way in which specific 
instructional strategies were used in the classrooms.  For example, a few techers 
demonstrated a broad, well integrated web of content and procedural knowledge, 
encompassed by a view of history as “setting questions, finding out, coming across 
the problems of methodology, patterns being thrown up that then raise finding out 
more” (p. 71).  When observed teaching their students, the use of documents  
was not sterile ‘source work’; there was no hunting out and shooting 
down of bias, nor meaningless questions about reliability and 
usefulness. While the sources of evidence used by the teachers and 
pupils were often interrogated in these terms – What does this show 
us? Why does it show us that? What doesn’t it show us? – this was in 
the context of a real historical question. ‘Doing history’ was the focus 






At the same time, different goals seemed to drive different lessons.  
Sometimes teachers focused on developing historical understanding; other times their 
objective regarded a particular life skill, such as understanding films as source  of 
evidence, or a curricular driven goal.  Choice of particular material also took into 
account students’ interest and classroom dynamics.  However, similarly to what was 
reported in the VanSledright’s and Bain’s studies, teachers’ understanding of the 
nature of history and, thus, what they wanted their students to understand, profoundly 
influenced goals and choice of resources and activities (Husbands et al., 2003, p.93).  
In contrast to the British findings, a large United States survey examining the 
impact of web-based historical sources on the use of primary sources in the classroom 
suggested that “doing source work” mainly consisted in using these sources to 
support the narrative provided by the textbook or some other scholarship.  Teachers’ 
responses indicated that primary sources were mainly used to identifying key 
individuals, events, or ideas, comparing and contrasting details across multiple 
sources, detecting and evaluating bias, distortion, or propaganda, and providing a 
sense of the conditions of the period under study (Hicks, Doolittle, & Lee, 2004, p. 
224-225).  Teachers also indicated that primary sources were used to engage in 
historical interpretation.  However, fewer than half of the respondents indicated th t 
sources were interrogated based on the context in which they were generated.  This 
study did not directly assessed teachers’ views about the nature of history.  Yet, the 
purposes indicated by the teachers in using primary sources in the classroom, seem to 
suggest that they viewed history (or at least school-history) as something contained in 





Other Beliefs Influencing Teachers’ Pedagogical Moves 
The correlational nature of the studies reviewed so far does not support claims 
of causality and suggests the search for other factors that may explain the observed 
relations.  In other words, beliefs that are not epistemic in nature may contribute or 
compete with teachers’ epistemic beliefs in prompting particular pedagogic l 
decisions.  For this reason, I believe that it might be useful to look at those studies
that investigated what kind of beliefs may favor the adoption of particular 
instructional strategies.  For research purposes, considering the possible role played 
by other beliefs in the choice of specific pedagogical approaches may help us to 
identify the unique role played by teachers’ epistemic beliefs.  Further, a b tter 
understanding of beliefs particularly influential on teachers’ practice may also 
provide useful suggestions for the design of effective teachers’ education programs.  
The study of Pajares and Graham (1998) provides an example of an attitude 
that can strongly interfere with teachers’ beliefs and their preferencs for certain 
pedagogical choices.  Twenty-seven middle-school language arts teachers were 
shown a hypothetical student’s free verse poem.  They were asked how they would 
respond to a student who wanted to know whether they liked the poem and whether 
the poem was good.  During the interview, teachers were also invited to express their 
judgment on the writer’s work freely.  Even if teachers mentioned that they would 
engage in some form of instruction about the craft of poetry, the most prominent 
belief emerging was that “a teacher must always respond positively” (p. 860). 
Independently of their beliefs about the epistemic status of poetry, the concern most 





positive reinforcements or nurturing self-confidence).  Pajares and Graham named the 
“proclivity of individuals to turn the findings of research into formal principles” 
formalism, and observed that, in so doing, people develop beliefs that become rigidly 
applicable, independent of any context considerations.  
Teachers also expressed the beliefs that “criticism is the enemy of creativity,” 
“evaluative questions should be redirected to the students,” “students’ work should, 
above all, be praised and encouraged,” and that “poetry is a relative enterprise that 
cannot be evaluated.”  Only rarely did teachers provide a more contextualized 
response, taking into consideration the particular student involved and the existing 
relationship with the teacher.  Moreover, they never considered the possibility that 
caring for the well-being of the student might entail grounding the teaching 
conversation on mutual trusts and truth, together with providing strategies that may 
foster the development of actual subject-matter expertise in the student.  
Are the formal principles expressed by these teachers aspects of a more 
general, albeit tacit, epistemic thinking?  Although more research is needed to answer 
this question, it seems that, taken at face value, these statements portray a way of 
thinking in which arguments do not need to be supported by evidence.  In this respect, 
they reveal a specific stance in respect to some aspects of epistemic thinking a d, as 
such, may increase our understanding of the relation between teachers’ beliefs and 
teaching strategies.  
Another important aspect that can potentially affect the relation between 
teachers’ beliefs and teaching strategies implemented in the classroom is highlighted 





experienced reading teacher, was selected for a first study in 1991, as she was 
teaching third grade.  She also agreed to participate in a follow-up study eight y ars 
later, as a seventh-grade reading teacher.  While her overall beliefs about reading did 
not change and her instruction was, for the most part, consistent with her beliefs in a 
reader-centered approach in which learning occurred mainly through induction, her 
pedagogy changed when she had to prepare her students for state-mandated tests.  
In this case, teaching became teacher-generated, mainly deductive, and 
instruction of specific skills took the place of the holistic approach that better 
reflected the participant’s espoused beliefs.  Another occurrence that challenged the 
participant was the different environment she encountered in the middle school.  A 
general focus on the subject matter, perceived as independent of the learners, and the 
more crystallized reading habits of her students fostered a sense of disconnection with 
the junior-high environment.  These challenges notwithstanding, Deb did not change 
her basic approach, maintaining a high degree of consistency with her beliefs, but 
developed a sense of isolation from her colleagues; a factor that might affect teachers 
with different personalities or beliefs’ structure. 
The influence of classroom and teacher characteristics on teachers’ beliefs and 
practices was investigated in a study involving early elementary teachers (Buchanan, 
Burts, Bidner, White, & Charlesworth, 1998).  Participants (277 first, second, and 
third grade teachers) responded to a survey developed following the guidelines for 
appropriate teaching practices stated by the National Association for the Education of 
Young Children (NAEYC).  According to the NAEYC, learning is facilitated by 





development and learning, individual children’s strengths, interests, and needs, 
together with the social and cultural context in which students live.  Even if the 
NAEYC guidelines do not pose a stark dichotomy between child-initiated and 
teacher-directed practices, they generally support child-initiated and hands-on 
activities, giving space to teacher-directed activities mainly in response t  
individuals’ needs.  
The researchers found an overall positive correlation between teachers’ beli f  
and teachers’ practices.  Regression analysis also found that both class characteristics 
and teacher characteristics predicted, albeit in small measure, the practices employed.  
In particular, the number of children on free lunches and higher number of children 
per class predicted developmentally inappropriate practices, while gradlevel and 
presence of children with disability in the classroom predicted developmentally 
appropriate practices (with first grade teachers scoring higher than the other teachers).  
Among teacher variables, the amount of influence teachers believed they had on 
planning and implementation of the curriculum most strongly predicted 
developmentally appropriate beliefs and low scores on developmentally inappropriate 
practices.  
The preliminary nature of the study and in particular some measurement 
problems (e.g., low variance captured) do not allow strong claims about the relations 
identified.  The definition of developmentally appropriate and inappropriate beliefs 
and practice reflected in the survey also invite some caution.  Nevertheless, the 





beliefs and practices within the broader web of relations in which they develop and 
are enacted. 
Another important factor in influencing teacher pedagogical choices is 
highlighted by Gudmundsdottir and Shulman (1987) in a study comparing an expert 
and a novice social studies teacher.  Their findings suggest a close relation between 
the degree in which teachers are able to blend knowledge of content, knowledge of 
learners, and knowledge of curriculum and the pedagogical choices they make.  This 
“blend” constitutes what Shulman defined pedagogical content knowledge (1986).  In 
particular, Harry, the expert teacher, was well aware that different stories could be 
emphasized.  Using his extensive content knowledge, he was thus able to organize his 
classes around the story he chose to privilege, choosing the strategies that b st fit his 
objectives, while remaining fully aware of the drawbacks of his decisions. 
Chris, his novice colleague, lacked the ability to weight potentials and 
drawbacks of different curricular and pedagogical choices and often relied on the
organization of the subject matter proposed in the textbook to organize his classes.  
Both teachers seemed to be aware of the epistemic status of the discipline they taught, 
but, in addition to his extensive teaching expertise, Harry happened to teach the 
subject he also knew as a scholar.  On the contrary, Chris was teaching, for the m s  
part, topics that were out of his area of academic expertise.  This factor makes it 
difficult to disentangle the possible influence of teacher epistemic stances on their 
pedagogical moves and, more generally, to draw conclusions about the relative role 






A few studies (Bain, 2000, 2005; Elby’s, 2001; Husbands et al., 2003; 
VanSledright’s, 2002) highlight that teaching is a complex and holistic process, in 
which teacher epistemic commitment plays a pivotal role.  In other words, teachers’ 
epistemic stances provided meaning and justification to pedagogical moves and 
informed how selected instructional strategies were implemented in the classroom.  
Was this still the case when teacher epistemic commitment was less ov rt and 
epistemic development was not openly included among the goals of instruction?  
Even if the nature and the modest number of participants in the studies reviewed so 
far do not allow for generalization, their findings are not incompatible with this 
hypothesis. 
In fact, teacher epistemic stance influenced, for example, preference for 
problem-based or memorization of results approach (Brickhouse, 1990), choice of 
content (Brickhouse, 1990), interpretation of students’ responses (Hashweh, 1996), 
justification for the use of primary sources in the teaching of history (Bohan & Davis, 
1998; Gillaspie & Davis, 1998; Yeager & Davis, 1996), and goal setting for low 
versus high-achieving students (Zohar et al., 2001).  In my view, the broad character 
of the pedagogical moves that were found to correlate with teachers’ beliefs about 
knowledge and learning support the hypothesis that teachers’ epistemic stances m y 
act as catalysts, driving teacher decisions in terms of goal setting and purposes 
pursued through the implementation of specific instructional strategies (Husbands et 





It is also interesting to note that teachers who seemed to view evidence as 
granting direct access to the past, or equated it to disembodied information, tended to 
use primary sources to support and enrich a given narrative.  When conflict among 
sources arose, they tended to build polarized narratives, and indicated that they would 
leave students free to form their own opinion.  From an epistemic point of view, this 
relation is noteworthy, because it suggests that what appears in teachers as a pre-
reflective epistemic stance (in Kitchener’s model) tends to foster pedagogic l moves 
that typify quasi-reflective stances.  Within the history domain, this relation is 
understandable.  If historical evidence is conceived as a characteristic of the s urc  
and not as the results of a dialogue between the investigator and the remnants of the 
past, conflict among sources is not solvable.  Appealing to the authority of an 
established narrative or “bailing out” and leave the choice to the students would be, 
within this stance, two equally plausible options.  I will return to this point in the third 
section of this review, examining the models of progression in historical thinking 
offered in the literature. 
Teachers’ Pedagogical Choices―Students’ Epistemic Stances 
Contributions from Various Domains  
The adoption of specific teaching strategies is usually justified with reference 
to specific goals and students’ outcomes that those approaches tend to foster (Burden, 
& Byrd, 1999; Wiggins & McTighe, 1998).  Studies that investigate these latter 
relations are summarized in the next section.  A number of individual and social 
mediators and moderators can be hypothesized to affect the relation between 





in the literature (Alexander, 2003; Bandura,1997; Bronfenbrenner, 1989; Eccles, 
Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998; Kuklinski & Weinstein, 2001; Pajares, 1996; Pintrich, 
Marx, & Boyle, 1993; Wentzel, 1998). In line with the topic of this review, this 
section highlights those research projects that studied the relation between teachers’ 
pedagogical moves and changes in students’ epistemic stances. 
                    Figure 3: Aspects of the theoretical model addressed in this section 
  By establishing this focus, I do not wish to imply that student beliefs are the 
only moderator or mediator affecting the relation between teachers’ pedagogic l 
moves and students’ learning outcome.  Other individual and social variables surely 
merit careful consideration, but they exceed the purpose of the present review.  In this 
section, I focus therefore on the relation between teaching strategies and students’ 
epistemic stances, using results from a variety of studies that did not necessarily have 













































Windschitl and Andre (1998) studied the effects on conceptual change of an 
instructional strategy reflecting the theoretical views of cognitive constructivism 
(Cobb, 1994).  According to this view, individual experiences and personal reflection 
on these experiences prompt a unique construction of knowledge within the 
individual.  Focusing on 250 college students enrolled in a human anatomy and 
physiology survey course, Windschitl and Andre (1998) found an interesting 
interaction effect between students’ epistemological beliefs and the mod of 
instruction.  All students participated in a recitation class.  During the laboratory 
hours, students in the experimental group were exposed to computer-based simulation 
exercises dealing with the cardio-vascular system.  A set of hypothetical cases 
targeting the most common misconceptions was presented to the students, who had 
the opportunity to formulate and test their predictions.  The intervention of the 
instructor was minimal.  Students in the control group also used the computer 
simulations, but in this case they were asked to follow detailed procedures that guided 
them to the desired answers. 
Students’ epistemological beliefs were assessed at the beginning of the 
intervention using the 63-items of Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire (SEQ) 
(Schommer, 1990).  An index of student epistemological beliefs was created by 
calculating the mean value of the 12 subset means.  This variable was entered in a 
regression equation after controlling for pretest score on a knowledge measure, 
recitation instructor, and group (experimental or control).  The interaction effect
between group and epistemological beliefs was significant.  Main effect for 





classified as more epistemologically sophisticated, according to Schommer’s 
measure, performed better in the exploratory condition, while students with less 
sophisticated beliefs performed more poorly in such condition.  The reverse was true 
in the control condition.  
Schommer’s questionnaire taps dimensions of epistemological beliefs such as 
the simplicity (vs. complexity) of knowledge, quick learning (vs. learning over time), 
certainty of knowledge (vs. knowledge as context-dependent), and deterministic 
innate ability (vs. ability to learn how to learn).  It includes, therefore, dimensions 
related to the view of the learning process, which more intuitively should correlate 
with the facilitating effect of determinate learning settings.  It would have been 
interesting to know which dimensions were more responsible for the interaction and 
whether student epistemological beliefs (and not only conceptual change) were 
affected by the experimental condition.  Unfortunately, the design and analysis of the 
study do not offer this information.  Other problems linked to this particular measure 
are discussed in the next section and have been addressed also in the literature (Wood 
& Kardash, 2002). 
Nevertheless, Windschitl and Andre’s (1998) study opens interesting avenues 
for further research by reaffirming the centrality and uniqueness of the individual 
student in the learning process.  In other words, these results show that there is no 
pedagogical approach, be it constructivist or not, that “fits all.”  It would be almost 
ironic if, in the attempt to foster an aspect of development so deeply engrained and 





from a content-centered to a strategy-centered approach, discounting the realiy of 
individual students’ current beliefs.   
Jehng and his colleagues (1993) investigated how different learning 
environments affect epistemic development.  They studied the epistemological beliefs 
of undergraduate and graduate students in four different majors: engineering and 
natural sciences, business, social science, and arts and humanities.  The researchers 
developed an epistemology scale based on Schommer’s (1990) and Spiro’s (1989) 
measures.  Confirmatory factor analysis showed compatibility with a five-factor 
structure of epistemological beliefs measured by the scale (certainty of knowledge, 
omniscient authority, orderly process, innate ability, and quick learning).  
The investigators found that graduate students had significantly higher scores 
than undergraduates on the three dimensions that are more strictly epistemic in nature 
(i.e., certainty of knowledge, omniscient authority, and orderly process).  Similarly, 
students in so-called “soft fields,” such as the social science and the arts/humanities, 
also scored higher than students in “hard fields,” such as engineering/natural science  
and business.  Both comparisons did not show significant differences for the two 
learning components of the measure (i.e., nnate ability and quick learning).  
Even if the correlational nature of the study does not permit establishing 
causality or direction between epistemic development and learning environment, it is 
possible that the more open-ended instructional setting of graduate courses, in which 
contrasting viewpoints are often presented and discussed, favors epistemic 





with the greater exposure to ill-structured problems may also foster a perception of 
knowledge as less certain and less structured.  
Another study involving 290 college students majoring in different fields 
partially supported the aforementioned hypothesis (Paulsen & Wells, 1998).  The 
researchers used the 63-items SEQ and, through a series of regressions, studied the 
contribution of gender, age, grade level, GPA, and domain of study to the variance 
across the four dimensions identified by Schommer’s questionnaire (i.e., fixed ability,
simple knowledge, quick learning, and certain knowledge).  With respect to the 
current topic, Paulsen and Wells found that students majoring in soft fields were less 
likely to hold naïve beliefs about the certainty of knowledge.  Even if results go in the 
expected direction, they invite some caution, since scores were calculated on the 
untested assumption that a four-factor solution was compatible with the data. 
Two of the studies mentioned in the previous sections assessed the change in 
students’ beliefs following instruction explicitly targeting epistemic development.  
Elby (2001) used two different epistemological assessments, the Maryland Physics 
Expectations Survey (MPEX), developed by Redish, Saul, and Steinberg (1998) and 
the Epistemological Beliefs Assessment for Physical Science (EBAPS), developed by 
White and her colleagues (1999).  The MPEX measures both epistemological beliefs 
about knowledge and students’ expectations about the course, while the EBAPS 
assesses epistemology alone.  
The dimensions probed by the MPEX and the EBAPS partially overlap, since 
both instruments targeted the structure of knowledge (i.e., physics as a collection of 





information or as construction of understanding), and real-life applicability (i.e., 
physics as connected to the lives outside the classroom).  MPEX further explored 
mathematic integration (i.e., math equations as disconnected tools or as descriptors of 
conceptual relations), conceptual nature of physics (i.e., physics as a series of 
formulas or as a system of concepts), and effort (i.e., effort as conducive to success in 
the class).  EBAPS further investigated evolving knowledge (i.e., physics knowledge 
as more tentative than settled), and the source of ability to learn (i.e., learning s more 
a matter of fixed ability or of effort coupled with effective strategies). 
The changes detected by both measures suggested that an explicit focus on 
epistemology can affect students’ beliefs.  This remained true both in honor classes 
and in slower-paced courses.  Without direct targeting epistemic development, 
previous studies of interventions employing research-based, reform-oriented curricula 
showed gains in learning, but no overall change in students’ beliefs (Redish et al., 
1998).  Interestingly, students did not manifest equal gains on all the dimensions 
explored by the EBAPS.  The scores increased more on those dimensions that were 
directly targeted by curricular intervention, supporting the claim of the resea chers 
that epistemic concerns should be infused in the curriculum in order to affect 
students’ beliefs.  
The influence of teachers’ pedagogy on young learners is explored in a case 
study by McNeal (1995).  The researcher observed Jamey as he transitioned from a 
second grade, experimental inquiry-based mathematic class to a third grade textbook-
based class.  Teachers’ beliefs about the nature of mathematics and the learning





Implied beliefs appear sometimes more evidently from the transcripts of classroom’s 
interactions.  
In his second grade class, Jamey engaged in mathematical activity framed “as 
the construction of relationships among personally real mathematical objects,” where 
solutions were “validated by the community of learners as a whole, rather than by the 
teacher or the textbook” (McNeal, 1995, p. 209).  Students developed various 
algorithms to solve problems that did not necessarily follow the traditional procedures 
suggested by most textbooks.  These alternative constructions tended to be quite 
stable in time, and most importantly for the purpose of this review, they underscored 
a view of mathematics as a tool that “ought to make sense” (p. 212).  
In third grade, the understanding of mathematical procedures became the 
focus of instruction.  Understanding was stressed by the use of several strategies (e.g., 
manipulation of objects or problem solving).  However, the interactions between 
teachers and students deeply changed.  Over and over again, the teachers direct d the 
children to the “right” procedures, in order to avoid mistakes.  The focus was not so 
much on the problem to be solved, but on the recall of steps decided by an external 
authority.  The evaluation of children’s work privileged the number of problems 
attempted in a certain time, discouraging persistence in understanding.  Further, the 
children’s questions tended to address the requirements of the assignment more than 
the mathematical content of problems.  The dialogues between the teacher and the 
students, strongly teacher-centered and teacher-directed, also discouraged the 





Students quickly shifted to a new kind of interaction and their goal also 
shifted; from the solution of the problem at hand, to the search for the teacher’s 
expected answer. Even if this was not the intention of the teacher, Jamey’s beliefs of 
mathematics also shifted, and after eight weeks in third grade, mathematics had 
become something that, at least in school, had more to do with remembering and 
following procedures than something that had to make sense.  In this case, his 
achievement was also negatively affected, even if this does not always have to be the 
case.  If mathematics does not have to make sense at school, children might even 
perform well, not out of understanding, but in recognition of authority. 
Does epistemic development always require the sort of holistic commitment 
exemplified in the previous studies?  Harry Shipman was a professor teaching a non-
major astronomy course and an advocate for reforming undergraduate science 
education in the direction of becoming more demanding in terms of understanding.  
He wanted to ascertain whether his instruction met the goal of teaching about the 
nature of science (Brickhouse, Dagher, Shipman, & Letts, 2002).  The course served a 
large number of students (n=340) and so the prevalent teaching approach was the 
traditional lecture.  However, to stimulate students’ thinking, the professor used small 
group work during class and several of the assignments and test questions demanded 
extensive writing.  
To investigate the effectiveness of his teaching, the professor asked for the 
help of a research team that interviewed a sample of students’ representative of the 
different educational majors three times and examined students’ responses to 





students’ learning (i.e., the nature of evidence, the relation between science and 
religion, and the nature of theories).  
The study found that students’ views differed markedly across topics.  For 
example, almost all the students failed to recognize gravity as a theory and talked 
about it only in terms of force or law.  Perceived as a mere “fact,” the students did not
feel the need to provide any justification for their belief in it.  In the case of evolution, 
the students were able to distinguish between the explanatory purpose of the theory 
and the evidence it provides, citing some evidence in support of it, but at the same 
time casting the issue mostly in terms of personal opinions.  In contrast, student  
justified beliefs in terms of evidence in the case of the Big Bang.  Nevertheless, this 
was the theory that left the students more doubtful, with the most common reason for 
their skepticism being the indirect nature of the evidence.  Students tended to find 
biology claims more credible than astronomy claims, since the first dealt with 
tangible objects, while astronomical observations were mediated and limited by he
available technology.  Interestingly, no student mentioned microbiology. 
Overall, the Brickhouse et al. (2002) study underscored that students’ 
understanding deeply varies across contexts, suggesting that challenging the do matic 
view of science with respect to specific domains is not enough to foster epistemic 
shifts.  In this case, it is actually possible that students concluded that knowledge in 
that particular domain was not as certain as that produced in other fields, without 
feeling challenged in their general epistemic assumptions.  
In a further analysis of data coming from this study and focusing more 





Brickhouse, Shipman, and Letts (2004) found that the moderate changes observed for 
some of the students’ representations were insufficient to claim the occurrence of 
major epistemic shifts.  Reflecting on the course curricula in the light of the data 
collected through the interviews, they concluded that a more explicit discussion of 
words like “law,” “theory,” and “proof” would have been desirable, since students’ 
use of these terms revealed deeply entrenched misconceptions.  In addition, even 
when students perceived the tentativeness of theories, they tended to ascribe such 
status to the lack of experimental evidence, and not to epistemic reasons (e.g., the 
nature of the inductive process).  
Finally, the results of Brickhouse et al. (2002) and Dagher et al. (2004) studies 
support the hypothesis that affecting students’ epistemic stances requires designing 
educational experiences that explicitly challenge students’ thinking across ontexts 
and over a sustained period of time; a goal perhaps at odds with the large class typic l 
of many introductory undergraduate courses.  Moreover, talking about 
epistemological issues may not be enough.  In fact, careful choice of reading 
assignments and the support given by the instructor during the lectures to the view 
that theories are explanations based on evidence were not enough to affect students’ 
beliefs.  
This hypothesis is further supported by a study of English undergraduate 
students’ images of science (Ryder, Leach, & Driver, 1999).  Researchers interviewed 
11 undergraduates while they were working on their final year research project, a 
work that involved students in original scientific research, usually for the first time.  





Researchers found that, during the course of the project, more students came to see 
knowledge claims as provable on empirical grounds or referred to the importance of a 
critical approach to experimentation in scientific work.  
Echoing findings of the Brickhouse et al. (2002) study, researchers observed a 
difference across different scientific fields.  In particular, only students from earth 
science raised the issue that knowledge claims can go beyond the data, thus making 
proof problematic.  The researchers interpreted this result as an indication that 
students’ image of science can better be characterized by a profile of images rather 
than as a single, coherent view.  Students also increasingly came to realize the role of 
theory in guiding the questions that scientists choose to investigate.  Moreover, the 
interviews highlighted that different kinds of research project differently affected 
students’ epistemic development.  For example, projects that required students to 
relate data to knowledge claims supported a greater development in epistemic 
reasoning than projects more focused on experimental techniques.  Among the 
triggers of epistemic reflection, students also mentioned discussions with lecturers 
about the history of science  
Outside the scientific domain, the role of teaching strategies in fostering 
epistemic cognition was investigated in a study focusing on the development of 
argumentative reasoning (Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997).  Researchers found that 
adults and adolescents who participated in five weeks of dyadic discussions about 
capital punishment increased, improved, on average, the quality of their reasoning 
about the issue, becoming increasingly more able to consider alternatives, providing 





of their thinking (their certainty or their conflict). Individuals who participated only in 
the pretest and posttest and individuals who were only asked to talk once on the 
phone about the issue and write a two-page statement on the topic following the 
conversation did not show improvement in thinking. 
The influence of the learning environment on students’ explaining and 
understanding of chemistry is illustrated by a case study involving twelfth graders 
(McRobbie, & Thomas, 2000).  Even if the researchers do not explicitly refer to 
epistemic change, the new curriculum introduced in the class focused on fostering 
reasoning in terms of theories and evidence, an important aspect of epistemic 
cognition.  
In this case study, the researchers collaborated with the teacher of a 12th grade 
chemistry class.  The goal was to change the learning environment from a teacher-
centered approach (e.g., based on extensive use of textbook and focused on 
completion of numeric problems and routine laboratory activities) to a place where 
students were encouraged to develop their own understanding.  In particular, students 
were encouraged to explain phenomena using a three-level model of explanation (i.e., 
descriptive or phenomenon-based level; empirical relational level; theory or model-
based level).  The teacher, who at the beginning of the intervention did not believe in 
the ability of the students to think at the level required by the new curriculum, also 
had to change the way in which she perceived her role, becoming both a learner and a 
model of the expected thinking. 
Experiments and instruction sheets were modified to foster the goals set and 





develop consensus based on evidence.  Quantitative and qualitative instruments 
monitored the intervention.  Results indicated that students perceived the increased 
focus on their thinking and understood the changed aim of the experiments (i.e., from 
proving theories developed by others to disproving students’ emerging theories).  
Students also acquired a discourse that enabled them to discuss different levels of 
explanation and increase their overall understanding.  
Unfortunately, from the results reported it is not easy to understand whether 
students perceived the change only at the level of their learning experience, or 
whether their view of chemistry changed, as well.  This may be a consequence of the 
theoretical framework of the study, emphasizing the social constructivist approach 
over the investigation of change in epistemic cognition.  In their interviews, students 
also stressed that the change generated some anxiety and confusion; they found it 
particularly problematic to be forced to decrease their reliance on the textbook and to 
live with the uncertainty fostered by the more open-ended approach.  These concerns 
echo the fifth graders in VanSledright’s (2002) class in their effort to build historical 
understanding and suggest the potentiality of this approach to foster epistemic 
development.  
It is also important to note that the trust between teacher and students 
developed during the previous years favored the receptivity to change in this 
chemistry classroom.  The centrality of trust is also highlighted within the very 
different context of a medical school (Miflin, Campbell, & Price, 1999, 2000).  In the 
Miflin et al. studies, the lack of a shared set of beliefs among teachers and student  





principle to that described in the previous study.  The researchers monitored the 
introduction of a problem-based, graduate entry course in a medical school and found 
that the teachers viewed the implementation of this strategy as a way to develop self-
directed, lifelong learners.  By contrast, the students perceived it as an inappropriate 
lack of guidance that, far from fostering self-direction, deprived the students from a 
proper introduction to the fundamental principle of the discipline, causing useless loss 
of time and energy.  An explicit sharing of the learning objectives with the students 
together with support, especially during the initial phases of the process, remains 
fundamental for the successful achievement of the learning goals. 
The importance of students’ epistemic stances in the learning process, and the 
need for teachers to be aware of them, is underscored also in a study by Hammer 
(1995).  In this case study, Hammer reversed the order of the relations investigated 
and considered how students’ beliefs, affecting learning outcomes (solution to a 
physics problem), influenced the teacher’s pedagogical choices.  Teacher epist mic 
stances, far from being absent from the process, were viewed as the lens through 
which students’ responses were perceived in the first place, and also as core 
influences on the teacher’s strategic decisions.  Therefore, Hammer’s study illustrates 
the importance of looking at what happens in the classroom as a circular, more than 
as a linear process, in which teacher and student beliefs interact and influence each 
other and the learning outcomes.  
Focusing on History 
In the history domain, studies focusing on the relation between teachers’ 





available studies tend to echo what has been found in other domains.  In 
VanSledright’s study (2002), eight fifth-graders, selected in such a way to represent a 
broad range of abilities within the class, served as informants.  An interview 
conducted prior to the beginning of the intervention investigated children’s epistemic 
stances about history.  In general, students expressed the view that history wa “what 
happened before what’s happening right now” (p. 114), with a majority of them 
adding the idea that history dealt only with important people and events.  For the most 
part, children had no idea about the work of historians, apart from some speculations 
about writing of books and record keeping.  When asked how historians arbitrate 
disputes about what happened in the past, the most prevalent answers suggested 
appealing to a majority vote or to an indisputable source like an encyclopedia.  Only a
couple of students referred to the possibility of combining different, even if 
incoherent, stories, or to follow one’s beliefs, once was exhausted the available 
evidence. 
The resilience of what VanSledright termed an “encyclopedia epistemology” 
(p. 76) surfaced again throughout the four months during which he taught this fifth-
grade class, prompting him to challenge it by focusing on the role of perspective in 
historical thinking.  Once challenged with conflicting sources, students seemed to 
abandon this initial reliance on an external authority to espouse the view that no 
account could be trust, a position indicative of an epistemology that still placed the 
truth of the historical account in some evidence “out there,” without recognizing the 
role of the historian in the individuation and evaluation of evidence.  Similiarly to the 





ascribed the tentativeness of scientific theories to the lack of experimental evidence, 
these fifth graders attributed historical indeterminacy to lack of factual information or 
to the deceitfulness of witnesses and not to the interpretive nature of history.   
When interviewed at the end of the intervention, students still defined history 
as what happened in the past, although they dropped the idea that it regarded only 
great events.  The greatest shift in their thinking regarded the role of the his orian, 
who was conceived as someone comparing and contrasting evidence emerging from 
various accounts and sorting among interpretations by weighting the evidence usd to
support historical arguments.  All students referred to the importance of looking at the 
source of the accounts and considering the perspective of the historical witnesses.  
Thus, they seemed to have espoused the view that historians follow some criteria in 
the generation of historical knowledge, even if the informants voiced the complex, 
hard, and sometimes inconclusive nature of this interpretive task.  
The detailed descriptions of students’ reactions to an investigative approach 
also highlight how differences in epistemic (and probably cognitive and motivational) 
stances affected the way in which students responded to the intellectual discomfort 
introduced by this method.  While some students took seriously the challenge of 
building arguments and involved themselves in passionate discussions about the 
reliability of the evidence used to back different interpretations, others transfo med 
what had been presented as “detective work” to the common “research project,” 
concentrating on finding the right answers to the questions asked, without doing any 
source work.  The explicit, continuous monitoring on the teacher part of these 





VanSledright’s intervention and influenced the planning of further instructional 
activities. 
As in Elby’s (2001) case, at the end of the study these fifth graders 
demonstrated a shift in their epistemic stances aligned to the goals of instruct on.  
Their young age and diverse academic abilities challenge the practice of postponing 
the consideration of epistemic issues to graduate studies, showing that children are 
capable of dealing with such issues if taught to do so.  How this change in thinking 
may influence students’ outcomes is discussed in the next section. 
Similarly, high-school students in Bain’s (2000) class also developed a view 
of history in which interpretation played a central role.  Yet, as a result, some students 
adopted a questioning stance that served them well in the investigation of the world 
around them, but some others embraced a cynical relativism that prevented a 
productive engagement with reality.  The data reported make speculating about what 
factors may prompt such different reactions very difficult. 
Summary 
An important indication emerging from these studies is that students’ 
epistemic changes probably require a holistic approach, sustained in time (Elby, 
2001; McNeal, 1995; VanSledright, 2002).  Differences in epistemological beliefs 
found in students majoring in different fields support this insight (Jehng et al., 1993; 
Paulsen & Wells, 1998).  Further, it seems that epistemic issues need to be explicitly 
discussed with students in order to foster epistemic change (Brickhouse at al., 2002; 





Yet, different students tended to respond differently to pedagogical 
approaches aiming at fostering epistemic development (Windschitl & Andre, 1998).  
Being able to monitor students’ epistemic stances becomes thus important to choose 
the intervention that best fit individual needs at a certain moment in time.  In terms of 
research design, these studies also suggest the need to control for other cognitive and 
motivational variables that may moderate the effect of teachers’ pedagogic l 
decisions. 
Finally, it appeared that unveiling the uncertain nature of knowledge does not 
suffice per se to move students toward a reflective epistemic stance (in Kitchener’s 
terms).  It seems that until students conceive knowledge as something directly 
springing forth from raw data, confrontation with the conflicting or insufficient nature 
of evidence tends to foster a cognitive helplessness and motivational disengagement 
(Bain, 2000; Dagher et al., 2004).  Providing students with criteria to evaluate 
evidence and build arguments based on such evidence appears to be critical; yet, 
students’ responses vary (VanSledright, 2002; Windschitl & Andre, 1998).  
Students’ Epistemic Stances ― Students’ Outcomes  
In this section, I review the results of studies examining the relation between 
students’ epistemic beliefs and students’ outcomes.  In some cases, this link 
constitutes the only focus of the identified study.  In other cases, the researchers 
examined this relation together with other phases of the teaching/learning process.  
Table 3 overviews these studies.  Are some epistemic beliefs actually more conducive 
to desirable learning outcomes?  Starting in the 1990s, several studies addressing this 





system.  Most of these researchers also used Schommer’s epistemological 
questionnaire or some modification of it.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to start hi  
section by examining this research framework.  The same instrument also served to 
explore what could affect students’ epistemological beliefs; a few studies a dressing 
this question were summarized in the previous section (e.g., Jehng et. al., 1993; 
Paulsen & Wells, 1998; Windschitl & Andre, 1998).  
          Figure 4. Aspects of the theoretical model addressed in this section 
The Research on Epistemological Beliefs 
The first major study within this line of research was reported in 1990 and 
tested two major hypotheses.  The first regarded the compatibility of a 
conceptualization of epistemological beliefs as a system of substantially independent 
beliefs with data collected from 263 college students.  The second hypothesis 
considered relations between epistemological beliefs and various aspects of students’ 
comprehension.  Based on a reinterpretation of the literature available at the time, 















































epistemological beliefs that she called simple knowledge (i.e., belief that knowledge is 
simple rather than complex), omniscient authority (i.e., belief that knowledge is 
handed down by authority rather than derived from reason), certain knowledge (i.e., 
belief that knowledge is certain rather than tentative), innate ability (i.e., belief that 
the ability to learn is innate rather than acquired), and quick learning (i.e., belief that 
learning is quick or not at all).  
As discussed, while the first three dimensions directly addressed 
epistemological issues about the nature and justification of knowledge, the last two 
addressed beliefs about how people learn.  The rationale for their inclusion was to 
develop research on motivation (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) and intelligence 
(Schoenfeld, 1983, 1985). Although there are good reasons to hypothesize that these 
beliefs influence learning, they do not target epistemic cognition per se.  For this 
reason, in reporting the results of studies within this framework, results about nature 
and justification of knowledge and results about the acquisition of knowledge will be 
discussed separately to the degree possible.  
Each of the five dimensions addressed by Schommer’s questionnaire was 
characterized by two or three aspects, each aspect assessed by a specific subset of 
items. Factor analysis of data on these subsets generated four independent factors 
with eigenvalues greater than one accounting for 55.2% of the total variance; thus 
supporting the innovative view of epistemological beliefs as a system.  
However, the factors yielded by the exploratory factor analysis were in part 
different from the original structure of the epistemological questionnaire.  In 





subsets loaded across three factors.  In addition, some subsets loaded differently rom 
what hypothesized.  For example, items expressing preference for avoiding ambiguity 
did not load on certain knowledge, but on simple knowledge and items expressing 
beliefs that learning happens first time or not at all did not load on quick learning but 
on innate ability. Even if there was not a complete overlapping between the subsets 
originally characterizing each dimension and the factors emerged from the analysis, 
the four factors were named according to the original scheme, an occurrence that 
generated some confusion in further studies.  
Finally, it is important to note that subsets of items and not the original 63 
items were used in the factor analysis.  No available analysis confirmed that items 
within each subset were actually indicative of the hypothesized dimensions, thus 
leaving the validity of the measure uncertain.   
The second question addressed by the study regarded the relation between 
dimensions of epistemological beliefs and aspects of comprehension.  Students were 
given either a psychology passage presenting different theories of aggression or a 
nutrition passage exploring the controversy about the optimal daily intake of vitamin 
B-6. The passages did not offer any conclusion and students were asked to write a 
conclusion paragraph.  After controlling for social and personal background variables, 
Schommer found that students believing in quick learning tended to draw 
oversimplified conclusions, performed more poorly on the psychology mastery test, 
and tended to overestimate their understanding of the passages.  Students believing 
that knowledge was more certain than tentative tended to draw certain conclusions, 





Later studies provided some support for the SEQ’s proposed factor structure. 
Responses from a new sample of undergraduate students yielded a fairly good fitfor a 
four-factor model (Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992).  The main differences from 
the original study regarded the subset of items probing the belief in innate ability, 
which loaded together with the belief in quick learning.  The subsets designed to 
investigate the belief in an omniscient authority loaded separately on simple 
knowledge and certain knowledge.  Schommer and her colleagues also found that, 
when confronted with statistical text requiring integration of concepts, students who 
believed in simple knowledge tended to perform more poorly on a measure of 
comprehension, were overconfident about the degree of their understanding, and 
tended to choose less adaptive test preparation strategies (which in turn negatively 
correlated with comprehension).  This result suggests that dimensions of 
epistemological beliefs may differently correlate with learning that occurs in various 
domains and context, a hypothesis also discussed by Elby (2001).  
Replication in a cross-sectional study with high-school students also yielded a 
four factors structure fairly similar to the original one, even if  subsets cros -loading 
increased (especially beliefs in quick learning) and beliefs about innate abili y loaded 
together with beliefs in quick learning on the third factor (Schommer, 1993).  
Schommer also found that girls were less likely than boys to believe in quick learning 
and in fixed ability.  Further, older students were less likely to believe in quick 
learning, simple knowledge, and certain knowledge.  When students’ IQ scores were 
entered in the prediction equation of student GPA, only belief in quick learning 





epistemological beliefs on GPA is more subtle, contextualized, and indirect than what 
the methodology of the study allowed to detect.  It is also possible that the nature of 
learning reflected in high GPA’s does not require the integration of knowledge and 
epistemic awareness measured by the other dimensions of the questionnaire.  The 
deeper analyses afforded by case studies seem to support this hypothesis. 
Further support for the multidimensionality of epistemological beliefs has 
been provided by Wood and Kardash (2002), who factor analyzed data collected from 
college students with an 80-item instrument comprising items from both Schommer’s 
(1990) and Jehng’s (1991; Jehng et al., 1993) questionnaires.  Five factors emerged 
from the analysis, which only partially overlapped with those found in previous 
studies.  In particular, Wood and Kardash factor-analyzed individual items, and not 
subsets of items, thus addressing issues of substantive validity of the questionnaires.  
The amount of variance accounted for after extraction was less than half the amount
reported in previous studies that had factored subsets of items. 
The first factor, speed of knowledge acquisition, addressed mainly beliefs 
about the process of learning, with low scores manifesting belief that learning is a  
“all or nothing,” straightforward process, and it accounted for almost half of the 
variance extracted.  Interestingly, three items loading on this factor were taken from 
Schommer’s knowledge is certain and seek single answers subsets, an occurrence that 
supports the usefulness of factor analyzing single items, even if it makes the 
interpretation of the factors more complex and nuanced.  The second factor, structure 
of knowledge, reflected beliefs on the more or less integrated nature of knowledge 





unambiguous pieces of information” (p. 250).  The third factor, knowledge 
construction and modification, addressed beliefs about the acquisition of knowledge, 
with low scores reflecting the view that knowledge does not require integration of 
information and involves an overall passive and unquestioning stance.  Overall, the 
last two factors explained little more than 3% of the total variance and the internal 
consistency of the items was lower.  The fourth factor, haracteristics of successful 
students, mainly addressed beliefs about the innate ability to learn while the fifth 
factor, attainability of truth, comprised three items targeting beliefs about the 
possibility for scientists to discover the truth (both manifested by low scores on these 
items). 
All five factors were inter-correlated, with particularly high correlations 
among speed of knowledge acquisition, knowledge construction and modification, 
and characteristics of successful students.  This finding, together with the loading of 
subset items on diverse factors, suggests prudence in linking particular dimensions of 
epistemological beliefs to particular outcomes, since it seems that the dimensions so 
far investigated are closely interrelated, with beliefs about learning explaining the 
most part of variability and beliefs about the nature of knowledge still largely 
dodging detection.  
Wood and Kardash also investigated whether epistemological beliefs could 
predict GPAs over and above ACT scores.  Once again, the strongest contribution 
came from the speed of knowledge acquisition scale, accounting for an additional 4% 
of variance.  Characteristics of successful students, attainability of objective truth, 





1% of variance.  Besides suggesting important methodological implications, this 
study indicated that much work has still to be done in the development of research 
designs able to capture epistemic beliefs, particularly if researchers are interested in 
studying its role in reasoning and learning.  
Using Schommer’s questionnaire, several relations between epistemological 
beliefs and learning outcomes were explored.  Qian and Alvermann (1995) found that 
items reflecting beliefs in certain and simple knowledge loaded on a common factr 
and predicted conceptual change in physics, but the three factor model that best fit th  
data explained only around 20% of the total variance.  
Kardash and Scholes (1996) investigated the effect of beliefs in certain 
knowledge on the interpretation of text.  Similarly to Schommer (1990), they 
presented college students with a dual-positional text reporting two different views
about the relation between HIV and AIDS and asked students to write a conclusion 
paragraph.  Analysis of the data fairly replicated Schommer’s factor structure.  
Further, regression analysis used to predict the degree of tentativeness in the 
conclusion drawn revealed that scores on the four items tapping beliefs in certain 
knowledge accounted for 9% of unique variance.  The result is particularly 
noteworthy, since the same analysis also found that need for cognition and strength of 
previous beliefs were unique predictors of the degree of tentativeness displayed in the 
conclusions.  
A subsequent study (Kardash & Howell, 2000) extended the investigation to 
interactions between epistemological beliefs and topic-specific beliefs and cognitive 





text.  Factor analysis of data from the same 42-item epistemological beliefs 
questionnaire used previously did not replicate the factor structure emerged in the 
1996 study, even if the certainty of knowledge factor kept emerging, accounting for 
4% of the total variance.  Students believing less in the certainty of knowledge ten ed 
to use more strategies aiming at making connections beyond individual words, 
phrase, or sentence level (intersentential ties).  They also tended to make more 
statements revealing inaccurate text processing and to rate themselves less familiar 
with the text.  Confirming previous results, stronger relations with strategies use 
emerged in relation to the speed of learning factor.  
The relation between the ability to construct meaningful connections and 
epistemological beliefs was further explored by Bråten & Strømsø (2006) who found 
that students holding sophisticated epistemological beliefs (assessed by the total score 
on Schommer’s 63-items questionnaire) performed significantly better than studet  
holding naïve epistemological beliefs when asked to respond to a questionnaire 
assessing their ability to build inferences from the reading of multiple texts.  
Interestingly, students holding different epistemological beliefs performed quite 
similarly when asked to complete the same questionnaire after reading the same 
material presented in the format of a textbook-like single text.  
The influence of epistemic disposition on the evaluation of argument strength 
was investigated by Stanovich and West (1997).  These researchers found that 
undergraduates who scored high on a composite score indicating openness to belief 
change and cognitive flexibility (resembling the SEQ’s simple knowledge and certain 





independently from their previous beliefs.  The result is noteworthy because, in this 
study, epistemic dispositions were unique predictors (6.7% unique variance 
explained) of the argument evaluation, even when other measures of cognitive 
abilities were taken into account.  Further, in contrast to several other studies included 
in this review that presented participants with conflicting arguments, this study
specifically investigated the ability of evaluating the strength (or weakn ss) of single 
arguments independently from personal beliefs on the issue, an attitude that is usually 
considered an important component of critical thinking. 
Sinatra and her colleagues (2003) built a single composite measure of the 
sophistication of epistemological beliefs using only a few subsets of SEQ (i.e., seek 
single answers, don’t criticize authority, ambiguous information, dependence on 
authority, and certain knowledge; Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 
2003).  They studied the relation between this composite and the level of knowledge 
and acceptance of three different scientific theories (i.e., photosynthesis and 
respiration, animal evolution, and human evolution).  The researchers found a 
moderate, negative correlation between this measure of epistemological beliefs and 
the degree of acceptance of human evolution, but no significant relation was found 
between epistemological beliefs and knowledge of evolution.  
The modest reliability of the measure of epistemological beliefs weakens th  
aforementioned conclusions, even if results support the hypothesis that the interaction 
between epistemological beliefs and acceptance of scientific theories may vary in 
relation to their controversial status.  The researchers also found that epistemic 





(1997) study, were a significant predictor of students’ acceptance of human evolution.  
Yet, such dispositions did not predict acceptance of photosynthesis or animal 
evolution.   
The view of epistemic beliefs as a system also inspired the research of 
Schraw, Dunkle, and Bendixen (1995).  In this study, these researchers investigated 
the relation between various dimensions of epistemological beliefs and problem 
solving.  They also dedicated much effort to the design and testing of a measurement 
instrument, the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI).  This 32-item questionnare 
attempted to capture the original five dimensions of epistemological beliefs 
hypothesized by Schommer.  The researchers reported that factor analysis of the data 
yielded a five-factor solution as hypothesized, explaining about 60% of the total 
variance.  Similar claims were made in further studies comparing analysis of data 
obtained through the contemporary administration of the EBI and Schommer’s 
Questionnaire (Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002).  
Inspection of the eigenvalues of the 5-factor solution reported in the articles 
does not support the claim, and it would seem that these factors accounted for a much 
lower percentage of the total variance (about 25%), unless several items were actually
dropped from the questionnaire and analysis was repeated on a smaller item pool.  
Unfortunately, the data reported in the article do not resolve this issue.  A further
concern with data obtained through the administration of the EBI regards the items 
targeting the dimension of certain knowledge that tap, for the most part, beliefs 
regarding moral truth and the existence of absolute truth, introducing some confusion 





Study of the relation between epistemological beliefs and problem solving 
found that the variables created as a composite of items loading on the certainty of 
knowledge and omniscient authority factors explained roughly 30% of variation of the 
performance on the ill-structured problem solving measure.  The task requested 
participants to respond to the question “Is truth unchanging?”  The resemblance of 
this question to the items in the questionnaire might explain in part the strong relation 
found.  However, the generalizability of the result to other ill-structured problem 
solving situation is problematic.  No relation was found between epistemological 
beliefs and performance on a measure of syllogistic reasoning, supporting the 
hypothesis that different problem solving activities require different cognitive 
processes that may not necessarily involve the epistemic level. 
A few studies also began to investigate relations between epistemological 
beliefs and motivational constructs (Hofer, 1999; Paulsen & Feldman, 1999a).  
Results suggested moderate relations, especially between beliefs in simple knowledge 
and goal orientation, task value, control of learning, self-efficacy, and text anxiety 
(Paulsen & Feldman, 1999a).  These findings were partially corroborated in the 
specific domain of mathematics (Hofer, 1999).  Significant correlations also emerg d 
with dimensions targeting beliefs about learning (quick learning and fixed ability).  
The dimension of certain knowledge did not show any correlation with 
motivational measures.  The paucity of results in this respect may also be due to 
measurement issues.  Specifically, reliability of the epistemological beliefs scale in 
the Hofer’s study was modest and no factor analysis of the data was available for the 





contextualize the study of such relations within a specific disciplinary domain 
(Paulsen & Feldman, 1999a).  Finally, the correlational nature of the study does not 
allow speculation about the direction of the relations. 
The relation between epistemological beliefs and self-regulated learning 
strategies was also explored by Paulsen and Feldman (1999b).  They found that 
students scoring higher on the dimension of simple knowledge (tapped by the SEQ) 
tended to use more surface learning strategies, to employ less strategies iming at 
integrating new information with prior knowledge and experience, to adopt less 
metacognitive strategies to plan, monitor, and regulate their learning, and to have less 
control on their effort and attention.  
In addition, the dimension of certain knowledge did not predict any of the 
self-regulation variables considered in the study, while beliefs in fixed learning 
correlated with all the components of self-regulated learning strategies.  It is 
important to note that data were not factor analyzed and composite scores were 
created on the basis of analysis reported in previous research.  Finally, contrary to the 
methodology of several previous studies, all the measures employed by this study 
were self-reported measures. 
Schreiber and Shinn (2003) used a similar design to study relations between 
dimensions of epistemological beliefs and learning processes.  They found that 
students who scored high on the dimension of simple knowledge tended to prefer 
learning processes that emphasized the acquisition of factual information and 





correlation was found with the dimension of certain knowledge and beliefs in fixed 
ability correlated with the learning processes students declared to use more often. 
Contributions from Various Domains 
A different insight into the relation between students’ beliefs and learning 
outcomes is provided by some examples of qualitative research nested in specific
disciplinary domains.  Instead of focusing on the relation between general beliefs and 
decontextualized abilities, these researchers attempted to individuate aspects of 
epistemic cognition and learning outcomes typical of a specific domain.  
The theoretical justification to situate the study of epistemology within 
specific domains comes from a growing body of research on expertise (Alexander, 
2003; Wineburg, 1991).  It is also compatible with views of individuals’ 
epistemologies as a “range of cognitive resources for understanding knowledge,” 
differently activated by different contexts, whose organization and availability to 
conscious reflection varies across degrees of expertise (Louca, Elby, Hammer, & 
Kagey, 2004).  Pedagogically, this renewed attention to the domain specificity of 
learning has become visible in the national standards developed for various 
disciplines, such as history and science.  
Davis (2003) investigated the relations between beliefs about scientific 
knowledge and science learning.  Six eight-grade physical science classes, t ught by 
the same teacher within a computer based learning environment (CLP/KIE) that 
encourages deep understanding of concepts, together with application and integration 





posttest measures assessing beliefs about the nature of science (i.e., its tentat veness 
vs. its immutability) and learning science.  
Two aspects of learning science were investigated.  First, the strategy 
employed by students (i.e., a focus on understanding vs. a focus on memorizing 
discrete facts); second, the degree of autonomy in learning (i.e., placing the 
responsibility for learning on oneself vs. placing the responsibility on someone else). 
All students also completed a performance task, requiring them to review an article 
about some of the topics addressed in class for a fictitious editor.  The task evaluated 
the degree of connection among and conceptual validity of students’ idea, as a 
measure of knowledge integration.  A representative sub-group of the students was 
selected for further interviews to cross-validate the findings and to add a richer
description of the relations emerging. 
Beliefs in the tentativeness of science did not change significantly throughout 
the semester.  The changes in students’ autonomy and orientation toward learning for 
understanding were statistically significant, but effect sizes were small, further 
supporting the hypothesis that long time is needed to substantially affect student’ 
beliefs.  A considerable relation emerged between beliefs in the tentativ ess of 
science and the use of strategies geared toward understanding, a link validated also by 
the analysis of students’ interviews.  This result indicated that students tended to 
behave reasonably in their approach to learning, leaning toward memorization if they 
perceived science as a collection of discrete fact, but opting for a deeper 






Surprisingly, neither beliefs in the tentativeness of science nor a preference for 
understanding correlated with the scores on the review task, although the degree of 
autonomy did.  Yet, it is possible that the context of the study (i.e., strongly urging 
students to go beyond memorization) contributed to this result.  It is also possible that 
the variance in beliefs captured by the dimensions investigated was too low to show 
significant correlations with the outcome measure.  Further, students worked in pairs 
to write the review.  The researchers took care to pair off students with similar init al 
beliefs; yet, it is possible that this occurrence affected the outcome and thus the 
correlation. 
Some support for this last hypothesis is provided by a study of college 
students engaged in a computer-based simulation targeting some common 
misconceptions related to photosynthesis (Windschitl, 1997).  Dyads were formed 
based on the scores obtained on a measure of the “belief in the complexity of 
acquiring knowledge,” an instrument that targeted epistemic dimensions similar to 
those addressed by Schommer’s questionnaire.  
Regression analyses found that higher posttest scores of individuals predicted 
lower posttest scores of their partner.  Observation of a subsample of dyads supported 
this result, since students who scored higher on the epistemic measure tended to 
assume a more directive and inquisitive role during the simulation exercise, whil  
partners with lower scores played a more passive role, seemingly less conducive to 
learning.  Thus, in terms of outcome, the exchange ultimately tended to generate a 





research is needed to investigate how students’ epistemological beliefs play out in 
collaborative learning settings. 
Also in the mathematics domain, a few studies have considered the possible 
role that students’ epistemic beliefs play in cognition and motivation and have been 
reviewed by Muis (2004).  In general, correlations were found between students’ 
beliefs and justification of answers, students’ learning strategies, and achievement, 
supporting the hypotheses that students who approach mathematics as a purely 
empirical (vs. rational) activity, and believe that mathematics is essentially 
procedural, certain and simple tend to be unable to justify their answers to problems, 
to adopt mainly memorization strategies, and to reach lower levels of achievement 
and interest.  While this literature supports the individuation of common trends, 
measurement and design issues quite similar to those discussed above prevent from 
providing strong evidence for cause-and-effect relations. 
Did research establish any relation between students’ epistemic stances and 
general learning outcomes measured by traditional tests?  Elby’s study (2001) offers 
an initial investigation of this question.  Students in his honor physics class achieved 
an average score of 84% on the Force Concept Inventory, a level that the researcher 
notes is comparable to that obtained by post-test Harvard students.  The slower-paced 
class did not take the FCI, but usually performed well on FCI-like questions that were 
included in class tests.  Content coverage was reduced in this case, too, perhaps 
limiting the possibilities and the motivation of more capable students.  However, the 





conceptual development.  Moreover, it is important to recall that, for Elby, epistemic 
development was regarded as a prominent educational outcome in itself. 
Focusing on History 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the literature on historical thinking suggests the 
existence of important connections between epistemic beliefs and the ability of 
individuals to think historically (Lee & Shemilt, 2003; VanSledright, 2002; 
Wineburg, 2001a).  In particular, second-order concepts (e.g., historical account and 
evidence) and use of heuristics that typify the process of historical investigation (e.g., 
sourcing, contextualization, and construction of evidence-based arguments) 
presuppose particular ideas about the nature of historical knowledge and the ways in 
which historical knowledge claims may be justified.  Thus, from a psychological 
perspective, studying how people develop these concepts and strategies becomes a 
privileged way to look at their epistemic development in the domain. 
In this regard, an important contribution was offered by a group of British 
researchers, who explored how second-order concepts such as evidence, causation, 
empathy, and nature of historical accounts developed across a group of students 
between the age of seven and fourteen (Lee & Ashby, 2000; Lee, Dickinson, & 
Ashby, 1997; Lee & Shemilt, 2003).  The study involved 320 students who were 
asked to read three pairs of stories about three issues in European and British history. 
Within each pair, the stories differed in theme, tone, and time-scale.  Students 
completed several written tasks and were also asked a few questions that more 
directly addressed their epistemic stances (Lee & Ashby, 2000, pp. 204-205).  





sample of pupils.  Using a similar method, the study was then extended to other 92 
children, who were interviewed at the beginning of the spring and at the end of the 
summer term.  A longitudinal study (from second to fourth grade) also took place and 
involved 22 children. 
Based on these data, the researchers developed a progression of students’ 
ideas about history and about the past.  For the purposes of this review, I focus on the 
progression of students’ idea about evidence and about the relation between historical 
accounts and the past (Lee & Ashby, 2000; Lee & Shemilt, 2003).  At the first level 
in this progression, students viewed evidence as granting direct access to the past; in 
other words, they perceived the past as given and historical accounts as something 
existing “out there.”  At the second level, students likened evidence to information, 
still equating history to the past as known by some authority.  Lack of information 
made the past inaccessible and writing historical accounts impossible.  
At the third level, students became aware that most of the traces of the past 
were in the form of human witnesses; this instance brought issues of bias and loss of 
information to the forefront.  In addition, accounts came to depend on the information 
available.  At the fourth level, students struggled with issues of truthfulness within
each source and accounts became the results of an operation of “scissor and paste.”  
Only at the fifth level of the progression, students began to distinguish the role of the 
historical investigators, who selects and organizes the evidence and writes the 
accounts.  The ability of the investigator to interrogate the sources, asking questions 
that they were not specifically designed to answer and corroborating results, became a 





issues of bias.  Finally, at the sixth level, concern for the historical context and for the 
question addressed by the specific accounts acquired importance.  
However, even if some general trends were identified, these researchers 
caution from assuming a rigid, stage-like conceptualization of this progression.  Their 
findings indicate that, at any given age, student individual differences were 
noteworthy and second-order concepts did not develop in parallel fashion.  In 
addition, changes in how students performed specific tasks (e.g., comparing pairs of
sources) did not necessarily imply epistemic development.  
In schools, history is usually perceived as a subject heavily imbued with 
reading tasks.  Do students’ epistemic stances affect their way of reading historical 
texts?  Sam Wineburg (2001b) compared historians and a group of high achieving 
high school seniors reading historical accounts about the events at Lexington Green.  
He found that the two groups mainly differed in their way of conceiving what a text 
was.  More specifically, historians focused on understanding the subtext of the 
documents, that is they tried to infer the author’s purposes and goals in writing the 
account in that specific way.  In contrast, the students analyzed the texts looking for 
information, failing to recognize the presence of an author.  Very different ideas 
about the nature of historical accounts seem to lay beneath these profoundly different 
approaches to the text.  In particular, the idea that history is already written in the text 
prevented students from engaging with its author.  They processed the text, but they 
failed to comprehend it.  Particularly interesting in this respect is the instance that the 
students in Wineburg’s (2001b) study used several cognitive and metacognitive 





text, but those were of little avail in building understanding out of multiple historical 
texts.  
These findings are supported by a few studies implemented by Rouet and her 
colleagues (1998), involving American and French undergraduate and graduate 
students, with varied degree of specialization in the history domain.  Participants were 
asked to read a set of documents regarding the building of the Panama Canal.  Then, 
students were asked to rank the documents in terms of usefulness and trustworthiness, 
to justify their rankings, and to write an essay discussing to what extent the US 
intervention in the Panamanian revolution was justified.  
Researchers found that all students had some knowledge about different 
genres and were able to identify different points of view.  However, novices and 
history experts differed in the criteria used in ranking the documents.  In particular, 
when confronted by issues of bias, novices lowered their trust in the document, while 
history expert were able to appreciate the contribution of sources even if biased.  In 
addition, experts evaluated the documents using multiple criteria.  They analyzed 
them in terms of content and in terms of authorship, and also tested their usefulness in 
terms of the question investigated.  Novices tended to look at the documents mainly 
in terms of content.  In the case of primary sources, novices considered the 
perspective of the author, too; yet, they tended to dismiss the source as biased, 
preferring to place their trust in the textbook. 
Analyses of the essays indicated that novices and experts included citation of 
the documents in their writing.  However, experts referred to the documents to build a 





Novices seemed less aware of the conflicting nature of the documents provided and, 
for the most part, avoided addressing this issue.  Although these studies do not 
explicitly assessed nor referred to epistemic cognition, they suggest that differences in 
expertise may be reflected more in the purpose served by specific strategy (e.g., aid in 
the interpretation and evaluation of different texts) than in the use of the strategies 
itself (Wineburg, 2007).    
Yet, given that the differences emerging between novices and experts regard, 
for the most part, the nature of historical accounts and the justification of historical 
claim, I believe that these findings are compatible with the hypothesis that epistemic 
stances influence reading and writing in history.  An alternative hypothesis could be 
that these differences are mainly due to a different level of domain knowledge.  After 
all, the experts in the Rouet et al.’s studies were graduate history students with several 
years of exposure to the discipline.  However, if second-order concepts like evidence 
and accounts are considered an integral part of disciplinary knowledge, the two 
hypotheses are actually not incompatible. 
Summary 
Research on epistemological beliefs suggests that beliefs in the tentativeness 
of science and, more generally, in the constructive, complex, and uncertain nature of 
knowledge tend to correlate with adaptive learning outcomes.  However, 
methodological and theoretical considerations may suggest alternative interpretations 
of these findings.  These issues are discussed in more detail in the last section of th s 





findings from the research on epistemological beliefs and contributions from research 
nested in specific domains, one element seems to emerge with particular clarity.  
The scales used to assess epistemological beliefs do not discriminate betwe n 
beliefs reflecting an overall relativistic stance and beliefs reflecting the acquisition of 
criteria that enable students to build knowledge and justify claims even under 
condition of uncertainty.  In other words, the beliefs in the uncertain nature of 
knowledge tend to be considered an index of epistemic sophistication per se,
independently from the development of criteria that allow students to learn and build 
knowledge even under condition of uncertainty.  From this point of view, research 
nested in the history domain offers a much more nuanced representation of competent 
epistemic beliefs, describing  progression in historical thinking, and indicating the 
implications of these different stances in terms of learning, with particular reference 
to reading and writing in the history domain. 
Teachers’ Pedagogical Choices―Students’ Learning Outcomes 
The influence that different teaching strategies have on various students’ 
learning outcomes is documented by a broad literature that surpasses the limits of this 
review.  In line with the goals of the present analysis, this section includes only those 
few studies specifically investigating the effect of strategies aiming at fostering key 
aspects of epistemic cognition, such as argumentation, hypothesis testing, and 
evaluation of evidence.   
Continuing the investigation on the effects of teaching higher-order thinking 
to low-achievers, Zohar and Dori (2003) examined the outcomes of four programs for 





                   Figure 5: Aspects of the theoretical model addressed in this section 
argumentation skills, system thinking skills (i.e., identify and analyze relations within 
complex systems), and critical and scientific thinking (e.g., hypothesis testing and 
evaluation of evidence).  It is important to note that these programs involved about 
1000 students in different settings (urban, rural; middle-class, heterogeneous 
socioeconomic background; secular, religious) and were quasi-experimental in nature.  
Data about pretest and posttest on a series of measures were collected and, in two 
studies, data from control groups were gathered and analyzed, as well. 
In these programs, the teaching skills were embedded in various curricular 
areas (science) and involved the students both at a procedural (e.g., solving a 
problem) and at a metacognitive level (e.g., reflection on the thinking skills used and 
generalizations about how and when to use such skills).  After completing the specific 
task assigned (procedural level), the students were guided in a reflection on the 
thinking skills that had been used and prompted to transfer those skills to novel 



















































achievers benefited as much as (and sometimes more than) high achievers from the 
teaching of higher-order thinking, increasing their performance on content-knowledge 
based tasks as well.  This supports the results described in some of the case studies 
previously summarized (Elby, 2001; VanSledright, 2002).  
Evidence of transfer also emerged in the Zohar et al. (2001) study, making 
these results even more compelling.  In terms of teaching strategies, fost ring higher-
order thinking with low achievers may well require greater scaffolding, such as 
breaking up complex tasks into simpler components, identifying steps, or giving clues 
and examples.  However, the researchers’ claim that this does imply lowering the 
level of thinking at which students are engaged.  The importance of teachers’ 
strategies is therefore two-fold.  In the first place, these strategies help determine the 
level of thinking targeted by instruction.  Further, they provide appropriate support to 
make possible the pursuit of these learning goals for all students.  
The effectiveness of interventions targeting higher order thinking, both in 
term of student success and also in the relatively short time requested to obtain 
positive results is impressive.  One of these intervention studies was a quasi-
experiment examining the teaching of argumentation skills in the context of dilemmas 
in genetics (Zohar & Nemet, 2002).  The researchers compared the outcomes in term  
of both argumentation skills and content knowledge between two groups of ninth 
graders enrolled in a biology class.  The experimental group was taught a unit in the 
curriculum (genetic revolution) through the examination of moral dilemmas and 
explicit teaching of argumentation skills (e.g., formulation of arguments and 





information following a more traditional, “textbook” approach.  In the latter case, 
standard application problems followed the transmission of the relevant information.  
The unit comprised approximately twelve lessons.  
The qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data showed that students in 
the experimental group increasingly used biological evidence to construct arguments 
about proposed dilemmas.  They also scored significantly higher on a multiple-choic 
knowledge test administered at the end of the unit.  This last result offers a new,
encouraging perspective on the relation between teaching content and teaching 
thinking, an occurrence especially important in high-stake testing environments.  It 
challenges the “time constraint” argument often used to question the viability of 
teaching thinking.  It may in fact be that the time taken to develop student epistemic 
cognition pays off also in terms of the amount of content knowledge that students are 
able to retain.  Finally, the interactions within the classroom also changed 
significantly, and the researchers found that the students increased the frequency with 
which they supported their conclusion with explicit evidence, another aspect 
highlighted by many case studies (McRobbie et al., 2001; Elby, 2001; VanSledright, 
2002).  
Focusing on History 
 Is it necessary that epistemic beliefs become a direct target of instruction in order 
to influence students’ reading of historical texts?  In VanSledright’s study (2002), 
students’ epistemic stances were repeatedly challenged and epistemic cognition 
became the target of explicit instruction.  Did students’ reading and writing in history 





is, to investigate their ability to think historically, VanSledright (2002) constructed 
two performance tasks, which asked the fifth-graders to read, analyze, interpret, and 
draw inferences from a set of primary and secondary sources provided to them.  The 
first assessment was administered before the beginning of the intervention, the second
once it was completed.  
The analysis of the think aloud protocols of the eight informants revealed that 
all students increased the use of those reading strategies and thinking practices typical 
of experts, moving from an almost exclusively intratextual reading, to the adoption f 
intertextual comprehension strategies, identifying and corroborating source , 
evaluating the accounts’ point of view, their validity and reliability.  Even if students’ 
final outcomes differed, overall reflecting the initial disparities among the children, 
all students improved their ability to deal with and make meaning out of contrasting 
historical accounts.  Compared with the high school seniors in Wineburg’s (2001b) 
study, the results are particularly significant.  Further, these findings corroborate what 
Kardash and Howell (2000) found.  These researchers noticed that students who 
believed less in the certainty of knowledge tended to use more strategies aiming at 
building intersential ties (similar to VanSledright’s intertextual comprehension 
strategies) during the reading of a dual-positional text.  Such texts are similar to the 
reading of conflicting historical sources.  In this respect, the similarity between 
elementary and college students is quite remarkable. 
Works produced by VanSledright’s students during the intervention attests to 
an engagement with the disciplinary content much broader and deeper than what is 





Did these students also retain more factual information about what they investigated?  
Cognitive theories would support this hypothesis, but no data on some standardized 
measure of learning were available.  Interviews with the classroom teacher 
highlighted increased student motivation and development in thinking, together with 
the reduced coverage of the content assessed through state testing.  A trade-off often 
faced by educators that want to incorporate epistemic development in their curricula.  
The importance of considering students’ epistemic stances in a particular 
discipline is indicated also by a study involving college students (mainly freshmen) 
attending adjunct study strategy courses aiming at supporting academic success in 
three different classes (i.e., biology, chemistry, and history; Simpson & Rush, 2003).  
In particular, instructors analyzed the tasks required in the specific discpline and 
taught cognitive, metacognitive, and self-regulatory processes favoring a positive 
performance on these tasks.  Even if not explicitly investigating epistemic beliefs, the 
researchers noted that success in the history class required ability to synthesize 
multiple sources, create generalizations, and answer thought-provoking essay 
questions.  
The strategy course in history challenged students’ view of history as a 
collection of facts and dates and succeeded in changing students’ beliefs more than 
the strategy courses in the other disciplines.  Students also stated that they would 
more likely transfer to other domains the strategies learned in history.  Correlati n 
between change in beliefs and academic performance was also higher in the case of 





In the study described in the previous section, Bain (2000) also noted that 
high-school students exposed to a history course explicitly targeting epistemic 
cognition learned to read texts in a much more sophisticated manner, using the tools 
of historical thinking.  Finally, the hypothesis that instruction plays a major role in 
fostering students’ ability to think historically is also supported by the studie of Lee 
and Ashby (2000), who found that, on average, students  differed across schools in 
terms of their responses to the reading and writing tasks administered in the course of 
their research. 
Summary 
 The studies reviewed in this section highlight the key role that appropriate 
pedagogical practices can play in the development of higher-order thinking, in 
general and of historical thinking, in particular.  They also suggest that succesful 
interventions take care to explicitly address students’ epistemic beliefs and include 
the teaching of cognitive and metacognitive strategies that foster learning in that 
particular domain.  These research projects also contribute to dispel the notion that 
higher-order thinking is an appropriate goal only for high-achieving students or that 
only students in the upper grades can be taught to think historically.  
Suggestions from the Reviewed Literature 
Although most of the studies reviewed cannot claim causality, their 
corroborative evidence suggests that epistemic beliefs and epistemic cognition matter 
in learning and teaching.  Several studies indicate that the more teachers re aware of 
the epistemic status of the discipline taught, the more they tend to develop strategies 





Hashweh, 1996).  This awareness usually goes hand in hand with a greater knowledge 
of the subject matter (Gillaspie & Davis, 1998) and with the acknowledgment that the 
development of epistemic cognition is a valuable educational goal (Elby, 2001; 
VanSledright, 2002).  
Commitment to epistemic development required a more student-centered 
approach and thus a different presence of the teacher in the classroom.  Yet, it also 
required that the teacher carefully planned and vigilantly implemented all phases of 
instruction (Elby, 2001; Vansledright, 2002).  It also seems that while sporadic 
interventions did not trigger epistemic development, successful interventions tended 
to infuse the whole curriculum across a sustained period, from goal planning to 
assessment.  
Research also pointed out a few features of the educational system that may 
affect teachers’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and learning and their 
pedagogical choices.  In particular, the amount of influence that teachers beli ved 
they had on the curriculum implemented in their classroom was found to be a strong 
predictor of their willingness to adopt less conventional teaching strategies (Buchanan 
et al., 1996).  Teachers’ own knowledge of the disciplinary content of the subject 
matter and familiarity with the cognitive and metacognitive processes involved in 
learning were repeatedly found to predict teachers’ beliefs and teachers’ strategies 
(Arabsolghar & Elkins, 2001; Brickhouse, 1990; McNeal, 1995; Zohar, 1999). 
Comparisons between results of quantitative and qualitative studies indicate 
that much work is still needed to identify epistemic beliefs and aspects of epistemic 





the effect of students’ beliefs on students’ outcomes, it is particularly important to 
keep in mind the limits of the methodology used to tap epistemological beliefs and 
therefore to evaluate critically the constructs actually investigated.  A recent study by 
DeBacker and her colleagues tested the psychometric properties of three of th  most 
often used measures (i.e., Schommer’s Epistemological Questionnaire, Epistemic 
Beliefs Inventory, and the Epistemological Beliefs Survey) and found them 
problematic (DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2008).   
The definition and measurement of epistemic sophistication in several studies 
is also problematic, because it does not consider individuals beliefs about the 
justification of knowledge claims.  Thus, research misses the opportunity to tap into a 
key dimension that emerged from the developmental work of Perry (1970), King and 
Kitchener (2002), and Kuhn and Weinstock (2002), failing to discriminate between 
beliefs reflecting an overall relativistic stance, and beliefs reflecting the acquisition of 
criteria that enable the individual to build knowledge even under conditions of 
uncertainty.   
The pedagogical consequences are important. There is evidence (at least from 
case studies) that students who are made aware of the uncertain nature of knowledge 
without developing criteria to draw at least provisional conclusions from the evidence 
available tend to develop a skeptic, “everything goes” kind of attitude, a stance that 
does not foster engagement with the reality investigated by the subject matter.  On the 
contrary, a position that, acknowledging the limits of knowledge, proposes effective 





deeply with the material at hand, and overall to participate more fully in the domain 
discourse (Bain, 2000; Lee & Shemilt, 2003; VanSledright, 2002). 
Investigating epistemic cognition within knowledge domains seems a 
promising avenue to further our understanding of how epistemic beliefs emerge 
within school settings, how they likely develop, and how they influence teaching and 
learning.  It may also bring research a step further in identifying which beliefs are 
more or less adaptive to specific educational goals.  
Given the relative novelty of research about teacher epistemic cognition, the 
contributions of case studies for our understanding are particularly noteworthy.  The 
insights gained from such in depth studies can also suggest what key variables should 
be included in quantitative measures tapping teachers’ epistemic stances.  This effort 
could make feasible the extension to a larger population of the investigation about 
relations between teachers’ epistemic stances and teachers’ pedagogical m ves, thus 
contributing to the generalizability of results.  Moreover, only few studies 
simultaneously investigated all the relations hypothesized in the theoretical mode .  
Hence, in respect to epistemic cognition, our understanding of what “goes on” in an 
actual classroom context is still rough.  By studying the development of epistemic 
beliefs and epistemic cognition within three history classrooms, this study aims at 








The Relation between Teachers’ Epistemic Stances and Teachers’ Pedagogical Choices: Summary of Studies 
      Study             Design             Domain                        Teachers’ Beliefs                                      Teaching Strategies 
Bain (2000, 
2005) 
CS History History as inquiry shared by a          
professional community 
↔ Explicit discussion of epistemic status of 
history 
Development of linguistic tools 
Organization of the curriculum around 
meaningful historical problems 
Use of various sources 
Individual and group work 
Fostering student reflection 
Brickhouse 
(1990) 
CS Science Theories as problem-solving tools   
Scientific process is theory-driven   
Scientific progress as theory             
   change 
Theories as truth gained through      
experimentation 
Scientific progress as accumulation  
  of facts  











Problem-based teaching approach 
Centrality of prediction in experiments 
Reinterpretation of previous laws and        
concepts 
Memorization; stress on precision in 
experimentation 
Scarce attention to integration of 
knowledge 
Avoidance of potentially conflicting 
content 
Bohan, C., & 
Davis, O. Jr. 
(1998) 
CS History Historical documents have a              
  subtext 
Historical documents as biased         




Discussion on historical judgment 
 
Different perspectives generates a 
dichotomous view of the events.  
  Students are left to their own opinions. 
Buchanan et 
al. (1998) 
S General Belief in cognitive                              
  developmental theories                                 










Elby (2001) CS Physics Physics as a connected web of         
ideas  
Learning physics as relating concepts 
to problem solving techniques 
↔ Problems and class discussions fostering a 
reconciliation between intuitions and 
conceptual understanding 
Attention to students’ beliefs 
Active teacher’s role during class 
discussions 
Great attention to sequencing of learning 
experiences (from materials to 
assessment) 





E History Ability to think historically             ↔ Use of various sources only to provide 






CS History Teaching history as possibility       
   tell different stories 




Awareness of potentialities and drawback 
of specific pedagogical choices 




E Science Constructivist beliefs about             













Emphasis on active role of the learner 
Attention to alternative conceptions and 
need for conceptual change 
Centrality of theory 
Use of refutation, persuasion, and 
solicitation of questioning 
Rehearse of “correct answers” 
Repeat explanations 
Interpretation of “wrong” answer as 
procedural failings 
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Not directly addressed, but             
   history as information 
↔ Primary sources are used to add 
information, identify bias, and do 
historical interpretation. However context 
is largely ignored. 
Husbands et 
al. (2003) 
CS History History as disciplinary inquiry        ↔ Epistemic cognition as part of subject 
knowledge 
Source work as part of doing history 
Lipson et al. 
(2000) 














More active involvement of students 
Authentic and varied writing practices 
Writing process more flexible 
Acknowledgement of students’ ownership 
Mini-lesson on writing improvement 
Individual conferences and peer-revision 
Centrality of curriculum (vs. children’s 
needs) 
Pacing decided at the classroom level 
Focus on phases of writing process and on 
grammar, but few guidance about 
improvement 






I Poetry Formalism                                         
 
↔ Unqualified praise of students’ work 
Avoidance of evaluation based on criteria 










Use of lab and small group learning 
Challenging prior knowledge 
Interactive discussion and questioning 












CS History Beliefs in the interpretive nature       
  of history 
Beliefs in children’s ability to think 
historically 
↔ Use of disciplinary heuristics 
Use of multiple sources 
Historical investigations 
Focus on perspective and positionality 
Group work 
Open consideration of epistemic issues 
 
 Yeager & 
Davis 
(1996) 
CS History History as constructed                      
History as story to be brought to      
   life 
↔ 
↔ 
Attention to subtext 
Use of documents to grab attention 
Use of documents to find correct 
information 
No consideration of context 
Reliance of the textbook for information 
Zohar et al. 
(2001) 
I  Various 
domains 
represented 
Belief that learning is sequential,      
following a hierarchical path 
↔ Higher order thinking activities are 
inappropriate for low-achieving students 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 







The Relation between Teachers’ Pedagogical Choices and Students’ Epistemic Stances: Summaryof Studies 
        Study           Design      Domain     School Level                 Teachers’ Strategies                                 Students’ Beliefs 
Bain (2000) CS History High 
  school 
Inquiry, with attention to the 
epistemic status of history 
Students view history as interpretation.  
  Yet, some develop an inquisitive 
attitude, others a cynical relativism 
Brickhouse et 
al. (2002) 
CS Astronomy College Lecture with some small group work 
and extensive writing assignments 
Students’ views about the nature of 
evidence and of theories varies across 
contexts (biology’s claims are 
perceived more credible than 
astronomy’s claim because data are 
thought as directly accessible) 
Dagher et al. 
(2004) 
CS Astronomy College Lecture with some small group work 
and extensive writing assignments 
Students’ understanding of the nature 
of scientific theories did not change 
enough to hypothesize an 
epistemological shift 
Elby (2001) CS Physics High 
school 
Problems and class discussions 
fostering a reconciliation between 
intuitions and conceptual 
understanding 
Attention to students’ beliefs 
Active teacher’s role during class 
discussions 
Great attention to sequencing of 
learning experiences (from materials 
to assessment) 
Willingness to accept a reduction in 
coverage  
Students in honor and normal classes 
score higher on MPEX and EBAPS 
(epistemological assessments 
measuring beliefs about the structure 
of knowledge, nature of learning, 
integration of math and concepts) 
Hammer 
(1995) 
CS Physics High 
school 
Teaching strategies accommodate 
students’ responses 
Inquiry based 
Students’ beliefs are perceived within a 
three levels framework: Structure of 





Problems connected to experience 
Discussion of alternative answers to 
problems 
Content of physics (formulas vs. 
concepts); Learning physics (by 
authority vs. independent) 
Jehng et al. 
(1993) 





(Probable) Open ended instructional 
environment (seminars); exposure to 
ill-structured problems 
Students score higher on Certainty of 
Knowledge, Omniscient Authority, 
and Orderly Process scales. No 
significant differences on Innate 
Ability and Quick Learning scales 
(Revised Schommer’s EQ)  
Kuhn et al. 
(1997) 
E General Middle 
school 
College 
Dyadic discussions Ability to consider alternatives 
increases 
Quality of justifications increases 
Awareness of one’s own 
certainty/conflict increases 
McNeal (1995) CS Math. Elementary Inquiry-based approach (mathematics 
as construction of relationships 
among real mathematical objects 
with solutions validated by the 
community of learners) vs. textbook 
approach (application of teacher’s 
directed strategies together with 
manipulation of objects and 
problem-solving for understanding) 
From mathematics as a sensible way of 
solving problems to mathematics as a 




CS Chemistry High 
school 
Student-centered learning 
environment; teacher as learner and 
modeler 
Laboratory fostering communal 
decision-making processes 
Activities and discussions prompting 
students to support reasoning with 
evidence 
Experiments as a way to disprove 
students’ emerging theories 
Some anxiety and confusion, especially 






Miflin et al. 
(1999, 2000) 
PE Medicine Graduate Student-centered, problem based 
approach 
Lack of sharing of learning goals with 
students 
Strategies perceived as lack of 
guidance, depriving students of an apt 









(Probable) Exposure to ill-structured 
problems 
Students score higher on Certainty of 
Knowledge scale (Schommer’s EQ)  
Ryder et al. 
(1999) 
CS Science College Involvement in original scientific 
research for final year research 
project 
Lectures on history of science 
Students’ view of science changed 
differently across domains, project 
contexts and project focuses 
(experimental techniques vs. 




CS History Elementary Use of disciplinary heuristics 
Use of multiple sources 
Historical investigations 
Focus on perspective and positionality 
Group work 
Open consideration of epistemic 
issues 
Students become aware of the role of 
historians in the generation of 
historical knowledge and of 
disciplinary heuristics. 




Andre (1998)                   
E Biology College Constructivist approach (exploratory  
computer-based simulations) vs. 
objectivist learning environment 
(computer-based simulation with 
detailed instructions)  
Students scoring high on Schommer’s 
EQ perform better than students 
scoring low in the constructivist 
environment; students scoring low on 
Schommer’s EQ perform better than 
students scoring high in the scripted 
condition.  
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E Science College Naïve vs. sophisticated 
epistemological beliefs (Total 
score on Schommer 63-items 
questionnaire) 
↔ Sophisticated beliefs are particularly 
facilitating comprehension of multiple 
texts 
Davis (2003) QE Science Middle 
school 
Belief in the tentativeness of           
science 
↔ Use of strategies for understanding (vs. 
memorizing) 
Elby (2001) CS Physics High 
school 
Beliefs about the structure of          
knowledge, nature of learning, 
integration of math and concepts 
as measured by the MPEX and 
EBAPS 
↔ High performance on conceptual tests 
Hofer, B.K. 
(1999) 
S Math. College Math as Simple                            
 
Math as an Isolated Activity           
(scales built with items from lists 
of students’ typical beliefs about 





Higher use of elaboration strategies 
Lower intrinsic motivation 
Lower self-efficacy 
Lower self-regulation 












Certainty of Knowledge                  
(scales from 42-items instrument 







Lower use of strategies aiming at 
developing awareness, building 
intrasentential and intersentential ties, 
and resolving ambiguities  
Less strategies aiming at building 
intersentential ties 
Inaccurate text processing 












College Certain Knowledge                         
(scales from 42-items instrument 
built on SEQ) 
↔ Less tentativeness in drawing 
conclusions 
 





D History Elementary 
and 
Middle 
Different conceptions of                    
  evidence and historical  
  accounts arranged in a  
  6-level progression 
↔ Increased ability to build historical 
  arguments based on the sources 
  provided 
Increased ability to deal with issues of 









Quick Learning                                
 
 
Fixed Ability                                   
(scales from SEQ) 










Lower intrinsic goal orientation 
Lower task value 
Lower control of learning 
Lower self-efficacy 
Higher text anxiety 
Lower intrinsic goal orientation 
Lower task value 
Lower control of learning 
Lower intrinsic goal orientation 
Lower task value 





















Higher use of rehearsal strategies 
Lower use of elaboration and 
metacognitive strategies 
Lower effort regulation 
Lower use of rehearsal, organization, 
elaboration, metacognitive, peer-
learning, and help-seeking strategies 






Quick Learning                                
(scales from SEQ)  












Innate Ability                                  
Quick Learning                       
Certain and Simple Knowledge    
(scales from 53-items instrument 
built on SEQ) 
↔ Less susceptibility to conceptual change 
inducted by a refutational text 
Rouet et al. 
(1998) 
D History Graduate 
 students 
Sources conveying content,            
  authorship, and evidence 




Analysis uses multiple criteria. Sources 
are used to build arguments 
Analysis looks only at content. Conflict 
among sources is dismissed and trust is 






College Quick Learning                               
 
 
Certain Knowledge                         





Drawing of oversimplified conclusions 
Poorer performance on mastery test 
Overestimation of understanding 
Drawing of certain conclusion even if 





College Simple Knowledge                         
 (scale from SEQ) 
↔ Poorer comprehension 
Overestimation of understanding 
Less adaptive test preparation strategies 
Schommer et 
al. (1993) 
S General High 
school 
Quick Learning                               
 (scale from SEQ) 
↔ Lower GPA 




College Certainty of Knowledge                  
Omniscient Authority 
 
Quick Learning                                






Inferior quality solutions of an ill-
defined problem; no difference in 
syllogistic reasoning. 









S General College Fixed Ability                                   
 
Simple Knowledge                          




Lower use of agentic, elaborative, and 
deep thinking processes 
Higher use of agentic processes 
 




College Seek Single Answer                      
Don’t Criticize Authority 
Ambiguous Information 
Dependence on Authority 
Certain Knowledge 
(25 items from SEQ) 
 
Openness to beliefs change             
Cognitive flexibility 
(same scales used in the 









Less acceptance of theory of human 
evolution, but no difference in 
acceptance of theory of animal 
evolution and photosynthesis and 
respiration. 
No difference found in knowledge 
about the theory of human evolution 
Moderately higher acceptance of theory 
of human evolution, but no difference 








College Openness to belief change               
Cognitive flexibility 
(scales vaguely resembling 
Schommer’s Simple 
Knowledge and Certain 
Knowledge sub-scales) 
↔ Evaluation of evidence independently 




CS History High 
School 
Professors 
Text as voice                                   
 




Focus on subtext; reading driven by 
reader’s questions 
Inability to understand subtext; inability 
to deal with conflict; reading driven 




E Biology College Complexity of acquiring                         
knowledge   









S General College Speed of Knowledge Acquisition   
Characteristics of Successful          
 students 
Attainability of Objective Truth 
Knowledge Construction and 
Modification 
 (scales from 80-items instrument 





Small correlation with GPA 
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College History as interpretive activity Increased course grade 
Increased transfer of strategies to other 
disciplines 
Increased regulation of learning (planning, 




CS History Elementary Discussion of the nature of 
historical knowledge, 
exposure to historical inquiry, 
and teaching of domain-
specific heuristics.  
 
Increased use of experts’ heuristics 
Increased use of intertextual comprehension 
strategies 
Increased general motivation 
Individual differences noted among students. 
Zohar & Dori 
(2003) 
QE Science High School Problem-based instruction 
Inquiry 
Critical assessment of 
newspaper clips 
Discussion of dilemmas 
Metacognitive reflection on the 
tasks performed 
Engagement with transfer 
activities 
    
High and low achieving students improve 
number and complexity of questions posed 
High and low achieving students improve the 
quality of their argumentation (expression 
and justification of claims) 
High and low achieving students improve 
their general and domain specific reasoning 
skills (identify assumptions, avoiding 
tautologies, isolating variables, testing 
hypotheses, identifying relevant 
information, recognizing logical fallacies, 




High and low achieving students improve in 
content knowledge 





QE Biology High School Examination of moral dilemmas 
in bioethics 
Explicit teaching of 
argumentation skills 
(formulation or arguments, 
counterarguments and their 
justification) 
Students increase reference to evidence in 
their arguments 











In this chapter, I focus on the methods of the study.  I begin by describing the 
participants and the setting of the study, the measures used for data collection, and the 
theoretical justifications for these specific choices.  After describing the procedures 
followed during the phase of data collection, I focus on the analysis of the data and 
especially on the development of the rubrics used for the analysis of the qualitative 
data. 
Participants 
Three high-school teachers, Ellen, Lauren, and Danielle participated in the 
study.  In deciding to run the study in the high school, I have especially considered 
the possibility of observing teachers engaged in the process of fostering student ’ 
historical thinking.  The literature reviewed does not suggest that historical thinking is 
possible only with older students.  However, common practice is usually not aligned 
with research results and historical thinking is seldom addressed in elementary and 
middle schools.  At the same time, the diffusion of history Advanced Placement 
courses in the high schools has familiarized teachers and students with document-
based assessments and thus has increased the occasions to wrestle with epistemic
issues.  In addition, high-school teachers tend to have a higher degree of 
specialization in the discipline taught, thus increasing the possibility of observing a 
more diversified range of epistemic stances. 
The teachers were known to me and I selected them after a preliminary visit to
their classroom on the basis of a set of characteristics that made them promising 
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participants in the study.  All of them worked in a school system that encourages the 
use of a variety of primary sources and analysis of documents in teaching history.  It 
also encourages writing in history.  These strategies have been used to foster 
epistemic development and the literature has reported some success (Bain, 2000; 
VanSledright, 2002).  In addition, two of these teachers worked in the same school, 
but taught US History to two very different groups of students; Ellen taught a group 
of freshmen, who had been identified by their middle schools as challenged readers 
while Lauren taught a honor course to juniors.  Danielle also taught honors US 
History to juniors, but in a different high-school. 
These teachers also seemed to differ in their pedagogical practice.  Duringmy 
preliminary visit to their classrooms, I noticed that Ellen had developed a series of 
scaffolds to support her students in the analysis of sources, writing of accounts, and 
participation in class discussion.  On the other hand, Lauren tended to infuse the 
historical narrative with primary sources, but at the same time seemed to focus 
students’ attention on a few main events identified in the textbook.  Finally, Danielle 
seemed willing to take the risk and the time to let students explore multiple 
perspectives and she also introduced several primary sources to enliven her historical 
narrative.   
With the help of each teacher, one specific class was selected for the study 
and student participation was solicited during the first classroom visit.  Only in the
case of Lauren’s class all students provided parental consent.  In the case of Ellen’s 
and Danielle’s class only few students returned a signed consent.  Among those 
students that provided parental consent, with the help of their teacher, I selected four 
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students in each class representing various levels of academic achievement and 
attitudes to act as student informants.  Specifically, Kalyna, Jane, Eric, and Rick were 
freshmen and attended Ellen’s class (all names are pseudonyms).  Their average 
grade in the history class at the end of the semester was 3.25 (SD = 0.96).  Chris, 
Juliet, Monica, and Kate attended Lauren’s class.  Their average grade at the end of 
the semester was 2.5 (SD = 0.5).  Mark, Jack, Elizabeth, and Ashley attended 
Danielle’s class.  Their average final grade in the history class wa 2.25 (SD = 0.83).  
With the exception of Kalyna, who was an ESL student from Eastern Europe, all the 
informants were Caucasians, who spoke English as their first language.   
In the case of Lauren’s class, I included those 27 additional students who 
agreed to participate and were present in class for both administrations of the BHQ 
(25 students) or for both administrations of the CRT (23 students).  Following this 
criteria, only one student from Lauren’s class was not included in the study, because 
absent on multiple days in which data were collected.  This group was formed by 12 
males and 15 females; their average final grade in the history class was 2.06  
(SD = 1.07).  
Measures 
I have organized the measures used in the study in two main sections.  The 
first section describes instruments used with teachers and the second one describ s 
instruments used with students.  In general, I have tried to assess epistemic beliefs 
and historical thinking using a plurality of measures with the intent to triangulate 




Teacher Questionnaire.  The Teacher Questionnaire (see Appendix A) is an 
open-ended questionnaire.  The purpose of this measure is to collect data about 
teachers’ knowledge of history, their professional experience, their general 
educational goals, their goals in teaching history, and their level of confidence in 
reaching the stated goals in that particular class setting.  A follow-up interview that 
took place at the end of the semester gave teachers the opportunity to elaborate on 
their answers.  Informal interviews and observations throughout the duration of the 
study also aimed at gaining understanding of teachers’ affective involvement with the 
students. 
Evaluation of students’ essays.  The evaluation of students’ essays (see 
Appendix B) has been adapted from a task used by Wilson and Wineburg to 
understand the knowledge of history teachers (Wineburg & Wilson, 2001).  In their 
study, this measure proved particularly effective in eliciting teachers’ p dagogical 
priorities and what counts as historical knowledge to teachers.   
Teachers were given four essays to grade and asked to make comments on 
each essay that they felt might be useful to students.  With the exception of Danielle, 
who completed part of the task while thinking aloud, teachers completed the task by 
themselves.  I then interviewed them and asked about the criteria they used in grading
the papers, the level of students’ knowledge they perceived by reading the essays,
eventual students’ misconceptions emerged from the essays, and their pedagogical 
recommendations.  These interviews also took place at the end of the semester. 
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Beliefs about History Questionnaire (BHQ).  The purpose of this measure 
(see Appendix C) is to assess teachers’ epistemic stances directly.  The BHQ is a 22-
items questionnaire assessing history-specific epistemic beliefs and i ref nement of 
a measure whose factor structure was investigated in previous studies (Maggioni, 
Alexander, & VanSledright, 2004; Maggioni, VanSledright, & Alexander, 2009).  
Respondents are asked to express their position on statements regarding the nature of 
history and learning history by means of a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  In constructing the questionnaire, I referred 
to descriptions of progression in epistemic cognition offered by King and Kitchener 
(2002) and Kuhn and Weinstock (2002) as hints of what kind of relations between the 
knower and the known may characterize different epistemic stances.  Then, I ref rred 
to the characteristics of historical thinking across different levels of expertise and, in 
particular, to the progression in the second order knowledge concept of evidence (Lee 
& Shemilt, 2003) to formulate statements reflecting these different epistemic stances 
in the history domain.   
For example, one of the characteristics of pre-reflective thinking (King and 
Kitchener’s model), and of the realist and absolutist levels in the LEU model (Kuhn 
and Weinstock’s model) is a view of knowledge as directly obtainable.  In history, 
such view is very similar to the one characterizing students at the first two levels in 
Lee and Shemilt’s (2003) progression.  Failing to recognize any difference betw en 
history and the past, these students seemed to believe that history simply reflects the 
past. 
In a previous study, Maggioni, VanSledright, and Alexander (2009) termed 
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the epistemic stance underlying this view as Copier, because the thinker operates 
from the idea that the past and history are copies of one another.  The set of items 
created to exemplify views of learning history aligned with the copier stance paints an 
authorless view of history.  Examples include, “In history there is really nothing o 
understand: the facts speak for themselves” and “To learn history means mainly to 
study many facts about the past and commit them to memory.”  
Similarly, an item constructed to mirror quasi-reflective reasoning (multiplist 
level, in the LEU model) with its uncertainty and idiosyncrasy is: “Since there is no 
way to know what really happened in the past, students can believe whatever story 
they choose.” In history, elements of this view characterize people who realize that 
the past becomes visible to us mainly through the voices of witnesses and tend to 
conceive evidence as testimony (third and fourth levels in Lee and Shemilt’s 
progression).  Yet, once faced by a plurality of testimonies and lacking those 
disciplinary tools and criteria that allow investigators to deal with issues of bias and 
perspective, these individuals try to discriminate between “correct” and “incorrect” 
residuals of the past to build a description of it.  However, whenever the attempt at 
discrimination between “good” and “bad” witnesses fails, people adopting this stance 
tend to withdraw to the belief that history is fundamentally subjective and the past is 
made by whomever writes it.   
We named the epistemic stance underlying this quasi-reflective reasoning 
about evidence as the Borrower stance (Maggioni et al., 2009).  This label highlighted 
that individuals tend to “borrow” a history from accounts or pieces of accounts based 
on instinctive preferences or casual selections.  Further examples of items designe  to 
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describe a view of history in line with this borrower stance are “Good students know 
that history is basically a matter of opinion,” and “Historical claims cannot be 
justified, since they are simply a matter of interpretation.” 
Reflective thinking (evaluativist level, in the LEU model) is tapped by items 
such as: “It is fundamental that students are taught to support their reasoning with 
evidence,” and “Comparing sources and looking for author subtext are essential 
components of the process of learning history.”  We termed the stance of people 
agreeing with these statements as Criterialist to highlight a view of history as a 
process of inquiry, in which the questions asked by investigators inform the analysis 
of the sources (Maggioni et al., 2009).  Thus, criteria are necessary for deciding what 
can count as addressing the question.  From the point of view of learning and history, 
this view favors a focus on the use of criteria historical investigators can use for 
formulating historical arguments based on sound evidence from the past. 
In previous studies we investigated the factor structure of a similar instrument, 
the Beliefs about Learning and Teaching History Questionnaire (BLTHQ) and found 
it theoretically compatible with the epistemic stances emerging from the research of 
Lee and his colleagues (Maggioni, et al. 2004; Maggioni, et al., 2009).  In an attempt 
to increase the reliability of the scales, items of the BLTHQ with low loadings on the 
theoretically meaningful factors were substituted with new statements, previously 
tested in a pilot study with college students.  This questionnaire (Beliefs about 
History Questionnaire or BHQ) was then used as part of a battery of measures in a 
study with 66 elementary, middle-school, and high-school teachers participating in a 
professional development program.   
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Analyses of the data supported the theoretical compatibility of the scales 
derived from this questionnaire with the aforementioned theoretical framework and 
thus I decided to use the BHQ in the current study.  In particular, from the exploratory 
factor analysis (Principal components, Varimax rotation) two factors emerg d.  Seven 
items describing a borrower stance and four items describing a copier stance lo ded 
together on the first factor.  Eight items describing a criterialist stance loaded on the 
second factor, together with three items describing a Borrower stance, loading n the 
same factor but with negative sign.  Cronbach alphas for scales built on the basis of 
the factors emerged from the exploratory factor analysis were .78 for the 
borrower/copier scale (First Factor) and .72 for the criterialist scale (Second Factor).   
I found this factor structure theoretically compatible with the progression 
hypothesized in the literature, since the borrower stance shares with the copier stanc  
a lack of criteria in dealing with interpretation of conflicting accounts.  On the other 
hand, availability of criteria to build historical arguments based on evidence 
characterizes the criterialist stance.  Teachers completed the BHQ last, during 
structured interviews that took place at the end of the semester in order to limit
interference with their thinking and potentially their pedagogical practice.   
Constructed Response Task (CRT).  The purpose of this task (see Appendix 
D) is to assess historical thinking in action.  Similar tasks have been used in several
studies targeting historical thinking and reading and writing in history.  It has also 
allowed researchers to observe how people use evidence to construct historical 
arguments.  The task comprises 6 documents about beliefs concerning the shape of 
the Earth entertained by contemporaries of Columbus.  Teachers were asked to read 
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the documents while thinking aloud and to articulate a constructed response 
answering the following question: “Based on the documents provided, what was the 
prevalent belief about the shape of the Earth at the time of Columbus? What makes 
you think so? Please explain your reasoning.” 
Interest Questionnaire (Teacher).  This is a 13 items, 10-point Likert scale 
questionnaire asking teachers to indicate how often they participate in a series of 
history related activities (see Appendix E).  Items refer to activities indicative of 
general interest in historical topics (e.g., watching historical documentaries) nd to 
activities expressing participation in the professional discourse (e.g., reading 
scholarly history books and give talk about a history topic at public meetings).  The 
questionnaire has been used in the evaluation of professional development programs 
involving K-12 teachers.  Reliability of the scale measured by Cronbach alpha varied 
from .79 to .89 across various groups of teachers.  Teachers completed this 
questionnaire in writing at their own convenience. 
Students 
Student Questionnaire.  This questionnaire collects demographic data (e.g., 
grade, age, gender) and academic data (e.g., previous year’s GPA, final grade in 
English, and reading score on MSA test).  It also asks students to list the history 
classes taken in the previous years and to rate their confidence about learning history 
during the semester (see Appendix F).  Student informants completed this 
questionnaire at their own convenience, at the beginning of the semester. 
Beliefs about History Questionnaire (BHQ).  This is the same instrument 
described above in the Teachers’ section.  Students were asked to complete it twice,
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during structured interviews that took place toward the middle and at the end of the 
semester (see Appendix C), immediately after the completion of the Constructed 
Response Tasks. 
Constructed Response Tasks (CRTs).  The purpose of these tasks is to 
assess historical thinking in action and to monitor changes during the period of the 
study.  In the CRT, students read a set of 6 written documents while thinking aloud 
with the purpose of answering a specific question (e.g., “Based on the documents 
provided, what was the prevalent belief about Captain Cook among the Hawaiians? 
What makes you think so? Please explain your reasoning.”).  Two document sets, 
parallel in length, difficulty, and potential construction of argument, with parallel 
associated questions were assembled.  The first, administered toward the midle of 
the semester, regarded the landing of Captain Cook on Hawaii (see Appendix G); the
second, administered at the end of the semester, addressed ideas about the shape of 
the Earth during Columbus’s time and was the same that I used with teachers (see 
Appendix D).   
Procedures 
The study took place during the fall semester of the academic year 2006-2007.  
Before beginning any kind of data collection, I met with each teacher to explain the 
purpose of the study, obtain consent, and decide with them which of their classes I 
would be observing.  During my first visit, teachers introduced me to the students and 
I had the opportunity to present the overall purpose of the study to them and to solicit 
their participation.  Although class observations took place across the whole semester, 
I tried to observe at least a whole unit of instruction in each class.  This school system
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had adopted a module schedule, and classes met every other day for 90 minutes.  On 
average, I visited each class about 20 times, observing an average of 15 full class 
periods for each teacher and using the remaining visits for student interviews and 
partial class observations.  I took field notes during classes and reviewed them 
immediately afterwards, expanding on details that I could not write down 
immediately.  In separate sections, I also noted my reflections on what I had just 
observed and their eventual relevance for the study. 
The think-alouds and structured interviews with student informants took place 
in a quiet room made available in the schools.  Teachers were interviewed in their 
classes at a time convenient to them.  Teachers and student informants practiced the 
think-aloud procedure on a short article from Muse magazine.  Once they seemed 
comfortable with the procedure, I told them that I was interested in understanding 
what went through their minds while they were reading the texts and how they built a 
response to the question asked by the task.   
Although I encouraged these participants to read the texts aloud (and most of 
them actually did), I told them that they could read silently if they felt that reading 
aloud was hindering their comprehension.  In one case (Jane), I read the documents 
aloud to the student who would not otherwise have been able to complete the task.  If 
student informants remained silent for a long period of time, they were reminded to 
verbalize what they were thinking.  Because my main interest related to students’ 
ability to think historically, I invited students to ask me questions if they could not 
understand specific words in the texts, which a few of them did.  Once they had 
finished reading the texts, if students did not address it spontaneously, I also 
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reminded them of the question asked by the task.  Finally, I also asked students 
whether they had read and used the references, whether they thought that the 
documents agreed with each other, and how they managed eventual conflicts.  Other 
occasional questions mainly asked students to clarify statements that seemed obscure 
to me.  A structured interview followed, during which I asked students to express and 
explain their degree of agreement or disagreement with the items of the BHQ.  The 
entire session, encompassing think-aloud, oral response to and discussion of the task 
question, and interview, was audiotaped and later transcribed by me.   
With the permission of the teachers, I collected materials distributed in class 
and copies of students’ work relevant to the purpose of the study.  The additional 
group of 27 students in Lauren’s class completed the BQH and the CRTs in writing, 
the first time in October and the second time in January.   
Data Analysis 
Kinds of Data and Units of Analysis 
Qualitative data for this study come from three main sources: interviews with 
student informants and teachers; field-notes taken during class observations; ar facts 
(e.g., worksheets; material distributed in class) collected during observations; and 
student written responses to the CRTs.  Within each source, I defined the unit of 
analysis as follows: 
1. Interviews: the unit of analysis is the student (or teacher) utterance 
spontaneously offered as a response to the texts read or associated with a 
prompt provided by the Constructed Response Task, by a statement in the 
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BHQ, or by a question asked during the teachers’ interviews.  An 
utterance corresponds to a complete sentence in the transcripts. 
2. Field-notes and associated artifacts: the unit of analysis is a whole 
pedagogical segment, defined as a sequence of teacher and student 
activities addressing a specific goal (e.g., a lecture introducing a specific 
topic; a task assigned to students in class).  I analyzed artifacts within the 
context in which they were collected. 
3. Students’ written responses to the CRTs: since I analyzed these data with 
the main purpose to test trends that emerged from the analysis of students’ 
think-alouds, the unit of analysis was the whole student’s response.  
Specifically, I looked for explicit reference to or evaluation of sources; 
awareness of the texts’ authors; quotations from the documents 
(appropriate or inappropriate, in the context of the specific student’s 
claim); citation of factual information (correct or incorrect, according to 
the documents provided); decision criteria (e.g., accepting the view 
portrayed in the majority of the documents); and unwarranted additions to 
what suggested by the documents.   
Quantitative data come from the BHQ completed in writing by the 25 students 
in Lauren’s class; I used them to test the following hypotheses emerged from the 
analyses of the qualitative data: 
1. Do student responses to the BHQ suggest the same kind of “epistemic 
inconsistency” emerged in the interviews? 
2. What kind of ideas emerged as particularly problematic? 
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3. What kind of change, if any, emerged from the comparison of the data 
obtained at the two administrations? 
Analyses of Data from Think-alouds and Structured Interviews 
On the basis of the literature and prior studies (Maggioni et al., 2004; 
Maggioni et al., 2009), I began the analysis by including categories reflective of a 
copier, borrower, and criterialist ance.  I also looked for evidence of use of those 
heuristics identified in the literature as signaling historical thinking a d evidence of 
pedagogical practices that may influence historical thinking and epistemic b liefs.  In 
addition, I attributed specific codes to statements that explicitly mentioned the 
certainty or the truthfulness of knowledge, given the relevance attributed to hese 
characteristics of knowledge in the literature. 
I then began an iterative process of analysis, adding new categories to 
represent aspects emerging from the data that were not previously captured by th  
rubric, and checking the revised rubric against the data, until most of the data could 
be coded according to the rubric.  Thus, I used both deduction and induction in the 
development of the rubric.  Although I was open to acknowledge new aspects of 
epistemic and historical thinking emerging from the data, I also tried to create a 
parsimonious rubric, adding new categories only when a certain characteristic of 
epistemic thinking or historical thinking manifested itself across different 
participants.  Finally, as a result of discussions occurred with a colleague while 
working at improving interrater reliability, I refined the structure of the scale and 
further sharpened the descriptions of the sub-categories.   
128 
 
The rubric.   Appendix H shows the final rubric used for scoring the data.  
The rubric reflects two increasingly fine grained levels of analysis.  Using a coarse 
image, the first level identifies the first four preliminary “piles” into which I divided 
the data; the second level describes the main features of each “pile”.  Specifically, the 
first level comprises four main categories: Epistemic Beliefs; Historical Thinking; 
Use of Reading Strategies; and Others.  Epistemic cognition and historical thinking 
are the main constructs investigated by this study and thus my attention in analyzing 
the data was clearly drawn to find evidence of their manifestation.  The study of 
reading strategies exceeds the purposes of this study; however, I decided to create a 
specific category to code them due to the great number of utterances signaling these 
behaviors, especially during the completion of the CRTs.  I also decided to create an 
overarching category grouping constructs less central, although still pertinent, to the 
study, to be able to calculate meaningful reliability indexes for the various levels of 
analysis. 
 The finer grain level of analysis identifies the characteristics of epistemic 
beliefs and historical thinking emerged from the iterative process described in the 
prior section and specifies the other constructs used to analyze the data.  Specifically, 
sub-categories 1-6 regard characteristics of epistemic beliefs; sub-categories 7-11 
regard statements dealing with historical thinking; sub-categories 12-17 specify th  
other constructs used for analyzing the data.  In particular, sub-category 12 comprises 
strategies employed while responding to the task that are not typical of thinking 
historically, although they may sometimes be helpful (e.g., local and global rest ting; 
interpreting; elaborating; re-reading; asking meaning of words), sub-category 13 
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groups statements dealing with teacher and student motivation; sub-category 14 
gathers statements and actions regarding pedagogical practices potentially influencing 
epistemic ideas or historical thinking; sub-category 15 groups statements mtioning 
the idea of truth in relation to knowledge; sub-category 16 regards statements 
referring to the idea of certainty of knowledge; and, finally, sub-category 17 groups 
those statements that I was unable to interpret clearly because participants said too 
little to allow a sufficiently unambiguous interpretation of what they meant or were
just a repetition of the prompt. 
Description of the categories.  In this section, I focus on the first 11 
categories and expand on their description given that they represent the central 
constructs of the study.  I also indicate in what way those categories reflect constructs 
already used in the literature and to what extent they introduce new facets of 
epistemic beliefs and historical thinking.  I concentrate on the Epistemic Beliefs sub-
categories, first. 
 Epistemic beliefs sub-categories (1-6).  On the basis of prior studies 
(Maggioni et al., 2004, Maggioni et al., 2009), I began the analysis using three sub-
categories (Copier, Borrower, and Criterialist) that were overall compatible with 
Kuhn’s and King and Kitchener’s model of epistemic development (King & 
Kitchener, 2002; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002) and with the developmental trajectory of 
the concepts of evidence and historical accounts as described in the work of Lee and 
his colleagues (Lee, 2004; Lee & Ashby, 2000; Lee & Shemilt, 2003).  In particular, 
following Kuhn and Weinstock (2002), I found it particularly useful to characterize 
different epistemic beliefs along a continuum representing different combinations of 
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the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing.  The descriptions that follow are 
ordered with reference to this characterization. 
On one end of the objective-subjective continuum, the first sub-category 
EBCO (Copier) describes a view of knowing in which there is no overall awareness 
of the role of the knower and evidence is therefore conceived as detached from 
argument.  Two main ideas consistently tended to characterize this stance across the 
data; the first one can be described as the belief that history coincides with the past 
and it is thus constrained by the availability of its remnants (e.g., documents, artifacts, 
and bones).  Examples of this way of thinking were offered by utterances in which the 
words “history” and “past” were used as synonyms.  The second idea regards the role 
of historians, conceived as chroniclers or serendipitous finders of remnants of the 
past.  At best, historians are entrusted with the task of discriminating between tru  
and false artifacts or witnesses, but the weight of generating knowledge remains 
heavily dependent upon its object.  Similar ideas were also reported by Lee (2004), 
who found that some students tended to explain differences among historical accounts 
as a result of the impossibility of “being there” (in the past) or as a consequence of 
accessing different remnants of the past.  Again, similarly to what I found in this 
study, some students were seeing evidence as granting immediate access to th  past 
and blamed eventual problems on the incorrectness of the “information” (Lee & 
Shemilt, 2003). 
On the opposite side of the objective-subjective continuum lies the third sub-
category, EBSUB (Subjectivist).  In this case, the role of the knower in the process of 
knowing is perceived as predominant and for the most part unbound by any reference 
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to something existing outside of the knower.  Participants reflecting this stance often 
voiced the idea that history depends on the views of those who write it and thus it 
becomes a matter of opinion.  Whenever objective remnants of the past were 
mentioned, participants discounted them, on the ground that their use became a matter 
of choice and interpretation was therefore at the mercy of the historian’s personal 
opinions.  Also in this case, the findings of this study echoed what reported in Lee’s 
work (2004), where some students explained differences in accounts as an “author 
problem,” due to mistakes or differences in points of view.  In this study, statements 
reflecting these beliefs generally underscored issues of personal opinions and/or bias 
and rarely mentioned the difficulty in discriminating among different testimon es that 
we had hypothesized was at the root of this stance.  Thus, I decided to name this 
category Subjectivist and drop the term Borrower that we had created to interpret the 
factors emerging from the administration of a questionnaire similar to the BHQ to 
teachers (Maggioni et al., 2004, Maggioni et al., 2009). 
The remaining sub-categories describe increasingly successful attempts to 
integrate the role of the object and of the subject in the generation of knowledge.  In 
the rubric, I named two of these stances as transitional, because individuals seemed to 
oscillate between the arguments and ideas characterizing the two extremes of th  
continuum (within the same utterance), while remaining unable to produce a 
coordinated synthesis. 
I consider sub-category 2, TR1 (Transition 1), first.  Participants expressing 
this epistemic stance voiced the desirability of a coincidence of history with the past.  
In other words, historians were viewed as “wannabe” chroniclers, thus sharing much 
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of the copier stance.  However, these individuals were also aware that complete 
knowledge of the past is always, or at least very often, impossible because the 
interpretation of what we have left from the past is debatable or because we are 
simply left with too little.  In all these cases, these participants saw history as a 
hopelessly subjective endeavor and it became just a matter of opinion, echoing 
several of the ideas characterizing a subjectivist stance.  However, contrary to a 
purely subjectivist stance, they did not believe that this was a universal condition for 
historical knowledge and, in general, regretted these occurrences.  In particular, hey 
tended to cast the difference between possible and impossible (or subjective) history 
as a dichotomy between objective facts and opinions that cannot be challenged.  In a 
few cases, however, participants indicated that out of a multiplicity of opinions (and 
sometimes because of it) the truth about the past could be reached (or, at least, one 
could make up one’s mind).   
Sub-category 4 (TR2, Transition 2) signals clear movement toward 
coordination between object and subject of knowledge and is expressed by statements 
that acknowledge that history is the interpretive work of the historian based on the 
evidence.  However, these statements also suggest lack of clarity about the method 
that may make such coordination possible.   
The final developmental step envisioned in Kuhn’s and King and Kitchener’s 
models involves the coordination of the objective and subjective aspects of knowing, 
a stance represented in the sub-category 5 of the rubric and coded as EBCR 
(Criterialist).  Individuals sharing this stance would recognize the interpretive role of 
the historian in choosing and evaluating the remnants of the past.  In Lee’s terms 
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(2004), they would acknowledge that differences among accounts depend on the very 
nature of historical accounts.  However, they would also acknowledge that such 
interpretive work relies on specific disciplinary criteria and heuristics that 
characterize the historical method.  For example, this method allows the historian to 
transform the remnants of the past into evidence, by asking to the sources questions 
that they were not necessarily designed to answer and by placing them in their 
historical context.  I also created sub-category 6 to group statements expre sing 
epistemic ideas that did not fit the previous categorizations. 
Historical thinking sub-categories (7-11).  Sub-categories 7-11 regard 
various aspects of historical thinking.  I began the analysis by looking at statements 
signaling the use of heuristics that the literature suggested typical of hist rical 
thinking (Lee & Ashby, 2000; VanSledright, 2002; Wineburg, 2001a).  Within this 
broad category, I found utterances suggesting the use of heuristics clearly signaling 
historical thinking and utterances suggesting the use of heuristics clearly incompatible 
with thinking historically.  Three additional sub-categories were created to describe 
other kind of processes that participants used, especially while completing the CRT.  
In the end, five sub-categories seemed to capture the aspects of historical thinking 
emerging from the data. 
Sub-category 7 (HTYes, Historical Thinking Yes) comprises those utterances 
signaling that participants were using heuristics (e.g., sourcing, corroboration, and 
contextualization) characterizing historical thinking.  I coded in the same way 
utterances signaling that participants were knowledgeable about these heuristics.  
Sub-category 8 (HTNo, Historical Thinking No) included evidence of use or evidence 
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of knowledge of heuristics clearly incompatible with historical thinking.  In order to 
be coded as HTNo, a statement or a process should consist in a positive affirmation of 
some declarative knowledge (e.g., the historical method is not necessary since one 
can know history well even without it) or in a strategy actually employed by the 
participants during the performance on the CRT (skipping the citations of the 
documents in the CRT because they could not provide information useful for the task 
at hand) that hinder the possibility of thinking historically.  In other words, I did not 
code as HTNo the mere lack of use of heuristics that would be deemed appropriate in 
order to think historically (sourcing), but the deliberate use of a strategy (skipping) 
that prevents historical thinking. 
Sub-category 9 (CP, Cut and Paste) regards those statements and processes 
that signal an approach already identified by Lee and Shemilt (2003) in regards to 
ideas about evidence and defined in that context as “scissor and paste”.  Several 
participants handled the CRT by selecting parts from different documents in order to 
build a more or less coherent story.  Their approach was “additive” and “selectiv ,” in 
the sense that they did not do any kind of intertextual comparison; on the contrary, 
they dismissed potential conflicting evidence.  While this approach clearly lacks 
fundamental features of historical thinking, it does not directly oppose it (like HTNo) 
and hence may require a different pedagogical intervention.  For this reason, I 
decided to identify these instances with a specific category. 
The awareness that historians do not mirror the past but investigate it in regard 
to specific questions is an important step in thinking historically (Lee & Ashby, 2000; 
Wineburg, 2001b).  Sub-category 10 (AQ, Awareness of the Question) gathers 
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evidence of participants’ awareness of the question they were trying to answer while 
completing the CRT.  Similarly, the awareness that a text has an author and is not a
mere conveyor of information is an important step in understanding the nature of 
historical accounts and has been found to influence text comprehension (Paxton, 
2002).  Sub-category 11 (AA, wareness of the author) gathers evidence of such 
awareness.   
Reliability.   Once the rubric was defined, I recoded all the data.  Given the 
number of subcategories, I coded one category (e.g., Historical Thinking, Epistemic 
Beliefs) at a time.  Another researcher, familiar with the overall purpose of the study 
but who had not participated to the development of the rubric, was explained the 
rubric and asked to score part of the data independently.  Specifically, I chose three 
students who, in my view, manifested a broad range of epistemic beliefs and different 
levels of historical thinking.  After training, the inter-rater agreement on the four main 
categories assessed using the Cohen’s Kappa index was .92.  The inter-rater 
agreement on the five Epistemic Beliefs sub-categories and on the five Historical 
Thinking sub-categories was also assessed; the Cohen’s Kappa indexes were .90 and 
.92, respectively.  Most disagreements regarded instances in which only my colleague 
or I attributed a code to a specific utterance.  Very rarely, we attributed diff rent 
codes to the same utterance.  Specifically, this happened only in 3% of the coding for 
the Epistemic Beliefs sub-categories.  In all these cases, after reflection, I decided 
about the final coding.   
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Analysis of Field Notes and Artifacts 
In analyzing the field notes, I first built short summaries of each lesson, 
identifying its main purposes and listing the methods, pedagogical moves, and the 
tasks used by the teacher to achieve them.  In this way, it became easier to identify 
patterns in the lesson structure and the prevalent pedagogical approaches and moves 
used by each teacher.  The review of class assignments and other artifacts (e.g., 
additional readings; worksheets) helped me to better understand the overall contexts 
of classroom exchanges and provided additional material to identify recurrent 
pedagogical practices. 
Analysis of Students’ Written Responses to the CRTs 
In analyzing students’ written responses to the CRTs, I referred to the aspects 
of historical thinking identified in the rubric (sub-categories 7-11), while remaining 
open to the emergence of new facets.  Specifically, the following categories seemed 
to capture well the aspects of historical thinking (or lack thereof) emerging from 
students’ written responses: a) explicit reference to a specific document; b) direct 
quotations from the documents (appropriate or inappropriate, in the context of the 
specific student’s claim); c) justification of response (e.g., accepting the view 
portrayed in the majority of the documents); d) citation of factual information (correct 
or incorrect), taken at face value from two or more documents (i.e., Cut and Paste); e) 
citation of factual information (correct or incorrect), taken at face value from one 
document; f) unwarranted additions to what suggested by the documents. 
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Analysis of Students’ Written Responses to the BHQ 
I analyzed the written responses to the BHQ adapting a method used in a 
previous study to analyze data obtained from college students responding in writing 
to the BHQ (Maggioni, VanSledright, & Reddy, 2009).  In that study, Maggioni and 
colleagues found that results obtained by using this method of analysis were 
compatible with results derived from qualitative analysis of students’ justifications of 
answers provided to the written BHQ.  These justifications were offered in writ g or 
during interviews.   
Since items in the BHQ were written to reflect copier (items 5, 9, 16, 19, and 
20), subjectivist (items 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, and 22), and criterialist (items 1, 3, 7, 
11, 13, 15, 18, and 21) stances, a consistent epistemic position should produce 
agreement with items mirroring that specific stance and disagreement with i ems 
indicative of the other two stances.  The first step in the analysis involved attributing 
values to the 6 levels of the Likert scale.  Although I did not intend to assume 
continuity of the scale, relative numbers seemed particularly apt for the purposes of 
this analysis, because their sign could represent the position toward the statement 
(agreement or disagreement) and their value could represent the strength of the 
decision (strongly or somewhat).  In this way, I sought to maintain the order captu ed 
by the Likert scale, while creating a useful tool for the analyses describ d in the rest 
of this section.   
First, I scored students’ responses using the following equivalencies: strongly 
agree = +3; agree = +2; somewhat agree = +1; somewhat disagree = -1; disagree = -2; 
strongly disagree = -3.  Then, I assessed each student overall position toward a certain 
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stance by calculating weighted average scores; I did so by summing the scores
obtained on the items reflecting that particular stance and dividing the result for the 
number of items mirroring that particular stance.  For example, a student who agreed 
with item 5 and 9, somewhat disagreed with item 16 and disagree with item 19, and 
strongly agreed with item 20 (all items reflecting a copier stance) would receive a 
score of [(+3)+(+2)+(-1)+(-2)+(+3)]/5 = +1.  I interpreted the sign of the score (+) as 
an indication that the student’s degree of agreement with the copier stance tended to 
be stronger than his degree of disagreement.  I interpreted the value of the score (1, in 
the example) as an indication that such agreement was overall moderate.  As such, I 
used it as a provisional suggestion of the compatibility (or not) of the student’s belief  
with one of the theoretically derived epistemic stances.  
Yet, this score does not indicate the consistency of the student’s stance.  In 
fact, another student might obtain the same score (+1) by somewhat agreeing with all 
the items reflecting the copier stance and thus suggesting a more consistent copi r 
stance.  I decided to assess students’ epistemic consistency in relation to the 
criterialist stance.  Two reasons motivated this choice.  First, most students tended to 
agree with items mirroring this stance, thus suggesting a relative preference for it 
(yet, how consistent was this preference?).  Second, beliefs characterizing the 
criterialist stance are theoretically preferable because they are more reflective of the 
nature of historical knowledge and generally preferred by experts (Maggioni et al., 
2004).  Thus, I was particularly interested in assessing change along this dimen ion. 
Perfect consistency with the criterialist stance would be indicated by 
responses stating agreement (+1, +2, or +3 scores) on all criterialist item  and 
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disagreement (-1, -2, or -3 scores) on all copier and subjectivist items.  To express the 
degree of consistency, I created a ratio (expressed in percentage) betwen the number 
of such responses and the total number of responses (22, if a student responded to all 
the items of the questionnaire).  I called this ratio consistency score. For example, a 
student agreeing with all the copier items (total = 5), disagreeing with all the 
subjectivist items (total = 9) and agreeing with all the criterialist items (total = 8) 
would obtain a consistency score of 77%, i.e., [(8 + 9 – 5)/22]*100.  
Finally, I calculated the median scores of each item of the BHQ and inspected 
the frequencies of their scores.  In this way, I identified those statemen s reflecting a 
copier and subjectivist stance that students tended to find particularly appealing and 











In choosing how to organize the reporting of the results of the study, I was 
faced with several options, and I was aware that each choice would have brought 
certain aspects of the study to the forefront leaving others in the background.  In 
particular, I could have looked at the data as evidence of the influence that the 
pedagogical practices and moves of participant teachers had on students’ epistemic 
beliefs and epistemic cognition.  Hence, I could have organized the results according 
to the time sequence in which I collected the data.  I have to admit that this was the 
kind of story that I thought I would write as a result of the study. 
However, the more I analyzed the data, the more I became convinced that the 
main contribution of the study to current theory and pedagogical practice lies in the 
descriptive richness of epistemic cognition it affords.  In particular, I believe that it 
contributes to unveil some key features of teachers’ and adolescents’ domain-specif c 
epistemic beliefs and historical thinking that can be particularly useful to those
educators who strive to promote epistemic development in their students.  These 
students may be adolescents enrolled in high-school history courses or practicing 
teachers involved in professional development.  Be as it may, being aware of where 
they can be met on their developmental path and what stumbling blocks they are 
likely to encounter can greatly facilitate the task of accompanying them along the 
way.   
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In line with the theoretical model, I focus on teachers first, considering their 
goals, their pedagogical practice, their epistemic beliefs and the features of their 
historical thinking.  By triangulating data from different sources (e.g., class 
observations, structured and semi-structured interviews, and tasks performances) and 
testing whether features emerging from one set of data are consistent (or at least 
compatible) with behaviors and ideas emerging from a different set of data, I aim to 
enrich and keep in check the perspective I necessarily brought to my observations 
with the teachers’ own voices.  For this reason, I do not aggregate results across 
teachers, although I will summarize the similarities and differences especially salient 
for the purpose of this study in a specific section following the portraits of these t ree 
professionals. 
Then, I focus on student epistemic beliefs and historical thinking, identifying 
the facets of these constructs that emerged from the data as particularly significant.  
In this way, I can profit of student pre- and post-data to offer a description of their 
thinking as nuanced as possible; considering the moderate changes observed between 
the two data collection points, this approach offers the additional advantage of 
avoiding useless repetitions.  However, I will highlight all observed changes i  
student beliefs and epistemic cognition in a specific section.   
I leave the consideration of the evidence suggesting how teachers may have 
contributed to the epistemic development (or lack thereof) of their students to the 
discussion section, given the higher degree of inference implied by this level of 
analysis.  I believe that this organization of the results is overall consistent wi h the 
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research questions and with the core theoretical model derived from the literature, and 
I hope that it may foster the readability of the manuscript. 
The Teachers 
I organize the results regarding each teacher in four main sections.  In the first 
one, I describe teachers’ goals, teachers’ interest, and teachers’ rationalizations of 
their pedagogical practices, as they emerged from teachers’ interviews, written 
responses to the teachers’ questionnaires, and evaluation of student essays.  In the 
second, I summarize teachers’ pedagogical practices that I observed during my visits 
to the three classes involved in the project.  In so doing, I rely on my fieldnotes, 
which I took while classes were in session and immediately afterwards, as an 
integration of or a reflection on what I had been observing.  I also rely on material 
distributed in class (notes, worksheets, tests, and textbooks) that teachers generously 
shared with me. 
For each teacher, the results from observations reported in the second section 
comprise a description of features characterizing each teacher’s general pedagogical 
approach (e.g., relations with students and classroom climate) and then focus on those 
practices that may have had a more direct relation with student development of 
historical thinking and epistemic beliefs.  Although the specific question of this 
research project regards the emergence and development of epistemic cognition in 
history and of potential factors influencing them in the classroom, I believe that a
description of these teachers’ overall pedagogical approach is important for t least 
two reasons.  First, some understanding of the complexity in which teachers operate
is necessary to contextualize the results of this study and to appreciate how these 
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professionals faced the competing demands of their individual students and of the 
school system.  Second, I hope that relating the similarities and differences acros
these three teachers with findings about their students may provide an initial 
understanding of what broader factors may (o may not) be particularly influential in 
the development (or lack thereof) of historical thinking and epistemic beliefs. 
For example, at the time of the study, the schools in this particular school 
system followed a block structure, which meant that classes met every other day fo  
90 minutes.  Ellen was teaching the first block and had to recur to many small 
stratagems to keep some of the students awake.  On the other hand, Lauren’s class 
met during the last block of the day.  By that time, it was very difficult to keep 
students’ engaged for the whole period and, on top of that, Lauren had occasionally to 
take care of various situations that had developed during the day with students in 
other classes.  In addition, all teachers had several administrative tasks to fulfill (e.g., 
enter attendances on the computer as soon as possible) plus attending to various kinds 
of emergencies involving single students or deadlines affecting the schools as a 
whole.   
The pressure posed by school-system pacing guides and testing was also 
lamented by all the teachers and its influence on teachers’ pedagogical choices 
seemed to become stronger toward the end of the semester, when teachers struggled
to “cover” all the topics included in the pacing guide (“We have 30 years of history to 
cover; five classes.  Two days of review.” Ellen).  Writing in social studies classes 
was also encouraged in this school system; all written assignments were graded and 
contributed a large portion of student final grades.  For teachers (especially for the
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junior classes), it meant long hours of grading work and the implementation of a 
system of collection, scoring, recording, and distribution of assignments, which, 
although efficient, required its share of attention from teachers’ and students’ alike. 
Can some of the teachers’ choices in terms of pedagogical practice be 
explained by these particular circumstances? Class observations and the teachers’ 
rationalization of their practice suggest that these factors have certainly pl yed a role.  
On the other hand, are they enough to explain why teachers focused (or not) on the 
development of historical thinking in their students and how they did it? The third and 
fourth sections explore some concurrent explanations for their choices.  Specifically, 
the third section reports results from structured interviews with teachers about their 
epistemic beliefs (responses to the BHQ), supplemented by their responses to some
Grand Tour questions such as “What is history for you?” that opened the teachers’ 
interviews.  The fourth section describes their performance on the CRT task.  Finally, 
a section summarizing the main similarities and differences across these thr e 
teachers follows their individual portraits. 
Ellen (Class 1) 
 Goals. 
 Making it real.  History had a strong personal significance for Ellen.  
Specifically, it played a central role in determining one’s identity: “[I]t’s like the code 
that I have in my wallet, where you have been, where you are, and where you ar 
going.” When asked to rank in order of importance her major goals in teaching 
history, Ellen offered the following list: a) making lessons meaningful; b) making 
connections between students and the past; c) making history relevant; d) helping 
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students understand the topics and how they connect to present day; e) transforming 
the kids into historians.  These goals had precise pedagogical implications for Ellen.   
[Y]ou have to make it real to the kids, and you have to make it applicable, 
otherwise it is just pages in a textbook, and you have to make that come to life.  
It is an ongoing story that changes every day, every month, every year, so that 
is what history is, finding out where you have been and how that makes what 
you are today, whether it be at the personal level, or at the level of the nation, 
or at the global theater aspect. 
In this context, the introduction of primary sources in the curriculum served 
for Ellen the purpose “to get them thinking about it, to get them to see: OK, it really is 
real people, she is not making it up, it’s not a story, this is someone who really lived 
this.” Lurking behind this goal was the idea that history and the past should coincide, 
as hinted in this quote.   
I think it gives a whole new meaning to history when they are actually holding 
it in their hands, even if it is a replica […] [B]ecause you can speak all you 
want, but it’s not going to mean anything till they don’t actually see it.  […] 
[P]rimary sources make history real, [they] provide that connection, most like 
a doorway. 
While the importance of making history personally relevant for her students 
cannot be easily dismissed, this use of primary sources, from the epistemological 
point of view, raises a few questions.  Specifically, by fostering the idea that sources 
can grant a direct access to the past, how will students perceive the role played by the 
author (in the past) of the source in its production? Perhaps more importantly, what 
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role will they envision for themselves (in the present) in the process of knowing about 
the past? The answers to these questions may have important implications for student 
ability to think historically, another of Ellen’s stated goals.   
Ellen seemed to be aware of this connection and, in revisiting her goals during 
the interview, she explained that “transforming kids into historians” did not mean that 
they “have to be research historians,” but rather it meant that they needed to develop 
“higher order thinking,” be able to think about why something happened, get a deeper 
understanding of the complexity of the past, and “then make up [their] own opinion 
about what side of history.” It was precisely at this level that Ellen experienced her 
gravest frustration, especially with the low level reading class she was teaching.  Her 
disappointment was made worse by the fact that she was successful in reaching her 
goals with prior classes having the same reading problems.   
This year has been more of a struggle, with some of the kids, whether just not 
getting it, or not participating enough, or not doing enough.  Do I think they 
were getting it? Sometimes I feel it’s like beating a dead horse and going on, 
and on, and on.  […] I hate to say it, but it’s like higher order thinking is 
disappearing.  […] I am noticing in those kids who are struggling readers, 
higher order thinking is not a priority, and that frightens me, because it is not 
so much being taught to think why this happened.  They are taught to think 
about who, and what, and when, and where, and that’s it, and not the why’s, 
that has been left out so that they can get through. 
Getting it.  Ellen often underscored the centrality of students and was willing 
to challenge extant pacing guides and curricula if they did not serve her stud nts well.  
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When asked what she meant by students “getting” history, she mainly referred to their
ability of “making the connections” and “understanding what I am saying.”  As 
examples, she cited the role of nationalism and of international alliances during WWI, 
and the harsh conditions of the Treaty of Versailles as facilitating factors for Hitler’s 
rise to power.  Although Ellen stressed the importance of understanding connections, 
the focus remained on substantive knowledge.  The origins of and warrants for the 
preferred narrative were not shared with the students. 
 Writing in history.  Ellen’s optimal essay would include a strong thesis 
statement clearly addressing the question proposed.  The process of selection of 
evidence played a key role in essay writing, so much so Ellen often forced the 
students to “take a side,” aiming in this way to foster their ability to construct 
arguments grounded in evidence and to explore the “facts” provided by different 
perspectives.  Ellen was willing to let students argue for a middle ground providing 
that students justified their choice by presenting “arguments from both sides.”  
Ellen also appreciated essays that had a clear, precise focus (e.g., only on 
WWII, specific technologies).  Overall, she would have pushed students to take more 
risks in the construction of their thesis statements and engage themselves deeply with 
it, avoiding as much as possible to mimic a “textbook read.”  She would also expect 
use of appropriate vocabulary, overall factual accuracy (e.g., “[…] if they say Tokyo 
instead of Hiroshima or Nagasaki is better than saying that we blew up Paris”), some 
contextualization (e.g., “[…] that they know in what theater it happened”), and 
understanding of the relevance of specific events (e.g., “[…] what point the 
Americans had to be in to just want to end it like that”). 
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Interest.  In responding to the Interest Questionnaire, Ellen reported a very 
high degree of involvement in several of the activities listed.  With the exception of 
giving a talk about a history topic at a public meeting, she stated that she participated 
often in most of the activities included in the questionnaire.  Her total score on the 
questionnaire was 93 (max. score 117).  Her degree of engagement in the various 
activities suggests that she was interested in the popular aspects of historical 
knowledge, while considering history a domain of professional interest, as well.  In 
fact, she noted a particularly frequent participation in the following activities: search 
for primary source material, engage in historical inquiry, watch historical 
documentaries and popular movies on a historical topic, and read scholarly history 
books and historical novels.   
Pedagogical practices. 
General traits.  Since my very first visit to her classroom, Ellen struck me for 
the kind of relationships she strove to build with each student.  Authoritative and 
friendly at the same time, she encouraged and pushed them to give their best.  For this
purpose, she resorted to several strategies.  For example, when student participation 
was low, Ellen often played the role of the one in need of attention: “Wake up, guys! 
You are with me.  It’s all about me.  I am the princess.”  With this approach, she 
reminded them, jokingly but firmly, about her expectations (e.g., turning in their 
papers, putting books away, or paying attention).  Ellen was also very willing to take 
all the time that was necessary to address individual questions (especially when posed 
by students who did not usually participate much in the class’s conversation) and also 
to compliment some special outfits worn by students.  The effect on the overall 
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classroom climate was positive, fostering open and respectful relationships, and 
provided a space in which students were willing to comply with Ellen’s directions 
even when they would have rather done otherwise.  One of her quote of the week by 
G. K. Chesterton illustrated the ideal relationships she encouraged in her classroom: 
“There is a great man who makes every man feel small.  But the real great man is the 
man who makes every man feel great.”  
Students sat in pods, and Ellen encouraged a similar style of relationship also 
among her students; yet, during the course of the semester, Ellen was often frustrated 
by the lack of her students’ response.  They liked her, respected her, and, for the most 
part, they respected each other but, for many of them, the positive character of their 
relationship was insufficient to boost their motivation for learning. 
Ellen freely shared with her students her passions and her values, and she 
encouraged them to participate in social projects, such as a food drive to provide 
Thanksgiving meals for poor people living in the area.  She especially highlighted the 
connection between this activity and social studies, “because it [social studies] is 
around us.” Although respectful and appreciative of the diverse traditions that her 
students brought to class, Ellen had no trouble in sharing her Catholic upbringing and 
her Native American roots.  A few students responded by doing likewise, whenever 
the conversation made it appropriate.  Similarly, she did not hide her point of view on 
some of the topics studied during the semester (e.g., Indian Removal, appropriateness 
of government intervention to protect women and children labor).  On the contrary, 
the very way in which she read and commented upon the texts, her use of irony and of 
rhetorical questions demonstrated the role that perspective plays in history, besides 
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underscoring the personal relevance that history had for Ellen.  Given its relevance 
for the development of historical thinking, I will return to the issue of perspective in 
the subsection describing the use of primary sources in Ellen’s class. 
Consistently with her goals, Ellen’s questioning often aimed at activating 
connections (with student current experiences or prior knowledge) and at drawing 
logical inferences.  For example, at the beginning of the semester, Ellen used post-it 
notes to have students acknowledge and later share something they already knew, 
something they learned, and something they found striking in the assigned readings.  
Another quote by Henry James displayed on Ellen’s classroom wall described well 
this concern for personally meaningful, connected learning: “Nothing in education is 
so astonishing as the amount of ignorance it accumulates in the form of inert facts.” 
Although Ellen was teaching students identified as “low level readers,” she liked to 
qualify that this label did not imply that they were “low level students.”  In particular, 
she did not think that the difficulties they faced in reading would necessarily prevent 
her from fostering historical thinking.  However, as Ellen explained during her 
interview, historical thinking was often used in her class as a synonym for those 
“higher order thinking” skills she strove hard to foster in her students.  In the next 
sections, I describe a few characteristics of Ellen’s pedagogical practice that may 
have influenced more directly the development of epistemic beliefs and historical 
thinking in her students, as they emerged during the observations that I conducted in 
her class. 
Thoughtful recitation.  Ellen used a variety of techniques during her lessons, 
including individual and group work, video clips, and web quests.  However, most of 
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her exchanges with students took the form of a thoughtful recitation, with Ellen 
probing students’ understanding of topics previously discussed in class or asking 
questions aiming at clarifying the meaning of key words.  The following excerpt is an 
example of this kind of dialogue: 
Ellen: We are now talking about treatment of Native Americans from the 
United States.  The US takes away the land. 
Student: Made them move. 
Ellen: Pushed them back.  What is the name of the place? 
Student: Reservation 
Ellen: What about schools? 
Student: They kidnapped them. 
Ellen: Not really, what did they want? 
Student: Be like White people 
Ellen: Big word: assimilate.  What does it mean? She [in the video clip] just 
told us. 
Student: Become like the Whites. 
Ellen: How were the Native Americans described? 
Student: Savages. 
Ellen: Do you think they had no culture? 
Student: No 
In other cases, Ellen used these rapid exchanges with students to foster 
inferences and to push students to clarify their statements.  For example, during the 
lesson on the roots of Imperialism, she asked students about the characteristics of an 
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industrial nation.  Students mentioned factories, cities, and power.  At this point, 
Ellen asked what the student meant by power. 
Student: Do whatever they want.  It’s hard to explain. 
Ellen: Explain more, do what? 
Student: Hurt other countries, take them over. 
Ellen: Why may they want that? 
Student: To control them. 
Ellen used this kind of recitation especially when she was introducing students 
to new topics.  At the same time, students were usually provided with some form of 
graphic organizer that Ellen filled on the overhead projector and students copied.  
Very rarely, during this kind of exchanges, students (or Ellen) explicitly referred to 
sources; Ellen seemed more focused on presenting a well organized narrative that was 
meaningful and that “made sense,” highlighting connections with prior topics and 
with students’ current experiences.  Ellen used this venue also to foster understanding 
of first order concepts (e.g., assimilation, ration, resources) and to elicit student 
empathy for people who had lived in the past, especially if marginalized by their 
contemporaries.   
Tasks.  Besides being involved as a whole class in the kind of recitation 
described in the prior section, students spent a considerable amount of class time 
working individually or in small groups on a number of tasks.  What were the 
students mainly doing while completing these tasks? Most of the topics addressed in 
the course were introduced, explored, and revisited by using different kinds of tasks, 
often following a sequence that comprised the exposure to new information (through 
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lecture, recitation, reading of textbooks, and video-clips), the repetition and 
organization of that information, and the use of that information to construct a 
personal understanding of the issue examined.  Thus, most of the activities that I 
observed can be grouped into three main categories: organization of information from 
texts or other sources; construction of narratives; and analysis of primary sources.  
The rest of this section describes the main characteristics of each of these activities 
and provides a few examples taken from my class observations and from the analyses 
of materials distributed in class. 
I have previously described the kind of “thoughtful recitation,” used by Ellen.  
When information was presented through this venue, the main goal seemed to help 
students to internalize it in an organized fashion.  Ellen provided concept maps 
(containing drawings, boxes with titles, and links among boxes) and students filled 
them in by copying what she was writing on the overhead.  In some cases, some 
partially pre-completed Cornell notes were also used.  In all these cases, the nature of 
what was conveyed was not discussed.  Factual information such as events, people, or 
places and interpretive tools such as first-order concepts (e.g., assimilation) or causal 
relations were all presented as content to be learned and placed beyond interpretation.    
A diverse set of tasks was devoted to promote students’ repetition and 
organization of information conveyed by texts.  In this case, students were asked to 
summarize key points of the readings (or of the notes taken in class), sometimes in 
their own words, but, more often, by filling in blanks.  An example of this fill-in-the-




a) proposed by _____ 
b) no one may be kept from voting because of “race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude 
c) ratified in _______ 
A broader question usually followed a set of these review statements, such as 
“List five problems facing the South after the Civil War.  Describe the solution that 
was attempted for each problem.” In other cases, students were provided with graphic 
organizers to identify key ideas or events and then focus on similarities and 
differences (e.g., identify the ideas in Lincoln’s and Johnson’s plan for reconstruction 
and explain how they differ). 
In a few cases, some “question to ponder” was interspersed among a series of 
“fill-in-the-blank” statements (e.g., “If you are free and cannot vote, are you really 
free?” or “What does freedom mean to you?”).  However, the space provided in the 
worksheet for students’ answers was quite small and could contain no more than two 
or three lines of handwriting.  Similarly, the space provided for answering questions 
in students’ own words was also limited (one or two very crowded lines), suggesting 
that the expectations for student elaboration of the “information” was minimal, 
whether the question could be answered by just one word (e.g., “What was the 
nickname given to the laws that promoted segregation of the races?”) or whether it 




The main features of this kind of questioning did not change when students, 
instead of using printed texts, used the computer lab for a Web Quest on the Age of 
Imperialism.  Also in this case, the questions closely followed the structure of each 
text contained on the website, rarely requiring students to build meaning out of 
multiple paragraphs.  In addition, students tended to skip those questions that did 
require a broad understanding of a whole section. 
Another kind of task required students to evaluate the relevance of a set of 
events or the facets of a certain issue, by building “stories” that brought some factors 
to the forefront while leaving others in the background.  This kind of task implied a 
more active student role in the construction of knowledge.  For example, at the very 
beginning of the semester, students worked in groups to construct a dodecagon [i.e., a 
tridimensional solid with 12 faces, made out of light cardboard] illustrating their story 
of Reconstruction.  They were asked to use mostly pictures and very few words.  In 
explaining the task, Ellen told the students that she viewed this activity as an 
opportunity for demonstrating the knowledge that they had been able to build about 
Reconstruction and not simply a regurgitation of what she had previously explained 
to them.  She also told students that she would grade the outcome of this task as a test, 
although another more traditional test on the Reconstruction would follow, too.   
Other examples of this kind of activities included drawing a story board about 
pioneers’ life, creating a pamphlet to bring awareness to the problems faced by hild 
laborers or adult workers, writing a journal entry about one day in the life of a 
businessman or an employee during the Gilded Age, writing a newspaper article 
addressing one event that dealt with the ascent of the United States to a world powe 
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status, and creating a political cartoon expressing students’ views on imperialism.  
Ellen often encouraged students to take a stance, often repeating that “there was no 
right or wrong answer,” providing that students backed up their responses with 
evidence.  However, the epistemic connection between the kind of narratives (or 
“stories”) generated by the students and the nature of historical knowledge was not 
openly discussed, nor were the source and the reliability of the “evidence” (i.e., 
information extracted mainly from various texts) evaluated.  A good deal of emphasis 
was placed on building responses consistent with the historical context (as conveyed 
by the readings and the work done in class) and students often demonstrated the 
capacity to build narratives consistent with it  They were also able to scavenger the 
texts for finding the pieces of evidence necessary to complete the task at hand.  
However, this kind of thinking had little resemblance with the weighting of evidence 
necessary for thinking historically.   
Use of historical sources.  Although the textbook remained the main source 
of ideas and provided the broad narrative structure of the course, Ellen shared a few 
primary and several secondary sources with the students.  In the case of primary
sources, Ellen used them mostly to better illustrate some aspects of the topics 
comprised in the curriculum and to elicit empathy.  For example, while reviewing the 
Reconstruction, she gave to the students a copy of the literacy test that was required 
for voting.  Ellen also used primary sources to convey the perspectives of groups 
usually marginalized from the main narrative and to provide different point of views 
on controversial issues (e.g., forced education of Native Americans).   
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Several of the secondary sources used a narrative style (e.g., Hakim’s “A 
History of Us”; newspaper articles) or consisted of summaries of the textbook’s 
chapters.  Students tended to prefer these texts to their textbook, which most of them 
found too long and too difficult to read.  Despite these students had been identified as 
challenged readers, they were assigned the same textbook (The Americans: 
Reconstruction to the 21st Century, published by McDougal Littell) in use in the two 
Honors classes that also participated in the study.  Thus, Ellen used various 
alternative texts to support and foster the reading abilities of her students and to teach 
different reading strategies (e.g., previewing, skimming, understanding words in 
context, use text aids such as glossaries and pictures, and identify main ideas).   
On a couple of occasions, Ellen discussed with students whether certain 
sources could be considered primary or secondary (e.g., autobiography versus 
biography; quotes included in a textbook).  However, implications for this 
categorization in terms of interpretation of the sources were not discussed.  In 
analyzing documents presenting different ways of experiencing a similar situ tion 
(e.g., women working in sweatshops) or arguing for different policies (e.g., education 
of Native Americans), Ellen mainly focused on helping students to clearly identify 
the claims and to build their own arguments or narratives based on the evidence 
provided in the documents and on logical inferences.  Students were often required to 
name the author (and the time) of a source, but, again, such identification did not 
seem to inform the analysis of the content of the source, nor was the reliability of the 
content usually evaluated.  While students were encouraged to take a position in front 
of the opinions expressed and to judge whether the events narrated were compatible 
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with their idea of justice, the reliability of the source was not evaluated and therefore 
it did not influence the interpretation of these texts.   
For example, in talking about child labor at the turning of the century, Ellen 
gave her students an excerpt from John Spargo’s “The Bitter Cry of the Children.”  
Students were going to use this reading, together with other articles about women’s 
labor that had been published in various newspapers and magazines, “to create a 
pamphlet or brochure to bring awareness to the problems faced by child laborers or 
adult workers.” This exchange exemplifies this approach: 
Ellen: We are going to read another primary source.  I want you to hold on to 
your work.  You’ll need it for your project.  Look at the picture.  What do you 
think it’s dealing with? 
Student: Sweatshop  
[the handout showed a large picture of many women sewing hats in a large 
room] 
Ellen: Look at the title.  What group of people? 
Student: Children 
Ellen: Why do you think they use children? 
Student: Child labor 
Student: Energetic; they don’t have to be paid much. 
Student: Probably they can do whatever they want. 
Ellen: Who can get into the machine? [Ellen showed a picture of a small child 
in a factory] What kind of conditions could they expect? 
Student: Dangerous, horrible. 
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Ellen: What does it mean “horrible”? 
Student: Fall into the machine, goof off. 
Ellen: Probably no goof off.  Who wrote it? 
Student: John Spargo. 
Ellen: We are going to learn how to skim the text. 
[students answered a series of questions listed on a worksheet] 
Ellen: Do you think they played? 
Student: No. 
Ellen: Where can you find evidence for that? 
Student: “I have witnessed many pitiable cases of child slavery in northern 
mills.” [quote from the first paragraph of John Spargo’s excerpt] 
Ellen: Think Reconstruction.  Is slavery a good thing? 
Student: No 
Ellen: Look in the other paragraphs. 
Student: They are stunted. 
Ellen: What does it mean? 
Student: They cannot grow. 
Ellen: Find me two quotes that can back up that children were treated badly. 
Finally, primary sources were not presented in their original format (e.g.,
handwritten letter or newspaper article’s format).  On the surface, these handouts 
actually looked very similar to those containing summaries of textbook’s chapters, 
probably further fostering the idea that texts are first and foremost conveyors of 
correct information.  The task assigned (i.e., create a pamphlet) was also very imilar 
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to other activities that students had completed on the basis of their reading of the 
textbook (or of the Hakim’s text), such as writing journal entries pretending to belong 
to a particular group, write a newspaper article, or create a political cartoon.      
Epistemic beliefs. 
Information, opinions, and evidence.  In commenting on the statements of 
the BHQ, Ellen often acknowledged the subjective nature of history.  For example, 
she mentioned a few times that “history is written by the people who win history or 
the victors, and the people who lose, it’s not their side.”  She also referred to the 
influence that nationalism and group’s belonging can have on the interpretation of 
past events, mentioning the different views of Croats and Serbs about the roots of 
their ethnic conflict, the American and British interpretation of the American 
Revolution and the Boston Massacre, the British and Scottish accounts of the 
Scottish’ rebellion, different evaluations of the Vietnam War, and the casting of 
Germans as the “bad guys” after WWI, sanctioned with the Treaty of Versailles.  
Ellen was also aware that different historians identify different causes of historical 
events, citing as an example the women’s right to vote in the United States. 
At the same time, Ellen acknowledged that “there is definitely evidence in 
history, otherwise what is the point of studying it” and that “this is where those 
journals and those letters” come to play a role.  In her view, evidence limits the power 
of the historian for changing the past too much, so that a historian could not just go 
back and say “hey, they could have had electricity in 1776 and they just decided to 
use candles.”  However, this idea of evidence seemed to resemble more what Lee and 
Shemilt (2003) called information than what they named evidence.  The terminology 
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used may seem beside the point, but the main difference between the two has 
important epistemic consequences.  Specifically, information is treated as a irect 
testimony about the past that the historian may, at best, question in terms of its 
correctness, while evidence results from the work of the historian who, similarly to a 
prosecutor, asks the sources questions that they were not necessarily designed to 
answer.  As a corollary, reliability is seen as a fixed property of a source f 
information while it becomes defined in relation to the historian’s question in the case 
of a source of evidence; thus making history possible even in the presence of 
“incorrect” or “biased” sources.   
This view of historical knowledge fits well with what I have described as TR1
and, in fact, Ellen’s interview offered several examples of epistemic beliefs 
characterizing this stance.  She also described how she saw these two aspects of 
historical knowledge coming together, through a process very similar to what Lee nd 
Shemilt called “scissor and paste”. 
The social science is trying […] to look at different sides and tries to piece it 
back together to figure out.  I mean, can you be one hundred percent correct? 
No, because you are not there, but I think history has a bit more than 
interpretation.  I mean, it is interpretation, but if you do enough research… 
Interestingly, Ellen provided this comment while evaluating her disagreement 
with the statement “Historical claims cannot be justified, since they are simply a 
matter of interpretation.”  She began by saying that she disagreed with the statement 
(and drawing the parallel between the historian and the social scientist, which I found 
particularly suggestive) and ended up by changing her initial reaction to a “somewhat 
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disagree.”  This change of focus from the objective to the subjective component of 
historical knowledge happened in another occasion during the interview, and was an 
occurrence that was common across the three teachers and several students.   
On one hand, this finding lends some support to the developmental trajectory 
proposed by Kuhn’s and King and Kitchener’s models and could be interpreted as 
signaling a movement from an objectivist to a multiplist stance.  However, placed 
within the context of the whole interview, it seems to me that it may signal a position 
in which beliefs characterizing these two stances coexist.  Thus, to Ellen, those 
journals and those letters really mattered, but the knowledge they could afford 
regarded the “two sides” of the issues.   
De pluribus unum?  In the case of Ellen, the idea that evidence is ready made 
(i.e., it is treated as information in Lee’s terms) and interpretation is opinion went 
together with the idea that it is important that students understand that “there are two 
sides of every issue,” and “they get to see the different evidence, and what was 
happening, and just different opinions.”  In describing the historical method, Ellen 
mentioned that it includes knowledge about “how to break it down, and think about it, 
and different ways of analyzing history, and look at documents and examine and just 
determine facts from fallacies.”  Students “need to be able to evaluate, they need to be 
able to look at different information, they need to be able to look at something and 
realize: ‘Is this a primary source?  Was it written during the event, […], what side 
was it?’”  
These heuristics could facilitate thinking historically; yet, until reliabi ty 
remains an intrinsic property of the source, they may at best play a role in deciding 
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what side to choose.  Hence, Ellen “absolutely agreed” that learning history required 
comparing sources and understanding author perspective because “you need to say 
that there are different sides of the story.”  Actually, “if something interes s you, read 
both sides, look at the victors and look at the losers, like see how they justified what 
happened and then try to find a book that is in the middle, or a documentation that 
sort of represents it.”  
However, it appeared that history stopped at “taking a side”.  In other words, 
by being “able to tear it apart, to pick up the details” and “looking at the who, the 
what, the when, and the where, and then go back to the why” students can make up 
their “opinion about what side of history.” Students have the freedom to believe 
whatever story they choose “as long as they back it up and have their reasons for 
believing it,” but the warrants for preferring one interpretation to the other (if any) are 
left unclear.  To be sure, there is a limit to the stories considered acceptable.  One 
example would be “the revisionist history where you don’t want to believe in the 
Holocaust because that never happened.”  Interestingly, the evidence Ellen would use 
for rejecting this argument were pictures from the concentration camps; perhaps a 
legitimate and persuasive pedagogical choice, which nevertheless suggest  the idea 
that history is at its best when the past can come to us in some sort of unmediated (or 
so perceived) form. 
Historical thinking.   Ellen read the documents demonstrating an interest that 
went beyond the purpose of completing the task.  However, she also had the question 
of the CRT well in her mind, since she was able to discuss the documents in relation 
to it as soon as she completed the readings.  At the same time, she also let herself be 
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drawn into a discussion with the texts, noting their rhetorical tone and making 
frequent connections with her experience.  For example, while reading Document 1, 
she commented: 
The literalist of the Scripture, note that.  I shouldn’t say that, but just…I 
always just get confused about those.  Ooops, what page in the Bible gave the 
map of the world? My teacher used to get mad at me, I was, I am serious, I 
did miss a page in the Bible; I want to see the map.  And she thought I was 
being sarcastic, but I was honestly being sincere. 
She also used the references to check her interpretation.  For example, after 
reading Document 3 she asked herself: “Am I misinterpreting this? It almost sounds 
as they are saying that the world is round; in the 6th century.”  This question prompted 
her to re-read the passage, pay close attention to the language used, and revise her 
interpretation: “When I saw the vault, that’s when I started stopping and I was
thinking that the ‘over’ was sort of giving the roundness; but when they mentioned 
Moses and it was flat, so the vault goes over it and it keeps extending.” 
The transcript of Ellen’s reading of the texts demonstrates the use of several 
strategies typical of expert readers (e.g., interpreting, evaluating the content and the 
features of the text, connecting with prior knowledge, questioning, considering the 
author) and some heuristics that signal historical thinking (e.g., sourcing).  However, 
it was only after reading all the texts that the use of historical thinking becam  
particularly evident.  She began by acknowledging that the documents were not 
painting a clearly discernible answer and thus she tried to build a narrative by 
weaving them together and checking if they could all contribute to a reasonable story.   
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Interesting.  This is really tricky, because I don’t see here.  My interpretation 
of 5 and 6 is that a person like Ptolemy, he knew that the Earth was round.  
This idea of people, in probably Western Europe during the Middle Ages, who 
changed everything around: ‘No, no, we are flat!’ The Church impacted that.   
Ellen then reconsidered the documents to see if they could support this 
narrative and tried to “tell the story” following the line sketched in the quote, but she 
was unable to reconcile it, especially with Document 6.   
But that the world was flattened just amazes me, because […] why would they 
want to do that, unless they are trying to push up how far we have come. […] 
This also ties back to the whole idea that history can be revisionist, you can 
sort of make people look more like simpletons, and that they are not the 
brightest people in the world, or that “look how far we have developed as a 
culture if our ancestors thought that it was flat.” 
At this point, Ellen revisited the documents, checking whether they could fit this new 
interpretation.  She also acknowledged that the idea that medieval people did not 
think that the world was flat went against her prior knowledge. 
I probably would have said that he [Columbus] was part of a group that 
questioned the flatness of the Earth […] but after reading 4, 5, and 6 it 
obviously sort of makes you wonder whether it is revisionist history that 
makes people look a little bit like they are in the Dark Ages, that they had no 
clues.   
When Ellen read for the first time Document 1, she was amused by some of 
the language used by its author: “I love their description of Columbus [laughing]: not 
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educated, can’t speak, monotonous.” However, at that point, these text features did 
not trigger historical thinking.  Document 6 made her consider Document 1 in a 
different light; now, it could be treated as evidence for the “revisionist” hypothesis: 
“[…] I love this first one, being written in the 1890s; […] the way that he 
[Columbus] is a non-entity rebel, an obscure navigator.  So he was a nobody 
and then he comes out.  […] I’d like to see more to find out: Was he just sort 
of dicing on what these people perceived Columbus to be, or was he 
furthering out ‘He really wasn’t’?.  And so he goes to his intelligence 
and…yeah, ‘to his simplest proposition’.  It’s so interesting that […] 
Document 1 could tie and back up document 6, that the people in the 19th and 
20th century were trying to make the Middle Ages feel, a little bit, mentally 
slower, and too blinded by this whole idea of religion.”  
Lauren (Class 2) 
Goals. 
For the present.  For Lauren, history was an explanation of “why things are 
the way they are,” “why do we have that, why people act this way, how did this 
develop.” Hence, she would have gladly dedicated more time to current issues 
because “we are experiencing history right now.” These goals were confirmed also by 
the answers to the Teacher Questionnaire, were Lauren ranked, in order of 
importance, the following goals: a) how history has formed the way things are today;
b) the importance of historical events in our time; c) interpretation of primary source 
materials.  More generally, Lauren stated that her overall educational g al consisted 
in instilling “a sense of curiosity that will develop into the love of learning.”  
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Lauren identified the need to be “politically correct” as one of the greatest 
constraints on her teaching.  Political correctness tended to appear as especially 
problematic during discussion of current issues, generating potential conflict with 
Lauren’s main goals, which included connecting the past to the present.  An example 
of this occurrence and its implications for historical thinking and epistemic beliefs 
will be discussed in the section describing Lauren’s pedagogical approach. 
Primary sources and historical method.  Lauren often demonstrated being 
well aware of several heuristics characterizing historical thinking.  Teaching how to 
interpret primary source material was among her main goals and she often used 
primary sources in her class.  However, similarly to Ellen, the main purpose for using 
them was “to know that it actually did occur, it is not just something that I’m telling 
you about, it’s not something that you read on the internet, it’s not something that you 
read, that your friend is telling you, but it actually happened and we have proof.”  
In addition, Lauren was studying for a Masters degree in History at the time of 
the study.  When asked to compare her graduate studies with how she was teaching 
her class, she did not point to any radical difference, apart from the fact that her 
master’s class was “straight lecture,” they used “harder primary sources,” and the 
professor did not “necessarily go over what the interpretation is.”  
I found this final observation particularly striking, because the lack of 
exposure of K-12 teachers to disciplinary thinking required by graduate studies is 
often cited as a hindering factor in the teachers’ ability to promote this kind of 
thinking in their classroom.  This case suggests that the promotion of disciplinary 
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thinking may in fact need to become a much more explicit goal in graduate schools as 
well, and, as such, be openly addressed.   
Details and bare bones.  According to Lauren, teaching history well required 
the time and willingness to delve deeply into topics, examine several sources, give 
more space to social history, and pay attention to details.  Unfortunately, the way in 
which schools were currently organized constrained, according to Lauren, the 
possibility of going “into the nitty-gritty of things” and share with the students “all 
the other cool little things.”  Among the circumstances that prevented her from doing 
so, Lauren mentioned the need of being politically correct and specifically the feeling 
that she could not “do a lot of readings” because teachers had “to be cognizant of all 
kinds of different people.”  
Lauren also lamented a lack of student background knowledge, which 
prevented meaningful class discussions, and the need to cover so much material in 
such a small amount of time.  At the same time, mindful of time constraints, she also 
noted that she did not have “a problem in doing just the bare bones, just to get the 
information across.” 
Writing in history.  Differently from Ellen, Lauren mainly focused on the 
content of the essays and did not pay much attention to their structure.  She 
particularly praised essays that were demonstrating “extension of thinking” by 
including ideas that, although related, broadened the answers to the questions and 
reached beyond the obvious.  For example, in considering why and how technological 
developments played an important part in 20th century wars, Lauren appreciated those 
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essays that did not focus exclusively on weaponry, but considered also the 
advancement in medicine and the implications for the Cold War.   
In her own practice, Lauren’s overall focus seemed to be on the accuracy of 
substantive knowledge; even when her attention was on “the concept” (e.g., “that the 
Progressive [were] to help society”), the main ideas she was looking for were the 
ones proposed by the textbook narrative (The Americans: Reconstruction to the 21st 
Century, published by McDougal Littell). 
We usually have rubrics of what to look for, or I take my BCR [Brief 
Constructed Response] from the textbook, […] and they have the answers 
written out, they have a list of what they should write.  […] And then, of 
course, the perfect one does that extension of knowledge, it doesn’t just spit it 
out. 
Interest.  Lauren clearly discriminated among the various activities listed in 
the questionnaire, stating a very frequent participation in some of them and a 
complete lack of involvement in others.  Some of the high scores may be related to 
the course work that Lauren was completing for her master’s degree, but some reflect 
Lauren’s general interest in the past.  Specifically, she often read scholarly history 
books, engaged in historical inquiry, and wrote history-related papers.  She very often 
visited museums and historical sites, read historical novels and watched historical 
documentaries, as well.  Her total score on the Interest Questionnaire was 72 (max. 




General traits.  A well established, enforced routine was an essential 
component of Lauren’s class, as she remarked at the beginning of a test, reminding a 
few students about the need to be silent: “Please, please, if anything, we have a 
routine in my classroom.”  The sequence of classroom activities tended to remain the 
same across classes and, in addition, Lauren introduced a few clear rules atthe 
beginning of the semester and expected students to abide to them.  Most rules 
regarded procedures related to the collection of homework, grading, and expected 
level of social interactions during class.  For example, the board in the back of the 
room stated in big letters: “Homework: place in class folder before the bell.”  Grades 
were copied in a grade sheet and signed by parents.  The desks were arranged in rows 
and students sat at their individual desks, facing the wall used for projections. 
Several exchanges between Lauren and her students regarded homework and 
testing, points to be gained or lost.  Assignments often had the goal of forcing 
students to pay some attention to the content of class; for example, Lauren always 
assigned a worksheet to complete while students were watching a video.  An incidet 
is particularly exemplary of Lauren’s attempt to get students actually expos d to the 
material proposed in class (videos, textbooks, or other kind of texts).  In introducing a 
video about industrialization and urbanization, Lauren asked the students to number 
20 lines in a blank piece of paper and explained that they were “going to see a lot of 
primary sources and not much action.”  Then she briefly mentioned the main events 
addressed by the video and explained that students needed to list “20 facts from the 
movie,” specifying that they were expected to use “facts from the whole video,” and 
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thus they needed to pace themselves.  Finally, she remarked that “these [were] easy 
points, but it [was] not free.”  In most cases, it appeared that a low level of 
engagement and an overall shallow understanding of the material were sufficient to 
get credit for the work done. 
Lauren often lamented a lack of student discipline and disciplinary issues 
arose during most classes.  To face the situation, she used various classroom 
management techniques, from assigning seats to issuing warnings, to detention.  
Lauren was particularly concerned with the easy access that students had to partying 
and drinking when out of school and believed that this overall permissive attitude 
negatively affected their engagement and interest in academic activities. 
While Lauren succeeded in keeping the control of the class, her relationships 
with the students were heavily mediated by established regulations.  The 
disagreements that easily developed between her and some of the students about 
rules, grades, and disciplinary actions tended to negatively affect the classroom 
climate.  Students paid close attention to Lauren’s lectures and overall complied with 
class requirements.  However, with the exceptions of very few instances, their 
contribution to the class dialogue tended to be superficial and their effort strictly 
limited to what required by the tasks and rewarded by points.  It seemed that, as an 
old proverb noted, this approach succeeded in leading most of the students to the 
water, but could not make them drink. 
Lectures and recitation.  Students began each class by writing a journal (for 
about ten minutes), which usually consisted in answering a question about the topic 
addressed by the assigned readings and, occasionally, current events (i.e., Iraq and 
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identification of an important event for that specific year).  Only once during my 
observations did the journal require students to go beyond what they learned in the 
textbook, asking them to respond to the following situation: “You have invested all 
your savings on the newest technological innovation.  It turns out to be a bust.  You 
are wiped out–no credit–no chance for credit–your family can’t bail you out.  What 
do you do?”  Students were surprised and in fact asked where they could find the 
answer to this question, suggesting they were not used to this kind of prompt.  Lauren 
answered them that, in this case, the answer had to be sought in their own heads.  
After journal writing, Lauren usually used a mix of lecture and recitation to review 
the topic of the lesson and to revisit concepts she considered particularly important. 
The textbook had a central role in Lauren’s class, as she explained to the 
students at the beginning of the semester: 
You need to read the textbook, chapter 5.  If you have problems 
understanding, you need to use your textbook.  We use it for our tests.  I’ll 
give you examples, so you know all the words for the tests and for your ECRs. 
In fact, Lauren expected students to read the textbook whenever they had some free 
time in class (e.g., while waiting that other classmates finished an assig ed task).   
During her lectures, Lauren often used the overhead to share her notes with 
the students, because “it makes it clearer for the kids.” These notes had been prepared 
with a few colleagues of hers and were based on the students’ textbook. Lauren 
usually added further details she found interesting about the specific topic and tended 
to highlight relations of cause and effect.   
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She also suggested specific study strategies, mainly aimed at fostering 
memorization of first order concepts (or “vocabulary words”).  For example, in 
talking about the Populist Party, Lauren remarked the importance of avoiding 
confusion with the Progressive Movement and suggested the link with the word 
“population,” which, in turn, could trigger the link with that part of population made 
up of farmer (and thus avoid confusion between Populists and Progressives).  Lauren 
also tried to get students ready for the more independent college environment, 
remarking the importance of taking good notes and suggesting that students pay 
particular attention to concepts repeated several times because these ideas are usually 
addressed in the tests.  With the exception of very brief exchanges, students were 
usually silent while Lauren was lecturing and took notes of what she said, copying 
what she was showing on the overhead. 
Documentaries were often shown as an alternative to lecturing.  In these cases, 
Lauren tended to interject several comments to the events depicted in the videos, 
highlighting connections with the curriculum or calling student attention to specific 
features depicted in the video (e.g., “look at the clothing”).  In a few cases, she used 
video clips from popular movies to illustrate particular events (e.g., Homestead Act) 
or convey the feeling for a certain period (e.g., Modern Times).   
Although she often implied that the documentaries were showing several 
primary sources, Lauren did not discuss the perspective or, more generally, the nature 
of the documentary as a source in itself.  In a few cases, Lauren introduced a specific 
video clip as a primary source and asked students to write their journal on it (e.g., 
“You will be watching a video of Eddie Rickenbacker.  This is your primary source.  
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Write ten sentences describing his life.”).   In most cases, students were ask d to 
complete a worksheet while watching the video; occasionally, videos were shown in 
the last part of class, and Lauren left students the possibility of choosing between 
watching it or doing their homework. 
This lecture/recitation approach did not radically change when the focus was 
on current events.  The main difference regarded the fact that, in this case, the burden 
of providing information rested mainly on Lauren, since no other sources were 
considered and students mainly contributed personal experiences.  Given also the ever 
looming time concerns, current events tended to be presented in coarse terms and 
without the benefit of multiple perspectives.  Lauren also refrained from answeri g 
questions that she perceived as value laden, such as one regarding whether Iraqi 
insurgents found beheading pleasurable.  Beside a general reference to the fact t at 
Iraq had a very ancient culture and that religious beliefs played a relevant role in 
these matters, Lauren placed the responsibility of answering entirely on the students, 
saying that they were old enough to decide for themselves about these issues.   
Tasks.  In class, Lauren often asked students to read from the textbook and 
complete worksheets, which mainly aimed at rehearsing and organizing the lesson 
content.  Students mostly completed these worksheets by themselves, although 
occasionally they were allowed to work in groups (which usually meant that each 
student did only a part of the work and copied the remaining answers from the other 
classmates).   
A Web Quest on the Age of Imperialism, very similar to the one described for 
Ellen’s class, was an alternative way to present texts to students.  A long list of 
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questions forced students to read all the sections of the webpage and students were 
graded on the number of questions they answered.  The questions mainly asked about 
specific facts included in the readings (e.g., Mahan believed that America’s survival 
depended upon what?) or addressed the comprehension of particular terms or 
sentences (e.g., For the emperor to consult with barbarians was unthinkable.  Who are 
the “barbarians” in this reference?).   
Similarly to Ellen, Lauren used Hakim’s “A History of Us,” as 
complementary to the textbook; additional texts were occasionally distributed in 
class.  Yet, even when the readings presented different perspectives on a particular 
issue (e.g., views of the African American Movement according to Du Bois and 
Washington), the discussion of the texts was very brief (few minutes).   
During these activities, Lauren often interjected the narration of interesting 
events illustrating the issue under examination, added further information about the 
topic, made connections with popular movies and documentaries, and pointed to 
related artifacts available in museums.  In some cases, the content of a particular 
lesson was divided among different groups (e.g., inventions) and each group prepared 
a poster illustrating the topic assigned.  Posters were then shared with the rest of the 
class.   
In other cases, students revisited the topic of the lesson by writing mock 
articles or letters (e.g., a newspaper article about a specific aspe t of Progressivism, 
using the style of the muckrakers, or a letter home, pretending to be one of the 
Pioneers) and by brainstorming possible course of actions giving particular 
circumstances (e.g., Oregon Trail).  In various occasions, students were asked to 
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include a pictorial representation of a particular event or period.  This kind of task 
sparked a few discussions about contextualization (e.g., phones looked quite different 
at the turn of the century) and Lauren appreciated their potential for pulling together 
ideas on a certain topic  However, in overseeing student work, Lauren focused 
students’ attention on demonstrating their factual knowledge: “Hey, the drawing is 
very nice, but I’m not going to give you much for it.  So, write the article first, the 
rest is gravy.  I want to see what you know.”  
The importance of contextualization was underscored by Lauren several 
times, and she tended to consider it a mark (or the essence?) of historical thinking.  
For example, when students were asked to pretend to be pioneers and to write a letter 
home that explained the tough conditions on the frontier, Lauren underscored that the 
letter had to be historically correct.  Thus, when a student suggested that pioneers 
could get the seeds that they needed by stealing them from someone else, Lauren 
remarked: “Think of yourselves as historians; in the ‘800s they did not do that.”  
Use of historical sources.  During the interview, Lauren reported that 
including primary sources in her lesson plans was “her thing, her thrust” in the way of 
implementing the curriculum.  Yet, primary sources were mainly used in her class as 
facilitators for increasing familiarity with the topics of the curriculum or for 
illustrating particular aspects of it.  In asking students to describe pictures or cartoons, 
which in a few cases were taken from the textbook, Lauren reminded them to use the 
“vocabulary words.”  Thus, for example, the word “soddy” became very important in 
the description of a prairie house, because it brought with it several factors 
influencing the life on the prairie (e.g., lack of wood to build houses; atmospheric 
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conditions; conservation of food).  Pictures also sparked speculations about the 
presence of certain elements (e.g., how they could have a window in a soddy house).  
In these cases, Lauren encouraged students to contextualize their guesses within the 
historical period. 
Epistemic beliefs. 
Interpretations, facts, and opinions.  Similarly to Ellen, Lauren also 
acknowledged that history “is a lot of interpretation,” although not simply a matter of 
interpretation.  In particular, Lauren believed that it was important for students being 
“able to discuss [their] ideas and a bunch of other people’s ideas.”  Although Lauren 
saw a limit to the knower’s subjectivity in facts and primary sources, she never 
mentioned how facts were selected in the first place or how historians interroga d 
primary sources, an occurrence that suggests a lack of coordination between the 
objective and subjective aspects of historical knowledge.   
She often referred to the importance of understanding the perspective of an 
account’s author.  However, when pressed, she seemed to lack a method to move 
under condition of uncertainty.  For example, to substantiate the statement that history 
is interpretation, she cited the case of Jerry Ford, who has generally been looked 
down upon by prior historiography, but was now appreciated for having helped his 
country.  When asked how she would choose between the competing interpretations, 
she acknowledged the difficulty of the question and challenged current harsh 
interpretation of the Bush’ presidency because people were likely too clouded by 
present concerns (e.g., the Iraq’s war).   
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Finally, when pressed to describe what other factors, beside interpretation, 
constitute history, she revised her first answer and, similarly to Ellen, moved tward 
the subjectivist end of the continuum.  Lauren was reacting to the statement: 
“Students need to be aware that history is essentially a matter of interpretation.”  I 
report the exchange in full, because I believe it is a good illustration of this change of 
mind. 
Lauren: I don’t think it is essentially a matter of interpretation.  There are so 
many different things.  I think they need to be aware that there is a lot of 
interpretation in it.  That’s a good question, I guess, it’s a matter of who is 
interpreting, I do, but I don’t think that it is essentially a matter of 
interpretation, I think that’s part of it, I don’t think that’s the only thing that 
makes history. 
Interviewer: What are the other things that you see in it? 
Lauren: Oh, you know what? When I was reading it for the first time, I was 
thinking…[silence]…I guess it’s true, now that I am reading it again, it is 
essentially a matter of interpretation, who is looking at this aspect, who is 
interpreting what is happening, so I think it is essentially a matter of 
interpretation. 
“Playing” sides?  What I found particularly remarkable in the case of Lauren 
was that she defined herself as “a very fundamental person,” a “pretty much right or 
wrong kind of person.” As such, she acknowledged that she had “a hard time with a 
lot of social issues,” and that, sometimes, she perceived the necessity of being 
politically correct as a constraint on her teaching.   
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At the same time, Lauren also believed that she needed to provide the students 
with the multiple sides of the issues examined in class, without letting her own vies 
come too strongly to the forefront.  In so doing, she seemed to feel compelled to 
embrace an epistemic stance that considered all sides equally legitimate although she 
would embrace a very specific interpretation for herself.  As a result, Lauren felt the 
discomfort of silencing what she was while, at the same time, leaving the stud nts 
without a method to develop their historical reasoning.   
Historical thinking.   In working on the Constructed Response Task, Lauren 
stopped after each text to summarize what she perceived as the main points of each 
document.  First, she seemed to determine whether the source was suggesting the 
hypothesis of a flat Earth or of a round Earth.  Then, she added other ideas conveyed 
by the texts.  Her reading was a bit rushed and the restatements were sometimes 
inaccurate.   
Uh, so Document 2 says that it is round also, and that there is people on the 
opposite side of the earth and that they are just like us, there is people, there 
is food, and so it is absurd to say that someone may take a ship and travel the 
whole wide world and cross from distant region…[re-reading].  So, OK, it’s 
saying it’s not.  Let me go back. 
The think-aloud does not suggest that Lauren came to a successful re-
interpretation of Document 2 and, at the end of the task, she admitted that she found it 
confusing.  She was also not sure about the interpretation of Document 6, but in that 
case she dismissed the document from further analysis.  During the think-aloud, she 
never referred to the authors of the texts, but always referred to them as “Document 
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X”.  There is also no evidence of intertextual reading; overall, Lauren appeared to 
take the content of the texts at face value.   
After reading all the documents, Lauren concluded that “from most of the 
articles they think that it was flat.” This was particularly surprising, since only after 
reading Document 3, Lauren had concluded that the text was saying that the earh was 
“not round.” In other two cases (Document 2 and 4, and we might infer also 
Document 1 from the quote reported above) she had deduced that the documents were 
supporting the belief in a round Earth.  Document 6 was dismissed and there was no 
reference to the shape of the Earth in the summary of Document 5.  Where did this 
idea come from?  
When asked to explain the criteria that guided her answer, Lauren said that 
she would look at “how many documents spoke about a side.”  She added that she 
“would also look at the time frame.”  This last suggestion seems to imply 
contextualization.  However, Lauren appeared to rely only on her prior knowledge of 
the period.  She did not let the texts challenge her prior ideas nor, conversely, did she 
use her prior knowledge to evaluate the content of the texts.  In this specific case, she 
knew that religion was very important at Columbus’s time and “clouded things”; thus, 
she concluded that “whatever the religious people thought, that was the general idea 
at the time.”  Similarly, she belittled the idea that the Greeks believed in the
roundness of the Earth because she found the reasoning unconvincing on the basis of 
her understanding of the measurement process: “Well, the Greeks, you know, came 
up with measurements and things but how […] can you take measurements when you 
haven’t gone the way around the world?” 
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Danielle (Class 3) 
Goals. 
Roots and cycles.  History had a profound personal significance for Danielle.  
She loved investigating her family history and knowing where she came from. On 
the other hand, she also believed that “history cycles” and “it tends to repeat itself.” 
For this reason, one of her goals for her students was to understand connections 
across time and with their personal experience.  In the former respect, this meant 
being able to identify what changed and what remained the same: “America has 
changed; there have been periods in which history has repeated itself, and has 
repeated in a particular way.  So, what changed? That particular part is what I try to 
connect.” 
In respect to connections with personal experience, Danielle believed that this 
was a key factor in making students interested in what was being studied, in “turning 
them on.”  She referred to a very positive experience with a low level class in a 
technology program that got very interested in the World Fair; the occurrene of 9/11 
also sparked interest in the history of the United States. 
Primary sources.  While these responses during the interview may suggest 
that the main focus of Danielle regarded substantive knowledge, Danielle’s answers 
to the Teacher Questionnaire indicated another set of goals.  Specifically, Danielle 
stated that her major goals in teaching history regarded introducing primary 
documents with the aim of generating interests and enabling students to experience 
“living” history.  A connected goal regarded the creation of engaging lessons 
fostering more active learning.  All teachers in this study underscored that a general 
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lack in students’ interest deeply hindered deep levels of understanding.  Hence, 
introducing primary sources in the curriculum was conceived as an attempt at 
sparking some situational interest with the hope to increase students’ engagement 
with the subject matter.   
In addition, and similarly to Ellen and Lauren, Danielle used primary sources 
as facilitators of learning.  As maps and visual representations of some aspects of the 
lesson (e.g., map showing alliances during WWI) could facilitate understanding of 
specific concepts (e.g., Central Powers), primary sources could convey particular 
concepts (e.g., ultimatum) or even relations of cause and effect (e.g., the long-lasti  
effect of the Treaty of Versailles).   
When I used that one map with the alliances, what I wanted was to have a 
visual of what was happening and where they were located and when I use the 
documents, was kind of a DBQ, I wanted them to have the main causes of 
WWI.  So, in reading the documents then, instead of coming from me or the 
textbook, it’s coming from an actual person who was there.  Maybe it will 
stick with them a little better. 
While Danielle had often experienced that bits of information tended to “stick” better 
when conveyed through primary sources, she was also aware of the risks of this 
approach.  In fact, students tended to remember “not the actual documents, but 
quotes,” and sometimes they reinforced prior misconceptions.   
In addition, Danielle believed that making students build understanding from 
primary documents would make them “think it through.”  While Danielle had found 
this approach successful in the past, she was struggling with her current classes, since 
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a high percentage of students were not willing to work on the assignments and 
expected that she provide “the answers”.  In this situation, group work was also not 
providing any incentive to thinking, because “it [was] not a collective brain power on 
it, focused on the information; it [was] more ‘I sit around and maybe they shall give 
me the answers’”.   
Writing in history.  In evaluating students’ responses to essay questions, 
Danielle focused both on the structure of the essay and on its historical content.  In 
terms of structure, she looked for a thesis statement clearly addressing the question, 
followed by paragraphs focusing on specific ideas and providing explanations and 
factual details.  Finally, she was expecting that the conclusion summarized the aspects 
explored and added new ideas.  From this point of view, she referred to the style 
taught in AP US History classes for answering the Documents Based Question 
(DBQ), which consisted in a sequence of “main idea, detail, explain.” Danielle also 
paid attention to the use of transitions and the overall coherence between the 
categories included in the thesis statement and the main ideas discussed in the 
paragraphs following it.   
In terms of historical content, Danielle preferred essays that clearly connected 
factual information and what she called “explanations.”  In other words, she was 
expecting students to clarify the relation between the details they were providing and 
the aspect of the question they were addressing in a certain paragraph.  Although 
Danielle kept using the words “information,” “facts,” “details,” “examples,” and she 
would have wanted students to include what had been discussed in class, in the 
readings, or in the homework, the work of selection that she was expecting the 
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students to do had strong similarities with the process of building evidence out of the 
remnants of the past described by Lee (2005). 
Danielle had also several ideas about how to provide feedback on essays and 
what kind of follow-up activities to implement in the class in order to target eventual 
misconceptions, the appropriateness of the evidence provided, and the structure of the 
essay.  However, Danielle also admitted that she rarely assigned four/five paragraph 
essays because she was teaching 180 students and the time necessary to evaluate this 
kind of assignment was too great. 
Interest.  Among the three participant teachers, Danielle’s score on the 
Interest questionnaire was the lowest (56 out of a max of 117).  Yet, she often 
mentioned during her formal and informal interviews several occurrences that implied 
her involvement in the activities listed in the questionnaire.  It may be that Danielle’s 
definition of “often” tended to be stricter than Ellen’s and Lauren’s ones.  In relative 
terms, Danielle listed visits to museums and historical sites and construction of 
history curricula as the activities in which she engaged most often.  With lower 
frequency, she also reported reading scholarly history books and historical novels, 
and watching popular movies on a historical topic. 
Pedagogical practices.   
General traits.  The walls of Danielle’s classroom were covered with nice 
pictures and posters relevant to the period of American History that was taught; 
interspersed, there were posters showing beautiful photos of natural settings, which 
invited students to “soar high,” persevere, and respect each other.  Students sat in two, 
double rows groups, facing each other; the overhead projector was placed in the space 
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at the center of the room and Danielle often stand there during class.  In a way, this 
setting reflected Danielle’s desire to share with her students a passion for 
understanding the richness of the past and to foster a reflective and striving attitude 
toward learning in general and history in particular.   
Classwork was carefully planned, with sequences of activities, readings, 
homework, and dates for quiz and exams announced well in advance.  A calendar was 
often reviewed and updated at the beginning of class and included all the material and 
assignments discussed.  Yet, the schedule and style of each class varied significantly; 
the sequence of activities differed from class to class, and Danielle used a broad 
repertoire of tasks and assignments.  Among these, a regular assignment consisted in 
review questions, which accompanied the reading of the various sections in the 
textbook.  The questions tended to focus on the main idea of the section and prompted 
students to identify its meaning in the broader context of the topic explored (e.g., 
“How was the work of the writers of the 1920s a reflection of the roaring 1920s?”). 
The pace of class tended to be fast, despite the fact that Danielle’s questions 
and tasks could potentially solicit a good deal of analyses (e.g., comparison across 
multiple sources) and reflection.  In addition, she always appeared very 
knowledgeable and precise, although she had no trouble in admitting her limits.  For 
example, in reviewing the Battle of Little Bighorn, a student asked whether the chiefs 
of the Indian tribes were executed; Danielle began answering by saying that Sitting 
Bull lost his life, but not remembering where or how she added that she needed to 
check that.  Overall, the content of Danielle’s lectures, which went beyond what 
conveyed by the textbook, and her choice of additional sources and activities 
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demonstrated that she had dedicated a lot of personal reflection and research to the 
topics she taught. 
Danielle tended to collect homework at the beginning of class, and, 
occasionally, reminded students of impending quizzes or tests and how to prepare for 
them. However, tests and grades were clearly not the focus of her class, and sherarely 
referred to them while working on the various topics. 
Contributions from students were also encouraged, yet they tended to remain 
mediated by the teacher.  For example, the outcome of work done by students in 
groups was usually reviewed at the whole class level, with Danielle validating or 
integrating students’ answers.  In this respect, Danielle experienced som frustration, 
too; with the exception of four or five students, who steadily participated to the class 
dialogue and whose contributions tended to be thoughtful, the class that I observed 
demonstrated a very low level of interest.  The lack of effort regarded also the 
completion of homework, affecting the possibility of meaningful participation in 
class; during the semester, grades remained low for most of the students.  Although 
upset by such a lack of response, Danielle did not usually push students too strongly; 
she tended to tolerate student disengagement as long as it did not affect other students
or created confusion.   
“Grounded” lectures.  Danielle used lectures mainly to introduce new topics 
(usually corresponding to chapters in the textbook).  She organized them around 
specific movements in American history (e.g., the settling the West; the rise and role 
of big business in America), and used various kinds of sources (e.g., pictures, maps, 
and data) to ground the narrative.  In a way, the analysis of the sources guided 
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students in finding evidentiary support for a narrative explaining the origins and 
effects of the movement identified.  During these introductory lectures, Danielle 
usually provided organized notes, which linked together the main concepts, ideas, and 
events introduced in the unit and identified causal relations among them.  For this 
purpose, Danielle used various techniques, such as graphic organizers, partially 
completed tables, and acronyms, to foster memorization.  Students, if not in AP 
classes, were not expected to take notes by themselves and thus copied the ones 
projected in class.   
For example, Danielle introduced the Gilded Age by using a concept map that 
suggested causal relations between the graft and corruption of the era, the gap 
between the few rich and the many poor, and the birth of the Progressive movement 
(similar concept maps were used also by Ellen and Lauren).  After that, Danielle 
showed students a picture of the Vanderbilt’s mansion, asked students whether they 
knew about him, told them the story of this industrial family, and introduced the 
question about whether these entrepreneurs could be better characterized as industrial
leaders or robber barons.  Then, Danielle showed students a table, reporting the 
income (translated into 1998 USD) of some of the richest people in American history 
(e.g., Rockefeller, Carnegie, Vanderbilt, and Gates).  She also provided other 
information, such as the contributions to charities and the average wage of an 
employee.   
Students spent some time exploring the list, identifying the various businesses 
in which these entrepreneurs engaged, and noticing when members of the same 
family appeared among the richest people in America.  Once students had shared their 
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observations, Danielle introduced a graphic organizer highlighting relations of cause
and effect between several of the concepts examined in the unit (e.g., the industrial 
revolution needed labor, which required an increased population and thus facilitated 
immigration).  Several notes followed, together with further examples of particul ly 
complex concepts discussed in the unit (e.g., forms of business consolidation).   
Danielle believed that students could profit from the structure provided by her 
notes and encouraged them to use them for study purposes.  Yet, she tended to 
apologize for these long lessons, which she probably conceived as a necessary evil.  
Thus, she tried to include in the same class also some activities that required active 
involvement of the students (e.g., political cartoon analyses; review games).   
Danielle usually enriched her lectures by introducing personal anecdotes, and 
fostered connections with students’ lives by asking them to share experiences lat d 
to the topics examined (e.g., the origins of their families, while talking about 
immigration or their work experiences, while addressing the regulations introduced 
during the Progressive era).  The references to different kinds of evidence during her 
lectures were numerous and Danielle tended to “back up” her statements by referring 
to specific events and data.  However, in a few cases, she made students work on the 
content of a chapter by making them complete crossword puzzles that revisited the 
main concepts, people, and events addressed in the textbook.  In these cases (which 
remained exceptional during the semester), Danielle felt overall uncomfortable.  She 
tended to justify her choice with the need to cover in a short time a lot of material 
(i.e., chapters in the textbook).   
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 Tasks and activities.  Most of the tasks that students completed in Danielle’s 
class or at home involved some kind of primary sources; given their potential 
influence on the questions investigated by this study, I devote the next section to their 
specific description and analysis.  In this section, I focus on other activities that took 
place in Danielle’s class. 
Danielle used maps often.  Maps served the purpose of illustrating specific 
concepts (e.g., Manifest Destiny), to summarize state of affairs (e.g., alliances during 
WWI), and, more generally, to familiarize students with the setting of the events 
under consideration (e.g., imperialism in 1900).  Students were usually asked to 
complete, label, or color the maps, which became part of their study material.   
Danielle also used documentaries and movies to illustrate specific exampls of 
trends and issues examined in the curriculum.  Movies were mainly used for 
illustrating specific issues and fostering reflection.  For example, students watched 
“The Long Journey,” a story of an immigrant boy and his family at the end of the 19th 
century.  The questionnaire accompanying the movie drew students’ attention to a 
few factual aspects depicted in the video (e.g., “Where are the immigrants arriving at 
the beginning of the film?” “How did the family make enough to survive?”) and one, 
last question asked students to evaluate whether, given the grim conditions faced by 
the immigrants, it wouldn’t have been better for them to remain in their homeland.   
The differences (ethnic, social, and cultural) characterizing the United States 
in the early 20th century were further discussed after watching “The Lost Battalion,” a 
movie based on the events lived by an American Battalion toward the end of WWI.  
In this case, the movie guide provided a brief history of Major Whittlesey and of the
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events recounted in the movie, two questions addressing how the movie portrayed the 
composition of American society during WWI, and one question asking students to 
identify the characteristics that made the men of the Lost Battalion American heroes. 
Documentaries were sparingly used as alternatives to lectures, with the main 
purpose of conveying a narrative.  Danielle was particularly appreciative of th Peter 
Jenning’s series, and students watched a few of these videos in class.  Also in these 
cases, students were asked to complete questionnaires while watching the 
documentaries.  These questionnaires tended to be much more structured, sometimes 
in the form of “fill-in-the-blank” statements (e.g., “In 1900, there were _____ cars 
and less than ______ miles of concrete roads”).  Danielle tended to show the entire 
video and she did not usually comment on it.  However, at the end, students’ answers 
were briefly reviewed in class. 
Other activities served the main purpose of reviewing factual information and 
first order concepts, sometimes in preparation for upcoming tests, sometimes as a 
motivation for reading the textbook, and in some cases as a quick, formative 
assessment of a specific concept just discussed in class.  Danielle used various g mes 
format (e.g., Jeopardy; The Betting Game), crossword puzzles, matching items, and 
multiple choice items.   
Finally, Danielle often gave students additional texts, to integrate or deepen 
the topics that were addressed in class.  In these cases, she guided student reading of 
the texts by providing questions aimed at identifying key ideas, fostering 
comprehension and evaluation of the arguments exposed in the texts, and prompting 
connections with the broader historical context.   
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 Use of primary and secondary sources.  Danielle introduced several primary 
and secondary sources during her lectures; she often showed pictures and various 
representations of census data (or other data pertinent to the topic).  She also 
consistently referred to some piece of evidence to support her statements and 
prompted students to do the same, often asking them to quote evidence from the texts 
under discussion.  For example, in analyzing a political cartoon by Joseph Keppler, 
titled “The Bosses of the Senate,” Danielle asked students who the large figures in th  
top hats represented.  A student answered that they were the big corporations, who, 
with all their money, were the owner of the Senate.  Danielle’s question followed: 
“How do you know?”  Students volunteered that “They are in money bags,” and that 
“The others are very small.”  Danielle kept inviting students to look at the body 
language and to observe closely the particulars of the drawing.  Yet, Danielle very 
rarely shared with students why she selected certain sources and how she found them, 
why she thought they were reliable, or, more generally, what process she followed in 
building a narrative based on them. 
Although different perspectives were often considered and contrasted (e.g., 
Rockefeller’s views of industry and popular perceptions of big corporations; Wilson’s 
point and view and Zimmerman’s perspective), the process of analysis of sources was 
seldom explicitly addressed.  From prior years, students should have been familiar
with the APPARTS strategy, an approach that guided their analysis of a document 
(textual or pictorial) by noting the author (A), place and time (P), their prior 
knowledge of the topic (P), audience (A), reason (R, i.e., why the document was 
written), the main idea (T), and the significance of the document (S).  Only in one 
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case, I observed that students were explicitly directed to use it.  Half of the class 
seemed to remember the strategy with no difficulty; however, its application to the 
specific case (a political cartoon) was very difficult, since there was no clear 
indication of where the cartoon was originally published, and of who its author was.   
In one other case, I observed a brief discussion regarding the reliability of 
sources.  Specifically, students had contrasted two accounts of the Pullman strike, 
identified whether the authors were for or against the Pullman Company, compared 
their reports about the company’s levels of profit and control and their descriptions of 
the workers’ living conditions, and considered the sources used to write the accounts.  
In reviewing the assignment, Danielle prompted students to quote directly from the 
accounts in justifying their answers and students tended to do so with little difficulty.  
They also easily identified the sources used by the historians in building their 
accounts.  Then Danielle asked students what account they found most convincing.  
When students unanimously decided that it was account A, the one presenting the 
most varied sources (as Danielle had previously noted), Danielle asked: 
Danielle: How would you label the sources of historian B? 
Student: Biased. 
Danielle: Yes, they are all from Pullman’s. 
This short exchange concluded the evaluation of the two accounts. 
In a few cases, students worked in groups (usually using a “jigsaw” approach) 
to answer a key question on the basis of multiple sources.  These sources ranged from 
newspapers’ clips (e.g., on the sinking of Lusitania), excerpts of government’s acts 
(e.g., Pacific Railway Act), public speeches (e.g., President Andrew Jackson’s 
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Message to Congress “On Indian Removal”), and political cartoons.  Sometimes, the 
“document” consisted in a description of the actual primary source (e.g., Homestead 
Act), with the addition of background information about the historical context and the 
historical significance of the source.  In these cases, a small image of the actual 
source was generally included, but students were not directed to use it, nor was it 
readable in that format.   
For example, students examined the government’s role in the settling of the 
West by reading five sources: President Andrew Jackson’s Message to Congress “On 
Indian Removal,” Pacific Railway Act,  Homestead Act, Treaty of Fort La amie, and 
Dawes Act.  Only the first two documents included excerpts from the actual source.  
All the remaining documents had only a description of the content of the source.  
Danielle asked students to identify one key word that could capture the government’s 
role suggested by each document (e.g., relocation, assimilation).  The focus remained 
on the content of the texts, and there was no discussion about the different nature of 
these sources.  In addition, each student read only one of the documents and, although 
students were supposed to teach each other about the source they read, most students 
ended up by copying from each other the “key words.”  
Later in the semester, I observed a similar dynamic, when students used the 
same approach to address the reasons for the success of the prohibition movement 
during the era of progressive reform.  Also in this case, the collaboration withithe 
groups was minimal.  The whole class discussion was quite fast and it focused on the 
content of the documents to address the economic, social, and moral aspects of 
progressivism, which was the goal of the class.  The nature of the sources and their 
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point of view were rarely mentioned, although Danielle, in introducing the task, had 
noted that in a few cases, two different perspectives about a specific issue were 
offered (e.g., one favoring the prohibition amendment and one against it). 
Danielle also introduced multiple primary and secondary sources for 
integrating the textbook and deepening the understanding of specific topics.  For 
example, students read excerpts from “The Jungle” and from the Meat Inspection Act, 
together with a brief paragraph on the supply curve while studying the Progressive 
Reforms.  They also answered a few questions revisiting some key ideas explained in 
the readings.  In this particular case, I was surprised by the speed (about 10 minutes) 
with which students read these texts (roughly 4 pages in length) and answered the 
questions.  Danielle interpreted it as a normal occurrence with this group and read it 
as a positive indicator of students’ reading abilities.   
Epistemic beliefs. 
Digging deeper.  “For me [history] is the investigation of the past.”  This is 
how Danielle began responding to my Grand Tour question about what history was 
for her, and, in a sense, I believe that much of her thinking revolved around this idea.  
What drove this investigation?  According to Danielle, both the investigator and the 
sources at her disposal played a role.  Indicative of this belief was her reaction to the 
statement “The facts speak for themselves.”  She began by saying that she “almost 
agree[d],” but then quickly asked “[W]hat constitutes the fact?”, and answered her 
question by saying: 
Probably the date an event happened, that’s pretty much a fact.  Maybe who 
was involved in it, that’s pretty much a fact.  So those in and of itself, but it 
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depends on what you are going to call a fact, when you are approaching a 
historical event, what are you calling a fact? Students may take a look and 
say: “That’s a fact!” Not really, not really. 
Danielle was also well aware of several heuristics that facilitate historical 
thinking.  For example, she realized very clearly that historical accounts have an 
author and that the warrants of historical claims are in the evidentiary tracksprovided 
by the historian.  In addition, she was not at a loss in the presence of biased sources,
because the reliability of claims could be ascertained by considering, for example, the 
author’s purpose in writing the account and by corroborating it with other sources.  
Revisiting the idea of what constitutes a historical fact, she mentioned an activity that 
she often carried out with the students. 
Usually, we use scenarios of something they may be involved in, what is fact 
and what do you think it’s opinion? And there are evidences that we are 
giving them: an object, a diary.  Which would you say is a fact and what an 
opinion in this particular case? We have eyewitnesses that say this, but then 
she is writing something different into the diary, so which would you rather go 
for? Which would you believe most? 
Although Danielle mentioned the difference between facts and opinions, the 
entire interview appears to support the hypothesis that Danielle viewed historical 
facts as emerging in the context of a relation between an investigator (who brings 
questions and perspective to the table) and some remnants of the past.  She was also 
aware that investigators select among available evidence and, although she did not 
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gave into the belief that history is just a matter of opinion, Danielle believed that 
historical accounts needed to be read critically. 
I don’t think that historians go out there [and make up the past], maybe some  
historians have embellished it up a little, but again, I would, I guess, take a 
look at the historian’s background, maybe what they have written in the past, 
their approach, and again, what sources believed in order to come to that, 
and be a little skeptical at first. 
Danielle would not stop here, though.  Since she did not expect “that the 
historians use all the available sources,” before using their work, she would do some 
research herself.  It is at this point that an epistemic shift seems to occur.  The aspects 
of Danielle’s thinking reviewed so far seem compatible with the criterialist stance.  
However, other statements from the interview suggest a more complex view.  
Specifically, in taking up the role of historian, much more weight got placed on the 
objective aspect of knowledge and interpretation came to depend on the sources at 
one’s disposal.   
It depends on what documents you are looking at.  What type of evidence you 
have will lead your interpretation of that particular history.  You will need to 
look at all aspects of it by having, I guess, you will need more reliable 
sources, depending on the interpretation of the events.   
Thus, good inquiry came to be defined by the sources that one gathers, under 
the assumption that a disciplined method of inquiry would give more weight to 
accounts coming from “those that actually experienced it.”  This attitude a “ igging 
deeper” seems to imply an ultimate desire for finding out about the past in some 
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uncontaminated and certain form.  At the same time, the awareness that the remnants 
of the past that we may find are intrinsically biased, left the question about the 
relation between objective and subjective aspects of historical knowledge still open, 
as this quote illustrates: 
For me history is never just the facts, because you don’t really know what 
occurred unless you go in and research it, and then you know for sure what 
happened during the time period.  So you can gather information about a 
particular historical event, up to a certain point, but depending on the 
documents that you pick or the people that you talk to, there will always be 
bias.  I guess….    
 Historical thinking.   Danielle’s performance on the CRT was overall 
consistent with several aspects of her thinking emerged from the analysis of the 
interview.  In particular, Danielle demonstrated to be often aware of the author of te 
texts.  This emerged clearly after reading Document 3 and Document 4.  Danielle 
read the whole reference and, not knowing much about the authors of these 
documents, she focused on the titles of the works and found in it confirmation of her 
hypothesis that the documents addressed the conflict of religion versus scienceat a 
particular point in time: “Science and theology, just the title where this is coming 
from, ‘warfare of science with theology’.  You think religion versus science, coming 
out again.” 
Interestingly, in the cases in which she reflected on the source, in interpreting 
its content she explicitly addressed its author (e.g., “what they are saying is more, 
maybe oblong”; “so they are saying it is a sphere, but it is denied by the Church”).  
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However, when she perceived the content of the text as mainly informational (e.g., 
Document 5) and less related to the question at hand, she referred to the document 
using the impersonal “it:” “Here it is just talking about the measurement itself, 
again.” 
The effects of acknowledging the presence of the text’s author on adolescents’ 
reading of multiple historical texts have been explored by Paxton (2002).  She found 
that providing students with an introductory passage clearly conveying the author’s 
voice fostered consideration of perspective during the reading of the subsequent texts, 
a step considered very important for thinking historically.  On the other hand, without 
such prompt, students focused on the content of the text, a content now devoid of any 
context, and lost the possibility of understanding its meaning and evaluating its 
significance (Wineburg, 2007).  The analysis of Danielle’s think-aloud makes me 
wonder whether these two processes are reciprocally influential, since, in this
particular case, it seems that awareness of the author is prompted by clarl  sensing 
that issues of bias or perspective may greatly affect the content of the text.   
Danielle was a very careful reader.  At the end of each document, she often 
took some time to go “back into the document, to see if there is any evidence” useful 
to address the question asked by the task, and “if that particular understanding fits 
with the question itself.”  She noted that some conflict between science and religion 
was emerging from multiple documents, but her intertextual reading stopped here.   
Once she finished reading all six texts, she suggested that, in order to answer 
the question, she would “probably make a chart, either/or, sphere or flat, and see how 
many documents support[ed] the answer; […] or even make a T-chart, 
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science/religion.” In the end, she “would take more the scientific viewpoint tha the 
theological viewpoint,” because she did not “really have a lot of evidence to support 
that the world is flat, the theological standpoint.”  Overall, in building her answer, 
Danielle seemed to follow a sort of “majority rule,” espousing the view of the 
majority of the sources.   
Danielle was not particularly satisfied with the kind of knowledge she was 
able to build on the basis of the documents and felt that she “would need to look into 
the theological problem, why they are going against what science is providing.”  In 
particular, she believed that such lack of prior knowledge impeded her ability to 
evaluate whether some of the documents’ assertions were a consequence of bias.  I 
found this approach consistent with the attitude of “digging deeper” manifested 
during the structured interview.  The task completion clarified one of the 
consequences of the almost complete dependence of historical knowledge on the 
content of the available sources: specifically, the lack of corroboration across sources 
made it impossible to determine the trustworthiness of specific documents whenever 
the author was not previously known and brought to a halt the process of knowledge 
construction. 
Comparisons across Teachers 
In this section, I take a broader view and revisit the results described in the 
prior pages to highlight differences and similarities across these three teachers.  My 
purpose here is to offer a synthetic summary of the results (so that the trees shall not 
impede the view of the forest) and to prepare for the last step of analysis, which will 
compare students’ and teachers’ findings.  I organize the comparisons following the 
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same order in which I reported the results for each teacher.  Table 4.1 summarizes 
key results. 
Goals.  While several goals were shared across all the three teachers, here I 
focus on what goals each one of them brought to the forefront and what goals tended 
to remain in the background.  Ellen and Danielle underscored the willingness to foster 
a view of history as personally significant.  Lauren focused especially on maki g 
history relevant for understanding the present.  Danielle echoed Lauren’s goal by 
highlighting the existence of cycles in history.  Both Ellen and Lauren expressed the 
goal of making history “real” for their students.   
In terms of differences, Lauren tended to focus on the substantive content of 
history, while Ellen and even more forcefully Danielle expressed the goal of teaching 
students to build historical arguments and of fostering an overall thoughtful approach 
to the discipline (which, in the case of Danielle, included accurate substantive 
knowledge).  Introducing students to the use of primary sources was a goal shared by 
all teachers; however, it was mentioned as the first goal in order of importance only 
by Danielle.  For Ellen and Lauren, introducing students to primary sources was 
mentioned last.  All teachers justified their interest in the use of primary sou ces by 
referring to their potential of making history real and of facilitating learning.  In a 
way, their goal in using them mainly to provide illustrations of or additions to the 
narrative provided by the textbook and presented during lectures.   
Interest.  All teachers reported to be frequent consumers of history related 
material (from scholarly history book, to historical novels, popular movies, and visits 
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often engaged in historical inquiry and stated that they often looked for primary 
source material.  Danielle reported a moderate level of engagement with this kind of 
activities.   
Table 4.2 reports teachers’ average scores on the interest measure in terms of 
their participation in activities that suggests a general interest in history (e.g., watch a 
historical documentary and read a historical novel) and a professional engagement in 
the history-domain (e.g., read a scholarly history book and engage in historical 
inquiry).  While differences in the absolute average scores may depend on what 
“often” meant for each of these teachers, differences in the relation between 
participation in activities signaling general vs. professional interest may be an 
indication of expertise.  While all teachers reported to be more involved in activities 
signaling a general interest in history than in activities that could be considered a 
mark of expertise, the gap between the two scores was much greater in the case of 
Danielle.  Further, while Lauren’s participation in professional activities was mainly 
related to her work on a master in history, Ellen’s involvement in specific activities 
was a pure reflection of her personal choice. 
 
Table 4.2 
Teachers’ Average Scores for General (G.I.) and Professional (P.I.) Interest in 
History 
 






(G.I. – P.I.) 
Ellen 7.5 6.86 0.64 
Lauren 5.67 5.43 0.24 
Danielle 5.33 3.43 1.90 
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I found it particularly interesting that only Ellen perceived herself to serve as a 
historical authority or resource, and thus probably conceptualized her role as teacher 
in this way.  Both Lauren and Danielle probably interpreted this item as referring only 
to professional historians.   
General pedagogy.  Participant teachers differed markedly in the kind of 
relationships and classroom climate they strove to establish.  On one hand, Ellen 
tended to be authoritative and friendly, fostered and valued collaborations among the 
students, was willing to bend the curriculum if it served her students’ learning, and 
was comfortable in sharing her views and accepting different perspectives.  On the 
other hand, Lauren strove to foster her student responsibility for learning by enforcing 
routines, rules, and a system of rewards based on points and grades.  In her teaching, 
she felt the need to remain within the boundaries of what she perceived as politically 
correct, but was uncomfortable with this position.   
Danielle focused on creating rich learning experiences for her students, 
sharing and trying to foster a genuine interest for the discipline.  Although clear and 
steady in her expectations, she let students make their choices in terms of the degree 
of involvement they wanted to maintain in class.  All three teachers experienced some 
degree of frustration, which increased during the semester and was exacerbated by the 
tension of “keeping up” with the pacing guide, a constraint that became especially 
pressing with the upcoming of the final exams.    
Lectures.  All participant teachers used lectures to convey a narrative 
organized around broad topics (e.g., progressive reforms; imperialism); their notes 
highlighted relations of cause and effects between key concepts and events and 
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provided a structure for organizing the content of textbook’s chapters or units.  Ellen 
and Lauren tended to follow more closely the textbook, with Lauren adding further 
details and Ellen focusing on logical links between central concepts.  Danielle 
introduced several primary and secondary sources and built her narrative around 
them; students were responsible for reading the textbook, but the lectures were built 
more freely around its topics. 
Tasks.  Most tasks used in Ellen’s and Lauren’s classes served the main 
purpose to organize, repeat, and elaborate ideas and factual information conveyed by 
the textbook or by additional readings.  Ellen also designed tasks that prompted 
students to select evidence and built a story around it.  Both teachers highlighted the 
importance of being mindful of the historical context: Ellen mainly aimed at fostering 
empathy; Lauren tended to underscore accuracy.  Danielle designed several tasks 
aiming at deepening comprehension of texts, fostering reflection, and, similarly to 
Ellen and Lauren, reviewing factual information.   
Use of primary and secondary sources.  All participant teachers used 
primary sources for illustration purposes.  In addition, Ellen introduced secondary-
source alternatives to the textbook to foster reading comprehension; in this respect, 
Ellen used these additional sources just as texts.  She often asked students to note the 
author and the nature of a source (primary or secondary), but these elements wer  not 
used for evaluating the source and thus building understanding. 
Danielle used multiple sources to create the narrative that she conveyed 
mainly through lectures.  In this sense, she used sources as additive or illustrative 
evidence.  Students were also asked to complete several tasks that involved different 
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kind of sources.  There were several attempts to use sourcing for evaluation purp ses; 
however, the problem of bias seemed to remain unsolved and these additional sources 
were mainly used for gathering factual elements and ideas to add to the main 
narrative. 
Epistemic beliefs.  Table 4.3 reports the frequencies of the epistemic beliefs 
categories identified in the rubric (subcategories 1-6).  Because teachers and students 
differed with respect to the total number of utterances for each interview, in order t  
aid comparisons, I transformed the frequency of each category into a percentage, 
calculated as a ratio between the frequency of that category and the total number of 
epistemic beliefs codes attributed to that specific participant.  
All participant teachers demonstrated awareness of the interpretive na ur  of history.  
They differed, however, in the way in which they reconciled (or failed to reconcile) 
the subjective aspect of it with extant traces of the past.  Ellen saw in the availability 
of evidence a limit to historian’s subjectivity; at the same time, the idea that evidence 
tended to provide “two sides of the story” (why two?) seemed to push Ellen toward a 
subjective view of history.  Thus, a higher number of utterances were coded as 
EBSUB.  Lauren acknowledged the existence of multiple perspectives.  Yet, she had 
a hard time in reconciling this state of affairs with her clear identification of a right 
and a wrong side in many issues.  I suggest that her discomfort with instances of 
political correctness may have been related to the contradictions implied in this 
epistemic stance.  In addition, she tended to view evidence as detached from 





Frequencies and Percentages* of Utterances Expressing Different Categories of 
Teachers’ Epistemic Beliefs 
 
Name EBCO TR1 EBSUB TR2 EBCR EB Total 
 Freq. 
 (%) 









        
Ellen 1 (5%) 10 (50%) 6 (30%) 3 (15%) - - 20 
Lauren 5 (23%) 9 (41%) 8 (36%) - - - 22 
Danielle 3 (16%) 5 (26%) - 4 (21%) 7 (37%) - 19 
 
*Percentages are rounded to the closest integer; thus the sum by row does not necessarily equal to 100. 
 
 
argument, an idea that prompted me to code several of her statements as EBCO or 
TR1.  
 In discussing the nature of historians’ accounts, Danielle demonstrated a raher 
consistent criterialist stance.  In most of these cases, I coded her statements as TR2 or 
EBCR.  Yet, in the context of building her own understanding of the past, the 
possibility of generating true knowledge about the past came to depend mainly on the 
sources at one’s disposal, making the knower almost invisible.  Thus, I coded her 
statements mostly as EBCO or TR1.  The distribution of her statements across the 
different categories illustrates this split.   
Historical thinking.   Teachers differed considerably in their performance on 
the CRT task.  Table 4.4 reports the frequencies of the historical thinking categories 
identified in the rubric (subcategories 7-11).  Both Ellen and Danielle paid close 
attention to the authors and kind of documents.  In the case of Ellen, these 
understandings came to bear on the interpretation of the texts, while Danielle used 
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them especially for identifying a common theme across the texts.  Lauren did not 
seem to consider the authors of the documents nor the characteristics of these texts.   
Both Lauren and Danielle tended to consider each text in isolation (with the 
exception of looking for a common theme, in the case of Danielle); probably as a 
result, Lauren intended to approach the question by working from a “majority rule.”  
Danielle mentioned the possibility of creating a T-chart and referred to theneed of 
gathering further information about the issue.  Only Ellen actually corroborated 
across documents, checking them one against the other and using her gained 
understandings to revisit prior interpretations.  She also considered the historical 
context while, at the same time, she remained open to review her prior knowledge of 




Frequencies and Percentages* of Utterances Expressing Features of Teachers’ 
Historical Thinking 
 
Name HTYes HTNo CP AQ AA Total 
 Freq. (%) Freq.  (%) Freq. (%) Freq.  
(%) 
Freq. (%) Freq. 
       
Ellen 7 (64%) - 1 (9%) - 3 (27%) 11 
Lauren - 3 (30%) 2 (20%) 5 (50%) - 10 
Danielle 5 (31%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 5 (31%) 4 (25%) 16 
 





Epistemic Beliefs of Students in History 
Evidence for these data comes from analyses of structured interviews 
collected while student informants responded to the BHQ statements and justified 
their degree of agreement or disagreement with the items.  While teachers completed 
the BHQ only once, students responded to the questionnaire twice.  In reporting the 
results, I will first describe the characteristics of students’ beliefs, irrespectively of 
whether they manifested themselves during the first of second administration of the 
BHQ, and then focus on changes observed within each student.  I believe that, in this 
way, the description of the beliefs gains in richness and eventual developmental 
trends may appear more clearly.   
General findings.  Before describing the characteristics of beliefs emerged, I 
want to note a few general features that I believe may be important for their 
pedagogical implications.  In particular, they regard the interest of students in 
discussing epistemological issues, the accessibility of student beliefs, and their 
malleability.   
Specifically, I found that students were interested in discussing 
epistemological statements and able to justify their beliefs.  Although there were a 
few instances in which students manifested their difficulties in pondering the 
statements, there was no indication that they considered the effort useless or boring.  
While I do not mean to discount the possible influence of being pulled out of the class 
routine and benefit of one-to-one attention, I still found remarkable the overall high 
level of engagement with the statements.  When students answered the BHQ in 
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writing, the low number of responses left blank (about 1%) also confirms their 
willingness to engage these statements.    
In addition, there were cases in which students showed surprise or puzzlement 
at the emergence of these beliefs in themselves.  For example, at the end of the 
interview, when asked whether she found the questions difficult, Kate said: “Yes, it is 
hard to think about what you want to say, like how you want to explain it, but just if 
they give you a minute to process, then you are wow, this is how I think.”  Instance 
like these suggest that epistemic beliefs may be quite easily prompted, although 
students may be rarely reflective about them. 
Finally, there were instances in which the students engaged in a revision of 
their beliefs on the basis of the discussion of the statements in the questionnaire.  
Analyses of their responses suggested that it is probably relatively easy to challenge 
the idea that history is a collection of certain facts.  Yet, what happens aftrw rds is 
much more complex, indicating that radical and sudden epistemic restructuring is not 
a likely event. 
An example was provided by Juliet’s second interview.  While responding to 
the statement “Students who read many history books learn that the past is what the 
historian makes it to be,” she asked whether the historian has “to be there” in order to 
write history.  Once told this was not the case, Juliet often interjected this new idea 
(the “historian thing,” as she named it) while discussing the statements that followed.  
For example, while reacting to the statement “Students need to be aware that history 
is essentially a matter of interpretation” she said: “I somewhat agree with that, oh no, 
I disagree with that because it’s facts but then, again, somewhat disagree, because it’s 
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facts but we get our facts from people who weren’t there so they have to interpret 
what happened.”  And she concluded: “My answers have definitely changed since last 
time.”  
Juliet demonstrated awareness of the change she was undergoing.  She was 
able to describe her previous stance as being “pretty settled on that it’s f cts, and you 
can’t change facts, and get all your information from facts,” and to compare it with
her current realization that “it’s not really that what we learn is all based on facts; it is 
based on what the historians were, like their investigations, and using the historical 
method.”  Although this last statement may suggest a move toward a criterialist 
stance, the rest of the interview showed otherwise.  Aware that the historian was not 
necessarily an eyewitness, Juliet moved to the idea that the historian was an 
investigator.  However, lacking familiarity with the historical method, Juliet’s 
investigator was unable to interrogate the sources and this condition generated the 
idea that history was hopelessly subjective.   
Commenting on the statement “Even eyewitnesses do not always agree with 
each other, so there is no way to know what happened,” Juliet said: “I agree with this, 
because eyewitnesses, like a car accident, this person said that this person ran int  
him but he ran into her so no one really knows, because everyone has their own 
opinion, everyone sees things differently.”  However, as the rest of Juliet’s response 
illustrates, this sense of uncertainty still coexisted with the idea that the historian is a 
chronicler and that textbooks tell what happened: “[t]here really isn’t any wy to 
know today like 100% what happened in the Greek times, because I don’t really 
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know much about it, but none of us was there unless there was a textbook in the 
Greek ages of what happened, but I don’t think it did.”  
Specific epistemic beliefs emerged from analyses of structured interviews.  
Table 4.5 reports the frequencies of the epistemic beliefs categories identified in the 
rubric (subcategories 1-6).  As I did with teachers, in order to aid comparisons, I 
transformed the frequency of each category into a percentage, calculated as a ratio 
between the frequency of that category and the total number of epistemic beliefs 
codes attributed to that specific participant.  I based the calculation of the averages for 
each class and for the entire sample on these percentages. 
The table shows that, across the two administrations, I coded most of the 
students’ utterances as Copier (48% and 34%, respectively) and Transition 1 (26% 
and 27%, respectively).  Few utterances, contributed in large measure by just one 
student, Mark were coded as Criterialist (5% and 3%, respectively); the Subjectivist 
category moderately increased across the two administration (7% and 11%, 
respectively), utterances coded as Transition 2 increased from 7% to 22% in the 
second administration, and a few student utterances offered epistemic ideas that could 
not be described by the categories I created (6% and 4%, respectively).  For the most 
part, these general patterns remained consistent across classes, as well, although some 
differences could also be noted, especially in respect to changes across the two 
administrations.  I will examine more closely these occurrences in the section 
reporting about change in epistemic beliefs.  In what follows, I describe the categories 
of epistemic beliefs that emerged, providing illustrations from the students’ structured 




Frequencies, Percentages*, and Averages* of Utterances Expressing Different 
Categories of Student Epistemic Beliefs 
 
Name EBCO TR1 EBSUB TR2 EBCR EB Total 
 Freq.  (%) Freq.(%) Freq.(%) Freq.(%) Freq.(%) Freq.(%) Freq. 
        
Class 1.1 54% 19% 6% 8% 2% 11%  
Class 1.2 51% 21% 8% 14% 4% 4%  
Kalyna.1 4 (29%) - - 3 (21%) 1 (7%) 6 (43%) 14 
Kalyna.2 14 (61%) 1 (4%) - 2 (9%) 2 (9%) 4 (17%) 23 
Jane.1 7 (100%) - - - - - 7 
Jane.2 8 (67%) 3 (25%) 1 (8%) - - - 12 
Eric.1 7 (41%) 7 (41%) 1 (6%) 2 (12%) - - 17 
Eric.2 4 (18%) 4 (18%) 3 (14%) 10(45%) 1 (5%) - 22 
Rick.1 5 (45%) 4 (36%) 2 (18%) - - - 11 
Rick.2 11 (58%) 7 (37%) 1 (5%) - - - 19 
        
Class 2.1 54% 37% 8% - - 2%  
Class 2.2 25% 27% 14% 33% 2% -  
Kate.1 10 (42%) 8 (33%) 6 (25%) - - - 24 
Kate.2 1 (5%) 6 (27%) 9 (41%) 6 (27%) - - 22 
Monica.1 5 (31%) 10(63%) 1 (6%) - - - 16 
Monica.2 5 (31%) 3 (19%) - 7 (44%) 1 (6%) - 16 
Chris.1 10 (59%) 6 (35%) - - - 1 (6%) 17 
Chris.2 2 (8%) 4 (15%) 4 (15%) 16(62%) - - 26 
Juliet.1 5 (83%) 1 (17%) - - - - 6 
Juliet.2 21 (54%) 18(46%) - - - - 39 
        
Class 3.1 38% 22% 6% 13% 15% 7%  
Class 3.2 28% 34% 12% 18% 3% 7%  
Elizabeth.1 8 (53%) 6 (40%) 1 (7%) - - - 15 
Elizabeth.2 21 (70%) 9 (30%) - - - - 30 
Jack.1 9 (50%) 4 (22%) 1 (6%) 4 (22%) - - 18 
Jack.2 1 (5%) 5 (26%) 5 (26%) 8 (42%) - - 19 
Ashley.1 9 (47%) 4 (21%) 1 (5%) 5 (26%) - - 19 
Ashley.2 5 (25%) 11(55%) 3 (15%) 1 (5%) - - 20 
Mark.1 - 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 11(58%) 5 (26%) 19 
Mark.2 2 (11%) 5 (26%) 1 (5%) 5 (26%) 2 (11%) 5 (26%) 19 
        
Averages.1 48% 26% 7% 7% 5% 6%  
Averages.2 34% 27% 11% 22% 3% 4%  
 
Note.  When used after a name, .1 denotes data referring to the first administration and .2 denotes data 
referring to the second administration. 
*Percentages and averages are rounded to the closest integer; thus the sum by row does not necessarily 




Copier (EBCO).  In this category, I gathered utterances compatible with a 
view of knowing in which there is no overall awareness of the role of the knower and 
evidence is thus conceived as detached from argument.  Similar ideas were also 
reported by Lee (2004), who found that some students tended to explain differences 
among historical accounts as a result of the impossibility of “being there” (in the past) 
or as a consequence of accessing different remnants of the past.  Again, similarly to 
what I found in this study, some students were conceiving evidence as granting 
immediate access to the past and blamed eventual problems on the incorrectness of 
the “information” (Lee & Shemilt, 2003). 
Two main ideas consistently tended to characterize this stance across the data.  
The first one can be described as the belief that history coincides with the pas, and, in 
particular, it is seen as the series of events that happened in the past.  The second 
regards the role of historians, conceived as chroniclers or serendipitous finders.   
The first idea was sometimes signaled by utterances in which the words 
“history” and “past” were used interchangeably, as illustrated in some of th  
following examples: “[H]istory to me is things that happened in history, you learn
about it, it’s not like someone’s interpretation of a situation, it’s like facts tha 
actually happened” (Juliet); “[H]istory is about the past, the events that happened in 
the past, not really anything else” (Jack); “[Y]ou may have your own interpretation of 
it but it [history] doesn’t change.  History is already done and it is never going to 
change” (Ashley).   
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As such, history came to be determined by its remnants (e.g., documents, 
artifacts, and bones), as this quote by Elizabeth epitomized: “[T]he past is what the 
evidence makes it to be, what evidence you collect; it’s not the historian.  Historian  
can say anything about the past and it can be wrong, but the evidence says what 
happened in the past.”  
Several students echoed this idea, sharpening the description of this belief and 
making explicit some of its possible justifications.  Chris, for example, said th t “the 
past wrote the history down,” because “after a war, someone would just write about 
it.” Similarly, Monica affirmed that “there are certain things in the pastthat we know 
that happened just based on writings and things like that.”   These remnants of the 
past can “tell what really happened.” Monica admitted that sometimes it may be 
difficult to reach certainty about “what happened,” especially when the object of the 
search is “way back.”  However, also in these cases, she was quick to conclude than 
one can “kind of know, based on fossils.”  
Several students referred to fossils in their responses, especially dinosaurs’ 
bones and Egyptians mummies or artifacts, but also videos and photographs in regard 
to the more recent past.  Jane, for example, recalled that “the Egyptians […] wrote 
stuff on rocks […] and this is how they found out that Egyptians were there and 
stuff.”  Similarly, Kalyna referred to the mummy of an Egyptian’s empress; and Rick 
liked the idea of history as inquiry “because it is always going back to history, and 
digging, and investigating, and see what really happened.”  On the other hand, 
similarly to Monica, Juliet appreciated the difficulties in dealing with some traces of 
the past, such as cave paintings, and admitted that, in these cases, historians need to 
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“pick those apart” in order to find “the information for us.”  However, she found that 
in other cases historians’ work is much easier, such as when they can “rely on the 
video” or “even as easy as [reading] from [a]diary.”  Rick echoed Juliet’s comments 
by observing that “nowadays history can be made with videos and stuff.” 
Technology was sometimes mentioned as a powerful ally in dealing with 
“difficult” remnants.  For example, Ashley believed that it was possible to know 
about the past “because technology and things that we have are capable of knowing 
things.”  When asked for an example, her response, again, regarded “bones, the 
dinosaurs stuff.”  Thinking about the impact that technology may have on the future 
of history, Jack concluded that “in the future we will have evidence; we’ll have 
cameras and video cameras, and technology that can help us with evidence.”  In 
mentioning videos and photographs, students did not seem aware of the fact that 
human eyes have peeped through the camera and decided its focus, falling easily pr y 
of the referential illusion of these media (VanSledright, 2002).  At the same time, 
they often struggled with the issue of trustworthiness and possible bias of 
eyewitnesses.   
The second idea characterizing a copier stance regarded the role of historians, 
conceived as chroniclers or serendipitous finders and collectors of remnants of the 
past.  Although students seemed to be aware that history had an author, the weight of 
generating knowledge remained heavily dependent upon its object, a result that 
echoed what Hynd and her colleagues found by interviewing college students (Hyd,
Holschuh, & Hubbard, 2004).  Quite often, students did not seem to differentiate too 
sharply between the work of historians and the task of archeologists, or likened the 
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historian to an investigator.  These conceptualizations seemed to prevent students 
from understanding the interpretive role of historians and especially the importance of 
the question that the historian set out to investigate in guiding the historical research 
and in deciding what counts as evidence.  Kalyna illustrated this issue quite clearly:
[T]here is always evidence in history and also the detective that tries to find 
this person who is guilty, [who] strongly believes that this person is guilty, he 
needs to research all the stuff, like files […] so, that to show that the 
detectives and archeologists are both the same, search for evidence and never 
give up. 
Kalyna used the word “evidence” and hinted at the role of argument, as her detective 
seemed to know what he was searching for.  Yet, her attitude lacked the openness that 
should characterize historical inquiry.  Moreover, the rest of the interview sugge ted 
that Kalyna conceived of evidence as providing in itself the final answer (or pro f) 
about some event in the past.  For example, she explained that “historians do not 
make history […] [they] can just go and tell you how it goes.” 
Very interesting in this respect was also the concept of “fact” that emergd in 
a few cases.  Kate provided a clear definition: “Facts are facts and they tell you what 
happened and what didn’t happen; this is why they are called facts.”  Most students 
acknowledged their unfamiliarity with the term “historical method,” and a few of 
them voiced skepticism about the existence of a historical method and the opportunity 
to use it in order to generate knowledge about the past.  For example, according to 
Jack, the relation between the past and the account should be as transparent as 
possible; hence, he was suspicious of any method of inquiry because history “should 
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be what it is and method could skew the results.”  Similarly, Elizabeth acknowledged 
that “science has a method, but history […] just happens, so there is not really a 
method,” and Juliet echoed the same idea saying that “it’s not that history is like a 
method […]; history is just what it is, what happened.” 
However, a few students began to see some of these beliefs as problematic, 
albeit only in a few cases and without abandoning the overall epistemic assumptions 
characterizing a copier stance.  For example, some realized that, in a few unfortunate 
cases, knowledge about the past may become impossible since “the people [who] 
wrote the records could have changed it or made it not true” (Rick).  In other cases, 
they qualified their belief in the factual nature of knowledge by saying that facts 
speak for themselves only if they are true (Chris).  Finally, when prompted to hink 
about the relation between the past and historians, some students began to question 
the origin of historical knowledge.  This quote from Kate illustrates this moment: 
It makes you confused because you know that historians write the history 
books,  they have to get the history from somewhere, so they have to get the 
information from somewhere to write about it, so you question where does 
their information come from so that they can write about it? 
Transition 1 (TR1).  Utterances comprised in this category voiced the 
desirability of a coincidence of history with the past.  In other words, historians were 
viewed as “wannabe” chroniclers, thus sharing much of the copier stance.  However, 
these utterances also demonstrated the belief that complete knowledge of the past is 
always, or at least very often, impossible because the interpretation of what we ve 
left from the past is debatable, conflicting, or simply too little. 
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[T]here is evidence [in history] in the aspect of people knowing what 
happened, but there is no evidence because no one is going to say the same 
thing every time (Kate). 
[Y]ou really don’t know history; it’s just through books and people writing 
down stuff and documents from back in the days; there could be something 
missing that nobody knows about, but […] everybody has a different opinion 
about history and what they think happened (Ashley). 
In all these cases, these participants saw history as a hopelessly subjective 
endeavor and it became just a matter of opinion, echoing several of the ideas 
characterizing a subjectivist stance.  Jack, for example, said that “if there is lack of 
evidence, people will think something else.  […] If there is lack of evidence you can 
say pretty much anything […] about what happened.”  Similarly, Eric and Juliet said 
that “you can’t really know if the history is 100% accurate, so, in a way it [the past] is 
what the historian makes it to be,” and “historians were not there, so they cannot 
really just say what they want to, but they can fabricate on it.” Rick saw the proc ss 
even less grounded: “They are not really sure about what really happened until they 
guess about history, so that you can teach it.”  
However, contrary to utterances coded as Subjectivist, these statements did 
not reflect the belief that historical knowledge was intrinsically subjectiv  and, in 
general, students voicing these ideas regretted these occurrences.  In particular, they 
tended to cast the difference between possible and impossible (or subjective) history 
as a dichotomy between objective facts and opinions that cannot be challenged: 
“There is evidence in history that shows what happened, but a lot of it is opinion by 
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historians and people” (Jack).  In a few cases, however, participants indicated that out 
of a multiplicity of opinions (and sometimes because of it) the truth about the past 
could be reached (or, at least, one could make up one’s mind): “Anyone can have an 
idea, but one person can see evidence as one thing and another can see another one 
and then you just have to go against each other to find out the truth (Chris); “[H]istory 
itself is more of a boiling down of the different ways in which it was interpreted to 
find out the truth of what actually happened” (Mark). 
In some cases, students seemed to realize the problems implied by the 
coexistence of the beliefs characterizing these utterances, but were not able t  solve 
the contradiction.  For example, in evaluating whether she believed that history was 
simply a matter of interpretation, Monica showed uncertainty: “I don’t know, some of 
it is interpretation, but a lot of it is facts, I don’t know” (Monica).  Similarly, in 
considering the justifiability of historical claims, Jack said: “I somewhat disagree 
with this, because historical claims [silence] I somewhat agree with this because 
historical claims is pretty much interpretation by historians [silence] Ah, I don’t 
know.” 
The fact/opinion dichotomy was found in prior studies by Lee and Ashby 
(2000).  They warned that stressing this distinction without offering criteria to 
discriminate among different opinions could likely push adolescents toward an 
unwarranted skepticism or helpless indifference (p. 222).  Yet, students did not 
always welcome the idea of being taught to deal with conflicting evidence.  For 
example, during the second interview, I asked Elizabeth how she would discriminate 
between conflicting stories.  The lack of effective criteria emerged, and she admitted 
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that “you don’t really know what happened and so one thing could really overpower 
the other and be completely wrong.” At the same time, she declared that she did not 
want to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence.  This is the reason she provided: 
“because then you have to think and to be like ‘Oh, what is, which is right?’ And then 
you can make the mistake of being wrong and then you’ll be ‘Oh!’ and then you’ll 
tell everyone the wrong thing and change what really happened.”  A preference for 
relying on the authority of the teacher, the textbook, or, more generically, the 
researchers seemed to be related to this kind of fear.   
This refusal of epistemic responsibility seems to me a worrisome correlate of 
the idea that true knowledge can be obtained only when the knower is a passive 
receiver of ready-made evidence or of words from authorities.  Reliance on 
authorities to resolve eventual conflicts emerged during interviews with other 
participants, too, although in these other cases students welcomed the possibility of 
learning how to face these situations themselves.  The rationale usually provided was 
that “there’s historians that can probably tell you accurately what happened” (Chris) 
and that “it’s probably not rational to believe something and don’t have evidence for, 
or that a researcher researched for and come close to proving it” (Monica).  A 
different rationale was provided by Mark who noted that not “all students are mature 
enough to handle that decision.”  
In terms of justification of historical knowledge claims, I found that 
participants hardly distinguished between opinions and interpretations.  One rare 
exception was offered by Jack who provided the following definitions: 
“[I]nterpretation is taking all the facts, and putting together, and see what happened.  
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Opinion is what you think that happened, […] but with no facts.”  On the contrary, 
most students used the two words interchangeably, with an overall subjective 
undertone, suggesting that they were unable to evaluate the degree of justification of 
different opinions.   
In a few cases, opinion took on a judgmental character (of specific events or 
people’s behaviors), and referred to the evaluation of historical occurrences in moral 
terms.  When intended in this way, students did not think that opinion should 
withstand any justification.  This quote from Ashley illustrates this issue: “[Y]ou can 
have your own opinion on it [history], but it is not a matter of opinion, it is […] 
already done, but you can have your own opinion on it.”  The difficulties that students 
demonstrated in dealing with the contradictions that a stark dichotomy between facts 
and opinions engender suggest that pedagogical interventions explicitly aiding the 
clarification of these concepts and thus the development of a more mature epistemic 
stance may be necessary to overcome this impasse.   
Subjectivist (EBSUB).  In this category, I grouped those utterances conveying 
the perception that the role of the knower in the process of knowing is predominant 
and for the most part unbound by any reference to something existing outside of him 
or her.  In these cases, participants often voiced the idea that history depended on the 
views of those who write it and thus it became a matter of opinion.  The issue of bias 
sometimes arose in this context: “History is basically what you make of it, depending 
on what you have got to know, what your background is, like Democratic, 
Republican, because […] people see it differently depending on whether you are 
Republican or Democratic.” (Kate).  Elizabeth extended this idea to historians: “It is 
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all about the historian’s opinion, I guess, how they perceive history; so […] everyone 
is going to have a different opinion about what happened, or should have happened, 
or why it happened.”  In a few cases, personal experience was used to support this 
subjective view: “Everyone is going to have his own opinion [on a fight] based on 
whether one of their friends is fighting another person” (Kate). 
Whenever objective remnants of the past were mentioned, these participants 
generally discounted them, on the ground that their use became a matter of choice and 
interpretation was therefore at the mercy of the historian’s personal opinions.  Thus, 
for Eric, “everything is interpretation, because they [historians] recognize different 
opinions about things and different artifacts about everything.”  Although he 
acknowledged that “you got to have evidence about something,” he also pointed out 
that “there are different opinions about a lot of things, like the one that one thought 
that it has the face of Jesus on it; it could be just painted on there, it could be faded 
away, you never know.  It’s like a thousand years old.” 
 Similarly, Jack said that the historian writes “what he knows and he believes;” and 
“even if there is records, [he] can interpret them differently.”  Rick concluded that 
students should be aware that “history is just being created, it is just being made and 
interpreted.”  An exception to this trend, Elizabeth concluded that since “everyone is 
going to have a different opinion,” one has “to just do it with evidence,” ending up in 
a position that seems to resemble what I called TR1.  However, when asked how she 
would address the conflict, Elizabeth referred to class discussions in which “everyone 
has his own opinion,” but is asked to “listen to the others’ opinion and take it in.”  
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Thus, in contrast with beliefs categorized as TR1, in this case the evidence is 
someone else’s opinion.   
The result of this “taking in” without prior evaluation remains problematic, 
possibly ending up in internalizing unresolved conflict; an outcome quite likely if 
students do not have criteria to evaluate different points of view and mirroring the 
“Cut and Paste” approach emerged during the completion of the CRT task.  Also in 
this case, some of the findings of this study echoed what reported in Lee’s work 
(2004), where some students explained differences in accounts as an “author 
problem”, due to mistakes or differences in points of view.   
Transition 2 (TR2).  I did not find much evidence signaling a clear movement 
toward coordination between object and subject of knowledge, although the 
percentage of these statements increased during the second interview.  The statem nts 
coded as TR2 acknowledged some interpretive work of the learner while usually 
adding that such interpretation was based on evidence.  However, most of these 
statements also conserved some of the undertones characterizing a transition 1 stance, 
which means that the idea of historians as finders (albeit very active finders) se med 
to be still in the background.  Thus, for the most part, these statements conveyed the 
awareness that evidence needs interpretation, but they hardly suggested that stu ents 
were also aware of the role played by the historian’s question in the generatio  of 
historical knowledge.   
Jack, for example, said that “the historian is interpreting the events that he 
finds out and things that he finds out of the past.”  Jack’s historian still resembles the 
serendipitous finder typical of the copier stance, since the role of the historian’s 
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question or initial hypothesis about the past is still missing.  However, in this case, the 
historian does not simply collect the findings, but he interprets them.   
Mark and Eric offered further examples of the beliefs characterizing this 
stance.  Mark clearly identified that, in interpreting the evidence, historians shape and 
color the historical event and Eric underscored the effort and the active engagement 
of learners in order to develop justified beliefs about the past. 
I think that in history there is certain truth to what happened and different 
people, historical accounts of a given event have tendency to color and 
change and make the event appear differently to others (Mark). 
There is some evidence on something, so they [students] can’t just choose [to 
believe any story]; they have to actually research the evidence, what other 
theories are out there […]; and there are ways of knowing, it just takes a 
while (Eric). 
The statements coded as TR2 often indicated that the method to build 
historical knowledge remained fundamentally unclear and, when mentioned at all, it 
was conceptualized as mainly deterministic.  Jack, for example, acknowledged that, 
although eyewitnesses may disagree, historians “can still piece together something 
that happened, based on the evidence […] and see what a reasonable story [it] would 
be.”  Although the method to build this “reasonable story” remained unclear, Jack 
seemed to have in mind something resembling the “Cut and Paste” approach, when he 
said that one should “pretty much combine” the testimonies of different eyewitnesses.  
He also saw in its use a possibility to overcome disagreement among historians, since 
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sharing a common method might prompt historians to “come up with the same 
information.”  
Chris echoed a similar belief, when he saw in the historical method (“if there 
is one”) a way of avoiding “wrong decisions” in interpreting the remnants of the past. 
Similarly, other students acknowledged “a way to know what happened,” since, 
though eyewitnesses may disagree, it is possible to identify some common ground.  
Again, how one can accomplish such result was not clear.  Although students 
mentioned searching for evidence, finding information, using conflicting evidence, 
and considering multiple perspectives, how to find, choose, and use this “evidence” 
was not explained, leaving the features of a possible method fundamentally blurry.  
When pushed to explain how they would decide between conflicting stories, several 
students mentioned the textbook, teacher’s explanations, their prior knowledge, 
preponderance of evidence, and “what makes sense.” 
The idea of justifications of historical knowledge also began to emerge in a 
few cases.  Chris, for example, distinguished between history and the past while 
acknowledging that accounts can differ on the basis of the justifications that they 
produce: “[I]f you just write about something you cannot actually change the past, 
what happened back then happened back then; it’s how you justify it now.” Several of 
the utterances coded as TR2 also referred to the need of grounding one’s 
opinions/interpretations in evidence and, in these cases, students usually also thought 
that teachers should question students not only about their factual knowledge but also 
about their historical opinions. 
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Criterialist (EBCR).  Statements suggesting a clear acknowledgment that the 
interpretive role of the historian relied on specific disciplinary criteria and heuristics 
were rare.  Beside Mark, only few students mentioned specific criteria for generating 
historical knowledge.  They usually did that when prompted by the BHQ’s statemen s 
to consider the role played in learning history by the process of comparing sources 
and understanding author perspective.  Kalyna, for example, mentioned that “you 
need sources, different ones, and then understand the person who wrote them, to 
understand.”  She also hinted at subtext, saying that “when you read something […] 
that was written by some of the historians, you need to understand and read between 
the lines to understand what he is saying and to understand what he or she is trying to 
do.”  Eric made a similar remark, referring to the need of understanding author’s 
viewpoints in order to be able to learn from the accounts.  Finally, Kalyna implied the 
need for contextualization, by observing that one’s knowledge of the historical period 
can aid the interpretation of conflicting evidence.   
Mark was much more articulated and consistent in his beliefs.  He clearly 
differentiated between the past and history; within history, he believed there was “a 
certain amount of truth that is set in stone, like the events that happened,” a truth that 
would stand “whatever point of view you have of an event,” “no matter where you 
come from.”  However, the way “to come upon this truth” required “reading and 
learning from different interpretations.”  Mark reiterated the key role played by 
interpretation several times during the first interview.  For example, he attributed 
disagreement about past events more to a “lack of understanding of different 
perspectives” than to lack of evidence and noted that “facts may speak for 
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themselves, but they don’t think for themselves.”  Since students may find it difficult 
“to understand history simply from facts,” school should help them “to synthesize 
[…] the complex ideas that need to be learned to understand history.” 
Mark also demonstrated having developed several criteria to accomplish the 
work of interpretation; unique in this respect, these criteria enabled him to 
differentiate clearly between opinion and interpretation: “[H]istory is not necessarily 
basically a matter of opinion; I believe it’s a matter more of interpretation and 
gathering from different sources.”  When asked to elaborate on what “skills” tudents 
should have in order to learn history well, he volunteered “the ability to gather 
information, the difference between fact and fiction, based on the credibility of 
evidence.” 
While several students were helpless in confronting conflicting sources, Mark 
observed that “conflicting evidence […] usually leads to the most reasonable account 
and more accurate account, because it presents more than one point of view of an 
event or an idea.  It helps just diminish the bias of a certain event.” He also added 
that, although first-hand accounts “obviously include bias from people,” “biased or 
not, it is still evidence.”  However, there was a kind of bias that Mark considered 
truly undesirable; it regarded the inability of historians to look beyond their 
perceptions and cultural sensitivities.  In commenting upon the statement “History is 
a critical inquiry about the past,” Mark agreed, adding that “maybe a betterd finition 
would be ‘History is an unbiased, critical inquiry about the past.’”  When asked to 
elaborate about what he meant by “unbiased” in this context, he made the example of 
someone grown up “around racists, racism, and aryanism, and all those beliefs” who 
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sincerely believed that there was nothing wrong with slavery.  In this case, Mrk 
observed that “their critical inquiry about the past” would probably suffer from 
inaccuracies, “it wouldn’t be the whole truth and nothing but the truth, it would be 
part of the truth based upon their perceptions and their […] cultural sensitivities.”  
Changes in Students’ Epistemic Beliefs 
In comparing students’ answers to individual BHQ’s statements across the 
two administrations, I noted that, whenever the epistemic idea expressed as a 
response to a specific item did not change, students tended to provide the same kind 
of justification for their level of agreement or disagreement, sometimes using quite 
similar words.  For example, Rick related the need of interpretation in history to the 
lack of knowledge in both administrations: “[T]hey are not really sure about what 
really happened until they guess about history, so that you can teach it” (First 
administration); “[T]hey are not sure, so they interpret what they think happened a 
long time ago” (Second administration). 
Kate, on the other hand, continued to relate interpretation to perspective: 
“[H]istory is like depending on how you are growing up, I guess, and what you 
experienced yourself in history, or what you have heard though past generations 
about history” (First administration); “[T]he way you see it is based on someone else 
and if you grew up like in a rural society compared to like a rich, if you are poor, at 
the middle, or rich, your eyes are going to see history different” (Second 
administration).   
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Similarly, students who introduced new understandings about the nature of 
history seemed to leave prior, conflicting ideas unchallenged.  Juliet’s responses to 
the statement “History is simply a matter of interpretation” illustrate this occurrence: 
First administration: [H]istory is not interpretation, history to me is things 
that happened in history, you learn about it, it’s not like someone’s 
interpretation of a situation, it’s like facts that actually happened. 
Second administration: [H]istory is not interpretation, is facts [inaudible] like 
things happened and how it happened, then I guess it gets twisted; actually I 
disagree, because we have to go I guess with what the people back then said, 
so I think that it should be mainly based on what happened and not 
interpretation of what happened. 
During the second interview, Juliet briefly introduced the idea that history may “get 
twisted.”  Yet, still failing to attribute any positive role to the knower, she continued 
to cling to the idea of history as series of events, now depending on eyewitness 
accounts.   
These examples suggest that interventions aiming at fostering epistemic 
change need to address these prior ideas and provide convincing alternative ways of 
thinking about the issues that students perceive as problematic (an approach in line 
with findings from the conceptual change literature).  Failure to do so might likely 
result in students espousing conflicting ideas, an occurrence that I found reflected in 
several utterances coded as TR1.   
General trends.  Table 4.6 summarizes changes in epistemic beliefs across 
administrations and classes.  Overall, participants became more aware of the presence 
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of the knower in the generation of historical knowledge and, in the aggregate, a 
higher percentage of student utterances demonstrated awareness of the existence of 
criteria that can aid such process.  Copier and transition 1 utterances continued to 
comprise most student utterances across the two administrations, although the share 
of utterances coded as Subjectivist and Transition 2 increased during the second 
interview.  Thus, considered in the aggregate, it is tempting to “exchange” the 
decrease in copier utterances (-14%) with the almost equal increase in transition 2 
utterances (+15%).  However, an examination of what happened at the class and at 
the individual level suggests a more complex picture. 
 
Table 4.6 
Percentages* and Averages* of Utterances Expressing Different Categories of 




EBCO TR1 EBSUB TR2 EBCR EB 
 Freq. 
 (%) 
Freq.  (%) Freq.   
(%) 




       
Class 1.1 54% 19% 6% 8% 2% 11% 
Class 1.2 51% 21% 8% 14% 4% 4% 
       
Class 2.1 54% 37% 8% - - 2% 
Class 2.2 25% 27% 14% 33% 2% - 
       
Class 3.1 38% 22% 6% 13% 15% 7% 
Class 3.2 28% 34% 12% 18% 3% 7% 
       
Averages.1 48% 26% 7% 7% 5% 6% 
Averages.2 34% 27% 11% 22% 3% 4% 
 
Note.  When used after a class’ name, .1 denotes data referring to the first administration and .2 
denotes data referring to the second administration. 
*Percentages and averages are rounded to the closest integer; thus the sum by row does not necessarily 





Class and individual trends.  Although all classes moved in the direction of 
an increased awareness of the presence of the knower, the patterns of change differed. 
Because participants within each class also differed, I discuss class and indivi ual 
trends together.   
Class 1.  Looking at Table 4.6, it would be easy to conclude that the freshmen 
class manifested the least change.  However, the aggregated pattern may be 
deceiving, as an examination of the trends by students summarized in Table 4.7 
illustrates.  In fact, while Jane and Rick actually demonstrated moderate change 
across the interviews (as evidenced by a holistic comparison of their responses on th  
whole BHQ), Eric and Kalyna voiced a number of different ideas during the two  
 
Table 4.7 
Class 1: Percentages* and Averages* of utterances expressing Different Categories 
of Student Epistemic Beliefs  
 
Name EBCO TR1 EBSUB TR2 EBCR EB 
       
Kalyna.1 29% - - 21% 7% 43% 
Kalyna.2 61% 4% - 9% 9% 17% 
Jane.1 100% - - - - - 
Jane.2 67% 25% 8% - - - 
Eric.1 41% 41% 6% 12% - - 
Eric.2 18% 18% 14% 45% 5% - 
Rick.1 45% 36% 18% - - - 
Rick.2 58% 37% 5% - - - 
       
Average.1 54% 19% 6% 8% 2% 11% 
Average.2 51% 21% 8% 14% 4% 4% 
 
Note.  When used after a name, .1 denotes data referring to the first administration and .2 denotes data 
referring to the second administration. 
*Percentages and averages are rounded to the closest integer; thus the sum by row does not necessarily 




interviews.  However, since their direction of change went in somewhat opposite 
directions, their movements tended to cancel each other out once aggregated at the 
class level.  In what follows, I summarize the results in terms of change for each 
student. 
Jane.  I must note, first, that the number of Jane’s utterances that I could not 
code using the Epistemic Beliefs rubric was much higher than in the case of the other 
students.  Especially during the first interview, Jane often failed at understanding the 
statements and thus her comments did not address the issues posed.  This occurrence 
suggests that a threshold of literacy needs to be reached in order to enable individuals 
to discuss their epistemic beliefs.  The comments she provided to statements she 
understood referred to beliefs typical of the copier stance.  Overall, she portrayed the 
historians as people who “[m]aybe […] were not there, but they have like stuff to 
show that…like, they have stuff saying that, like…they have facts about them, they 
found stuff when they went there.” Thus, she remained convinced that we can know 
about the past “because people did live there, and then they, people, have studied it 
and stuff, so they know how it happened, and that’s how it was, and we are sure.” 
She never alluded to argument.  When opinions were mentioned, Jane put 
them in opposition to facts and characterized them as beliefs that do not have to 
reckon with evidence, as this quote illustrates: “[P]eople have different opinions 
about, like things, and teachers cannot be like ‘oh, well, you have to believe what I 
am saying.’  You can tell us the facts and stuff, but if we believe that something lse 
happened, then we can believe that.”  The only relevant change occurred regarded the 
mention of evidence during the second interview.  However, being aware of the limits 
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of her knowledge, Jane often expressed the advantage of relying on authorities, such 
as teachers and experts, “because if people that, doing their job, study for that [the 
past] and they are saying that ‘This is what happened,’ then everyone is going to 
believe ‘This is what happened,’ actually and stuff, they are not gonna argue or 
research about it, because they do have all the evidence, not evidence, but all the 
ideas, main ideas about…”.   
Rick.  In the first interview, Rick had several difficulties in understanding the 
BHQ statements, too.  As a result, his responses to the prompts were sometimes 
requests of clarification or he limited himself to state his agreement and disagreement 
while offering as justification a restatement of the item.  For this reason, I attributed 
no code to several of Rick’s utterances during the first structured interview.  His 
understanding of the statements seemed to improve during the second interview; he 
appeared more comfortable with the language used, and I was able to code most of 
his utterances according to the rubric.   
Overall, I coded most of Rick’s statements as Copier.  He often referred to 
evidence as the basis for history and acknowledged that differences of opinions may 
emerge when the evidence is lacking or unclear (or when eyewitnesses lie).  
However, he never acknowledged the role of argument and he interpreted the 
historical method as knowing “about history and what happened.” 
A slight change regarded a move from characterizing historians as those who 
“have evidence and that’s why it’s true,” to expressing, in the second interview, the 
idea that “because they [the historians] are not sure, they interpret what they think 
happened long time ago.”  The concept of interpretation seemed, however, very weak 
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and juxtaposed to the truthfulness of historical accounts, as Rick’s comments about 
the justifiability of historical claims during the second interview illustrates: “[T]hey 
are the historians, and so it’s true, it’s right, it’s not that they are interpre ing in 
history.  […] They have some evidence, they found some evidence.” 
Kalyna.  Kalyna’s shift was in counter tendency in respect to other students, 
because, in her case, the move was toward assigning a greater role to the objec in the 
generation of knowledge.  Specifically, in her first interview, Kalyna often addressed 
the role (and preponderance) of beliefs saying that “there is a lot of stuff that just is 
not supported by evidence.  So, if you strongly believe in it, there is, it happened such 
thing.” 
 Disagreement with a teacher back in Ukraine about the evaluation of a 
controversial historical character might have prompted Kalyna’s overall attitude, in 
this respect.  She recounted this event at length in her second interview and how she 
had spent time in the library and at a museum with her grandpa searching for 
evidence that vindicated who they perceived as a hero while the teacher depicted as a 
rogue.  Although she remained very sensitive to the role that beliefs may play in one’s 
life, in the second interview the need to “prove” the correctness of one’s beliefs also 
emerged several times. 
[Y]ou shouldn’t give up search, as my grandpa here, he never gave up and on 
the first day we didn’t find anything and then the next we found a lot of things 
that proved that that person was good, because that day I was just ready to 
give up and said: “Grandpa, my history teacher is probably right, because 
she has […] a lot of education about history, and she knows what really 
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happened.”  And he said: “Don’t let anyone fool yourself, they are just 
playing on you, or they just don’t know and so you shouldn’t give up on 
things; and then you prove things.” 
In so doing, however, Kalyna tended also to shift from considering evidence in 
relation to a belief to be proven to something existing independently from a knower.  
The different response to the statement “The facts speak for themselves” provided a 
clear illustration of this shift.  During the first interview, Kalyna said that she “would 
not really agree with that, because there is always a person that speaks for the facts 
and agree with those facts or disagree with those facts and say his or her opinion.”  
However, her response changed during the second interview: “I would agree with 
this, because those facts, if you find this picture or documents and you understood 
everything, then the fact speaks basically for itself.”  
In the second interview, she also downplayed the differences in historical 
accounts, “because a lot of people think the same,” or at least conflict is 
circumscribed to few instances.  She was also confident to be able to deal with 
conflicting evidence because “if one evidence is right, then one evidence is wrong,” 
or at least “it is kind of combining those.  They might both be true.”  Although she 
was not naïve, and mentioned the need to pay attention to the subtext of historical 
accounts, in the second interview Kalyna embraced more decidedly a view of 
historian as detective and archeologist who “search for evidence and never giv  up.” 
Eric.  He went from mainly stressing the role of ‘evidence’ in building 
historical knowledge to acknowledging some degree of interplay between evidence 
and interpretation.  Specifically, in the first interview, Eric tended to confine the need 
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for interpretation to those cases in which evidence was lacking.  In the second 
interview, he noted that people may disagree about the same event in the past because 
“they go down different paths.”  However, the relation between evidence and 
argument and the criteria of justifications remained overall blurry.  Eric 
acknowledged that history is “an opinion based on facts […] and things like that, so it 
is kind of an opinion and it is kind of evidence, too, so it is a mix of both;” at the 
same time, acknowledgment of the role of argument was not consistent and the goal 
of history as generically letting people “know what happened” still emerged during 
the second interview. 
Class 2.  Participants belonging to this junior class offered a consistent pattern 
of change, acknowledging more frequently the role of the knower and the existence of 
criteria of justifications (albeit still undefined).  With the exception of Juliet, this 
group of participants showed several relevant changes in the ideas expressed during 
the two interviews.  Table 4.8 summarizes data relevant to the students in this class. 
Juliet.  I described Juliet’s evidence of change in the section titled “General 
Finding” (pp. 209-210).  Juliet realized the “historian thing,” as she named it, 
becoming aware that historians were not usually eyewitnesses of the events they 
described.  After this discovery, she faced the problems opened up by this new 
understanding by developing the idea that historians needed to fill in what they could 
not find and that they had to research harder.  The role played by the historian’s 
question and argument remained absent from both interviews; thus, the role of the 
subject in the generation of historical knowledge remained minimal. 
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Kate.  In both interviews, Kate’s percentage of utterances coded as 
Subjectivist was the highest.  During the second interview, her concept of perspective 
seemed to become richer, moving beyond people’s political preferences to include 
“stories they  
Table 4.8 
Class 2: Percentages* and Averages* of utterances expressing Different Categories 
of Student Epistemic Beliefs 
 
Name EBCO TR1 EBSUB TR2 EBCR EB 
       
Kate.1 42% 33% 25% - - - 
Kate.2 5% 27% 41% 27% - - 
Monica.1 31% 63% 6% - - - 
Monica.2 31% 19% - 44% 6% - 
Chris.1 59% 35% - - - 6% 
Chris.2 8% 15% 15% 62% - - 
Juliet.1 83% 17% - - - - 
Juliet.2 54% 46% - - - - 
       
Average.1 54% 37% 8% - - 2% 
Average.2 25% 27% 14% 33% 2% - 
 
Note.  When used after a name, .1 denotes data referring to the first administration and .2 denotes data 
referring to the second administration. 
*Percentages and averages are rounded to the closest integer; thus the sum by row does not necessarily 
equal to 100. 
 
heard, books they read, things they may know.”  Also her concept of “facts” acquired 
complexity and facts, instead of just “telling you what happened and what didn’t 
happen,” came to acquire their meaning from the “whole scenario.” 
 At the same time, Kate became wearier of eyewitnesses and thus her overall 
uncertainty increased.  For example, in the first interview, Kate said that one can 
know about the past because “if someone from the past was there when things 
happened, tells someone else, there’s going to be a story and so more and more 
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people would know it, […] then it just keeps going, that’s why there are so many 
different like persons, aspects of it.”  In the second interview, lacking a criteria to 
discriminate among eyewitnesses and having realized that stories might not reflect 
truthfully what happened because people may make “themselves look bad,” she 
became less certain about the possibility of knowing about the past because “those 
stories could be made up, to make it sounds more interesting or not.”  Uncertainty 
became impossibility of knowing in case of conflicting evidence: “If you have 
conflicting evidence, […] unless you really know, unless you are also there and you 
know what happened, like as a third party, then how can you make a clear 
justification for what really happened?”  
Monica.  Contras to Kate, Monica strongly resisted the idea of history as 
subjective in both interviews.  In the first interview, Monica’s utterances often
reflected beliefs typical of Transition 1.  She perceived that both facts and 
interpretation played a role in history, but she remained unable to reconcile these 
views: “I don’t know, I guess, I don’t know, some of it is interpretation, but a lot of it 
is facts.”  In the second interview, her justifications included the role of historians’ 
arguments and hinted at their difference with opinions: “historians […] have 
arguments in their writing and not just opinions.”  However, the idea of indisputable 
facts still remained: “I guess people can interpret facts, but I say: ‘Something 
happened,’ and it happened, there’s evidence about it.”  
In the second interview, Monica’s description of sourcing became richer, 
although its utility remained still linked to determining issues of bias: “[W]hen you 
read a primary source document it is good to know when it was written, who was it 
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written by, and the author, their bias when they wrote, and that’s a good way of 
understanding what happened.”  Similarly, the lack of criteria for building historical 
accounts and the idea of evidence as detached from argument surfaced when I asked 
Monica how she would deal with conflicting evidence: “I guess based on your 
knowledge and your own opinion, you can create your own conclusions, even if, I 
guess, it’s harder if the documents have conflicting evidence to come to your 
conclusions.”  
Chris.  Chris provided perhaps the clearest example of consistent epistemic 
change and of some of the issues that need to be faced once the perception of the role 
of the knower in the generation of historical knowledge becomes stronger.  I must 
also note that Chris approached the tasks with exceptional seriousness and desire to 
“do well.”  In his case, it became particularly clear to me that the two Constructed 
Response Tasks and the constructed interviews could influence students’ epistemic 
thinking and thus function as interventions, independently from my original 
intentions.  In a couple of instances, during the second interview, Chris explicitly 
referred to the CRTs as learning experiences.  For example, in responding to the 
statement “Students who read many history books learn that the past is what the 
historian makes it to be,” Chris said: “I disagree with that, because of those readings 
that you just taught me, one reading is different from another, you cannot just learn 
from one historian, there are many different sides.”  
Chris was also well aware of the change that he was undergoing as his 
response to the statement “History is simply a matter of interpretation” sugge ts: 
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From these documents, I would agree with that, and I think I changed my 
answer on that one […] because I think it is interpretation, but I used to think 
that it wasn’t interpretation.  I thought facts were facts, but it’s on who writes 
it, it’s their interpretation of how history was seen. 
Similarly to other students, Chris’ criteria for building historical accounts remained 
very limited.  Although interpretation had become an undeniable factor in the 
generation of historical knowledge, Chris’ conceptualization of it was still too fuzzy 
and detached from evidence; the step into subjectivism seemed at times the logical 
trajectory: “Good students know that history isn’t just a matter of opinion, there are 
many others, it’s like you interpret, how you look at history, you read all the 
documents and then you believe what you want to believe.” 
Class 3.  The direction and level of change was not consistent in this junior 
class; overall, there was a greater acknowledgment of the role of the knower, but the 
integration between object and subject of knowledge, in a few cases, became more 
problematic.  Further, while Elizabeth and Ashley showed moderate changes, Jack 
and Mark demonstrated greater shifts in their thinking.  In several respects, Mark was 
also an outlier, expressing several ideas demonstrating an awareness of 
epistemological issues much greater than the other participants in the study.  
Table 4.9 summarizes data relevant to the students in this class. 
Elizabeth.  Across the two interviews, Elizabeth offered several examples of 
ways of thinking consistent with the copier stance, although at times she admitted that 
we “cannot know 100%,” because people could not “go back in time and get the 
evidence.”  Even in these cases, however, she was confident that it was possible to 
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find enough evidence to get to the right story, because, “if it really happened the way 
it was supposed to happen, one evidence will overpower the other.  You may have 
two things that conflict with each other, but then you will probably find more 
evidence that overpowers the other evidence and says that one is wrong and the other 
Table  4.9 
Class 3: Percentages* and Averages* of utterances expressing Different Categories 
of Student Epistemic Beliefs 
 
Name EBCO TR1 EBSUB TR2 EBCR EB 
       
Elizabeth.1 53% 40% 7% - - - 
Elizabeth.2 70% 30% - - - - 
Jack.1 50% 22% 6% 22% - - 
Jack.2 5% 26% 26% 42% - - 
Ashley.1 47% 21% 5% 26% - - 
Ashley.2 25% 55% 15% 5% - - 
Mark.1 - 5% 5% 5% 58% 26% 
Mark.2 11% 26% 5% 26% 11% 26% 
       
Average.1 38% 22% 6% 13% 15% 7% 
Average.2 28% 34% 12% 18% 3% 7% 
 
Note.  When used after a name, .1 denotes data referring to the first administration and .2 denotes data 
referring to the second administration. 
*Percentages and averages are rounded to the closest integer; thus the sum by row does not necessarily 




is right.”  Conceptualizing evidence as detached from argument was well in 
accordance with Elizabeth’s beliefs that stories cannot differ too much, either, 
because “evidence says what happened in the past.”  Thus, according to Elizabeth, 
“you can believe whatever story you want, but stories are closely the same, o you 
don’t have to worry about one being like ‘This happened,’ and another story saying 
‘This really didn’t happen.’”  
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Mark   Before analyzing Mark’s change across the two constructed interviews, 
I must note an occurrence that may have influenced the outcome.  Although all 
students completed the CRT prior responding to the BHQ statements, Mark dedicated 
much more time to the completion of the second CRT; specifically, he went over the 
texts twice, before venturing into a response.  It is thus possible that when we began 
the second structured interview he was more tired than the first time.  His language 
tended to be more casual, in contrast to the first interview when he chose his words 
very carefully.   
Mark clearly differentiated between the past and history.  Within history, he 
believed that there was “a certain amount of truth that is set in stone, like the events
that happened,” a truth that would stand “whatever point of view you have of an 
event,” “no matter where you come from.”  However, the way “to come upon this 
truth” required “reading and learning from different interpretations.”  Mark reiterated 
this idea also during the second interview, explaining that “there is a way in which an 
event actually occurred and then there is multiple, different ways that it is interpreted, 
but history itself is more of a boiling down of the different ways in which it was 
interpreted to find out the truth.”  
However, during the second interview, Mark seemed to conceive the existence 
of perspective more as a necessary evil than as a positive attribute of human 
knowledge.  As such, the tendency of historical accounts to “color, and change, and 
make the event appear differently to others” was perceived as something inherently 
biased, something to cut through in order to reach the unadulterated past.  His 
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response to the statement “Good students know that history is basically a matter of 
opinion” illustrates this shift. 
First interview: I don’t necessarily agree with that conclusion, I somewhat 
disagree.  Good history, I mean history is not necessarily, basically a matter 
of opinion; I believe it’s a matter more of interpretation and gathering from 
different sources […] There are events that happened and may be more than 
one perspective; there is, obviously, from each perspective there can be a 
certain amount of truth, otherwise there wouldn’t be so many perspectives. 
Second interview: I strongly disagree.  As I said, I don’t think that history is 
an opinion, I think history should be a fact.  It’s just, history should be a fact 
that is based upon, I guess, based upon the opinions of more than one source, 
an opinion being an historical account from one person, because historical 
accounts obviously can be biased. 
Thus, in the second interview, Mark strongly agreed with being taught to deal 
with conflicting evidence because “this would support the idea that history consists of 
facts that are gathered from several pieces of evidence.”  He also strongly agreed that 
comparing sources and understanding author perspective were essential components 
of the process of learning history because these heuristics “are entirely to delineate 
biased and unbiased information.”  These statements seem more in line with the 
copier and transition 1 stance than with the criterialist stance conveyed by several of 
Mark’s statements during the first interview.  Although the issue of bias emerg d also 
in the context of the first interview, it was only during the second one that Mark 
clearly pitted it against the idea of history as facts.   
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In this respect, I believe that Mark offers a clear example of how hindering 
and frustrating the lack of understanding of how knowledge develops can be.  He 
clearly and sincerely aimed for true knowledge of the past and was also very aware of 
the role of the knower in the generation of knowledge.  However, lacking the 
experience of how this process may develop (an inference suggested by his repeated 
declarations that he didn’t know what the historical method was), Mark seemed to 
perceive the role of the knower as just an obstacle (bias) that prevented his possibility 
of accessing the truth of the past, and not as the subject of the event of knowing.  
Mark’s harking back to the idea that, at least ideally, history should be facts may be 
interpreted as an attempt to overcome the uncertainty that comes with the shatering 
of the referential illusion.  His discomfort with a process of knowing in which there 
are no clear criteria to evaluate the truth of the outcome illustrates the probl ms of 
this epistemic stance: 
I don’t think that all students are necessarily able to [silence] synthesize 
accurate historical opinion based upon facts, because, obviously, one set of 
facts, if it includes some conflicting opinions, such as the documents that I 
looked through before, I mean, one person could write a response one way 
using the same facts than another person could write, and they can both have 
different papers with conflicting thesis statements, but they would be both 
based upon facts.  Teachers don’t question that, I think, it’s just really, it 
leaves too much uncertainty, I guess, about the truth of things.   
Ashley.   Considered as a whole, Ashley’s responses conveyed a similar 
epistemic stance across the interviews.  While she continued to conceive history as 
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the past (e.g., “History is already done and it is never going to change”), she also 
thought that it was accessible through its remnants: “There is documents that we 
found, dinosaurs bones and stuff like that […] None of us was there, but we can still 
[silence] some things we can be sure of.” 
On the other hand, she acknowledged that historians and students may 
develop their own interpretations, once they know the facts.  Although these elements 
were present in both interviews, in the second one their simultaneous presence in the 
same sentence made me code a higher number of utterances as TR1.  Often, in 
Ashley’s case, interpretation (or opinion) was used to convey the evaluation of past 
people’s behaviors.  Instead of an attempt at understanding the past on its own terms, 
Ashley’s opinions regarded how the past should have looked like.  This example 
refers to the unit that the students were learning in class and Ashley cited it in 
response to my request of clarification of what she meant by “historical opinion.”  
My opinion on the Great Depression is that I don’t know if it was as bad as 
they make it to be.  You have the facts, and they were saying that things were 
really bad, but I don’t think it was like that, because they were saying that 
everybody was getting sick, but they could still have gone to the doctor even 
though they couldn’t pay the doctor, because the doctors weren’t getting paid 
either, so I think that everybody could have just come together and help each 
other out and made things better than they were. 
Jack.  In the first interview, Jack showed little evidence of being able to 
reconcile the subjective and objective aspects of knowledge.  On one hand, he 
thought that “history is about the past, the events that happened in the past, not really 
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anything else.”  On the other hand, he was also aware that historians interpret the 
remnants of the past.  However, a lack of understanding of the role played by the 
historian’s question and of the purpose and features of the historical method made 
him unable to reconcile these ideas.   
In a couple of occasions, his impasse surfaced during the first interview.  The 
first instance was in response to the statement “Historical claims cannot be justified 
because they are simply a matter of interpretation:” “I somewhat disgree with this, 
because historical claims [silence].  I somewhat agree with this because historical 
claims is pretty much interpretation by historians [silence] Ah, I don’t know.”  The 
second instance was in response to the statement “Reasonable accounts can be 
constructed even in the presence of conflicting evidence:”  “I somewhat agree with 
this, because the evidence could be from like, sources could be from different things 
that could be, accounts could be skewed from different sources because, sources 
could be [silence] I cannot answer this question.” 
In the second interview, the role of the knower became clearer; at a minimum, 
one could “put the documents together and take the most reasonable information.”  
The difference between opinion and interpretation also began to take shape:  
[I]nterpretation is like figuring out what happened, opinion [silence], 
interpretation is taking all the facts and putting together and see what 
happened.  Opinion is what you think that happened, like with no facts, just 
what you would think is happening, but with no facts. 
However, Jack still lacked criteria for building historical understanding and, although 
he could in theory conceive that different historians might interpret the evidence 
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differently, he did not have much experience of conflicting historical accounts: “I 
read a lot of history books about the same event and pretty much say the same thing.”  
Thus, his heightened sense of the role of the knower made him at times lean toward a 
subjectivist position: “If you interpret something, you put facts together, I guess, for 
what you think that happened, and other people can have different interpretations;” 
“[W]e weren’t there, so we can’t possibly know what happened, even if there is 
records, they can interpret them differently and form their own position.” 
Analyses of Students’ Written Responses to the BHQ 
A few of the trends described in relation to analyses of the qualitative data 
were also confirmed by the analyses of 25 students’ written responses to the BHQ.  In 
reporting the results, I first focus on the patterns of students’ responses.  Specifically, 
I explored these patterns to test whether they were compatible with the kind of 
“epistemic inconsistency” emerged from the analysis of the interviews and looked for 
eventual changes across the two administrations.  
In order to address this issue, I compared students’ weighted average scores 
on the groups of items reflecting the three theoretically derived epistemic stances 
(Copier, Subjectivist, and Criterialist) and calculated consistencies scores.  Table 4.10 
reports individual students’ scores for the first and the second administration of the 
BQH, respectively.  Epistemic consistency would be signaled by students agreeing 
with items reflecting one epistemic stance and disagreeing with items mirroring the 
other two stances.  Across the two administrations, this occurred only in the case of 5 
students (identified in the tables by a gray background).   








Copier Subjectivist Constructivist Consistency 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
         
1 1.40 1.60 -1.00 -1.22 .50 1.63 57% 73% 
2 .60 .40 -1.33 -.56 1.75 1.75 77% 73% 
3 1.40 0 -1.78 -1.89 1.88 1.13 77% 86% 
4 1.60 1.20 .11 1.44 1.00 .88 59% 45% 
5 -.40 1.80 2.11 -.22 -.88 .50 32% 50% 
6 1.50 .60 -1.33 -1.22 1.63 1.75 71% 68% 
7 -.80 1.00 -.78 -1.33 -.38 1.13 55% 77% 
8 .20 1.20 .67 0 .38 .43 64% 40% 
9 1.40 0 .22 -1.50 1.00 -.33 48% 63% 
10 .80 1.40 -.11 -.78 .75 .75 50% 68% 
11 -.20 -.40 -.67 -1.56 1.00 1.88 71% 91% 
12 1.20 .20 -.44 .11 1.25 1.29 73% 71% 
13 0 -.20 -1.56 -1.67 -.13 .63 64% 73% 
14 -.60 -1.60 -.22 0 .63 .63 64% 55% 
15 1.75 1.20 .44 1.11 -.71 .63 35% 41% 
16 -.40 2.60 .56 1.33 .13 1.88 55% 36% 
17 .20 -.60 -1.11 -2.00 .88 -.75 77% 68% 
18 .60 .80 -.33 -.22 .50 1.13 59% 59% 
19 -1.00 -.40 .11 -.11 0 1.38 52% 68% 
20 2.00 .20 -.44 .22 1.38 1.63 59% 59% 
21 1.20 .20 -.67 -1.33 1.63 1.50 73% 82% 
22 .80 0 -1.89 -1.33 1.63 1.50 73% 77% 
23 1.60 1.00 -.44 -.11 1.75 1.50 55% 55% 
24 1.00 0 -1.56 -1.56 1.38 .75 71% 73% 




Since students tended to manifest a higher degree of agreement with 
criterialist statements, as signaled by comparison across their copie, subjectivist, and 
criterialist average weighted scores, I further addressed the question about epistemic 
consistency by calculating consistency scores for each student.  The last column of 
Table 4.10 reports the result of this second analysis.  All but 3 students at the second 
administration had consistency scores inferior to 80%.  This suggests that their 
agreement with criterialist statements was partial and interspersed with several beliefs 
typical of a copier or subjectivist stance. Only 1 of the 5 students identified by prior 
analysis as individuals that could potentially be characterized as epistemically 
consistent (i.e., individuals who had a positive criterialist average weighted score and 
negative copier and subjectivist weighted scores) also had a high consistency score 
(#11, second administration, consistency score = 91%).  I also checked for possible 
consistency with the subjectivist stance (with #5, first administration, as a potential 
candidate) but the score remained below 80%.  Thus, in regard to epistemic 
inconsistency, these results are compatible to what was suggested by the qualitative 
analysis of students’ interviews, inasmuch as these results indicated that student  may 
simultaneously agreed with statements that imply different conceptualization of the 
nature of historical knowledge. 
In regard to change, it is difficult to identify a consistent pattern across the 
two administrations.  Similarly to what I observed with student informants, the rang
of student belief systems and their modification during the course of the semester 
varied widely, as illustrated by the bar graphs included in Appendix I.  With this 
caveat, inspection of the medians showed that, as a group, during the first 
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administration, students tended to agree with statements reflecting a criterialist (Mdn 
= .87) and copier (Mdn = .80) stance and disagree with items mirroring a subjectivist 
stance (Mdn = -.44).  This trend continued at the second administration, although 
students’ degree of agreement with items compatible with a criterialist st nce 
increased (Mdn = 1.12), their degree of agreement with items reflecting a copier 
stance decreased (Mdn = .20), and their disagreement with items referring to a 
subjectivist stance increased (Mdn = -.78).   
It is tempting to interpret the direction of change in the median values of the 
average weighted scores as a sign that students were moving toward beliefs typical of 
a criterialist stance.  Yet, analysis of the consistency scores indicates that, on average, 
this was not the case.  Between the first and the second administration, the 
consistency score mean value slightly increased from 61.20 (SD = 12.17) to 64.96 
(SD = 14.48), but the t test was not statistically significant.  The range of change was 
also impressive, varying from -22 to +24 percentual points, further cautioning against 
unwarranted generalizations.    
Did the analysis of these data also identify what ideas seemed particularly 
problematic for the assumption of a consistent criterialist epistemic stan e (second 
question) and did these ideas changed across the semester?  Tables 4.11, 4.12, and 
4.13 report the Median, the Minimum and the Maximum values of the 22 items of the 
BHQ for the first and the second administration.  I grouped the items according to the 




Median, Minimum, and Maximum Values on Copier Items 
 
 Item 5 Item 9 Item 16 Item 19 Item 20 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
           
Median 1 0 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 2 2 
Minimum -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 
Maximum 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
Notes. 
Item 5:   Disagreement about the same event in the past is always due to lack of evidence. 
Item 9:    Good general reading and comprehension skills are enough to learn history well. 
Item 16:  The facts speak for themselves. 
Item 19:  Even eyewitnesses do not always agree with each other, so there is no way to know what happened. 








Median, Minimum, and Maximum Values on Subjectivist Items 
 
 Item 2 Item 4 Item 6 Item 8 Item 10 Item 12 Item 14 Item 17 Item 22 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
                   
Median 1 -1 1 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -2 -3 
Min. -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
Max. 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 0 
 
Notes. 
Item 2:  History is simply a matter of interpretation. 
Item 4:  Students who read many history books learn that the past is what the istorian makes it to be. 
Item 6:  Good students know that history is basically a matter of opinion. 
Item 8:  Historical claims cannot be justified, since they are simply a matter of interpretation. 
Item 10:  Since there is no way to know what really happened in the past, students can believe whatever story they choose. 
Item 12:  The past is what the historian makes it to be. 
Item 14:  It is impossible to know anything for sure about the past, since no one of us was there. 
Item 17:  Students need to be aware that history is essentially a matter of int rpretation. 





Median, Minimum, and Maximum Values on Criterialist Items 
 
 Item 1 Item 3 Item 7 Item 11 Item 13 Item 15 Item 18 Item 21 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
                 
Median 2 2 .5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Min. -2 -1 -2 -2 -3 -2 -3 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 
Max. 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 
 
Notes. 
Item 1:  It is fundamental that students are taught to support their reasoning with evidence. 
Item 3:  A historical account is the product of a disciplined method of inquiry. 
Item 7:  Students need to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence. 
Item 11:  History is a critical inquiry about the past. 
Item 13:  Comparing sources and understanding author perspective are essential components of the process of learning history 
Item 15:  Knowledge of the historical method is fundamental for historians and students alike. 
Item 18:  Reasonable accounts can be constructed even in the presence of conflicting evidence. 
Item 21:  History is the reasonable reconstruction of past occurrences based on the available evidence. 
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I considered as potentially problematic those ideas expressed by items whose median 
value signaled that a majority of the students agreed with statements mirroring a 
copier or subjectivist stance (positive value) or disagreed with items reflecting a 
criterialist stance (negative value). 
Although there were a few changes across the two administrations, all ideas 
expressed by items reflecting a copier stance were found appealing by a majority of 
the students at some time or another.  The median value was especially high (Mdn = 
2) for item 20, which read “Teachers should not question students’ historical 
opinions, only check that they know the facts.”  Granted that students may agree with 
this statement for reasons that are not simply epistemological in nature, I found this 
result supportive of the perceived dichotomy between facts and opinions emerged 
from the analysis of the interviews.  In the course of the semester, more student  
came to disagree with the idea that disagreement about the past is always due to lack 
of evidence and that disagreement among eyewitnesses makes history impossible.  On 
the other hand, an increased number of students came to believe that good general 
reading and comprehension skills were enough to learn history well.  A majority of 
the students continued to believe that facts speak for themselves. 
On the contrary, students found few subjectivist statements appealing and 
often came to disagree with them by the end of the semester.  At the first 
administration, among the ideas that they found appealing were the lack of criteria in 
the interpretive role of historians (item 2, 4 and 17) and the absolute impossibility to 
know anything with certainty about the past (item 14). By the end of the semester, a 
majority of students agreed that, as a result of the impossibility to know what really 
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happened, students can believe whatever story they choose (item 10).  Yet, at the 
same time, they disagreed with all the other subjectivist statements. 
A majority of students tended to agree with all the constructivist statements.  
Their degree of agreement with the view that history is a reasonable reconst u tion of 
past occurrences based on the available evidence increased at the second 
administration.   
Students’ Historical Thinking   
Evidence for these data comes from analyses of think-aloud protocols 
collected while student informants completed the two Constructed Response Tasks 
and from analyses of 23 students’ written responses to the CRTs.  In reporting the 
results, I will first provide some general trends and then describe the features of 
historical thinking emerged from the analyses of the think-alouds, irrespectively of 
whether they manifested themselves during the first or second administration.  A  any 
rate, the different topic of the tasks (beliefs about Captain Cook, and beliefs about the 
shape of the Earth, respectively) should make it easy to identify the context of a 
certain utterance, whenever this may provide further insights.   
In describing these features, I will refer to the categories of historical thinking 
identified in the rubric (sub-categories 7-11), provide examples, and offer an 
indication of how often these strategies were employed by the participants.  Then, I 
will focus on changes observed across the two administrations and across classe .  As 
with the description of epistemic beliefs, I believe that in this way the results may 
paint a more detailed picture of these adolescents’ historical thinking and of the 
direction of their eventual development (or lack thereof).  Finally, I will focus on 
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students’ written responses to the CRTs and report about results emerged from their 
analysis.   
Historical thinking features emerged.   Although participants markedly 
differed in terms of their basic reading abilities (e.g., fluency and vocabulary), the 
understandings they built as a result of the reading of the six documents were 
substantially similar.  Table 4.14 reports the aggregated frequency count for the 
features of historical thinking identified in the rubric (subcategories 7-11).  Because 
students differed with respect to total number of utterances, for each student I 
transformed the frequency of each category into a percentage, calculated as a ratio 
between the frequency of that category and the total number of historical thinking 
codes attributed to her or him on that particular CRT task.  I based the calculation of 
the averages reported in the table on these percentages.  In this respect, I need to note 
that one student, Mark, approached the task in a very interesting, but considerably 
different way than the other participants.  Specifically, he used heuristics typ al of 
historical thinking far more often than the other students.  For this reason, although I 
used qualitative data from his performance to illustrate evidence of historical 
thinking, whenever I aggregated data across students to provide some general trends, 
I treated Mark as an outlier and I did not include his data in the pool.   
The analysis of the categories that grouped most of the historical thinking features 
manifested by the students during their performance on the CRT task showed the use 
of a few consistent strategies and the emergence of recurring ideas that I took as 




Frequencies, Percentages*, and Averages* of Utterances Expressing Features of 
Student Historical Thinking 
 
Name AQ AA HTno CP HTyes Total 
 Freq.  (%) Freq.  (%) Freq.  (%) Freq.  (%) Freq.  (%)  
       
Class 1.1 40% 2% 47% 6% 7%  
Class 1.2 23% 14% 53% 12% 2%  
Kalyna.1 7 (70%) - 2 (20%) - 1 (10%) 10 
Kalyna.2 6 (32%) 2 (11%) 8 (42%) 3 (16%) - 19 
Jane.1 1 (17%) - 4 (66%) 1 (17%) - 6 
Jane.2 - 1 (20%) 3 (60%) 1 (20%) - 5 
Eric.1 5 (32%) 1 (6%) 8 (50%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 16 
Eric.2 3 (17%) 2 (11%) 11 (61%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 18 
Rick.1 4 (40%) - 5 (50%) - 1 (10%) 10 
Rick.2 6 (43%) - 7 (50%) 1 (7%) - 14 
       
Class 2.1 33% 14% 41% 8% 6%  
Class 2.2 12% 23% 43% 15% 7%  
Kate.1 2 (29%) 1 (14%) 3 (43%) 1 (14%) - 7 
Kate.2 1 (7%) 2 (14%) 10 (71%) - 1 (7%) 14 
Monica.1 2 (29%) 1 (14%) 3 (43%) - 1 (14%) 7 
Monica.2 1 (11%) - 4 (44%) 4 (44%) - 9 
Chris.1 8 (33%) 3 (13%) 10 (42%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 24 
Chris.2 1 (5%) 9 (43%) 6 (29%) 1 (5%) 4 (19%) 21 
Juliet.1 6 (40%) 2 (13%) 5 (34%) 2 (13%) - 15 
Juliet.2 4 (24%) 6 (35%) 5 (29%) 2 (12%) - 17 
       
Class 3.1 35% 3% 33% 22% 7%  
Class 3.2 24% 15% 38% 13% 11%  
Elizabeth.1 4 (33%) 1 (9%) 4 (33%) 3 (25%) - 12 
Elizabeth.2 9 (32%) 7 (25%) 8 (29%) 2 (7%) 2 (7%) 28 
Jack.1 6 (60%) - 1 (10%) 2 (20%) 1 (10%) 10 
Jack.2 4 (25%) 3 (19%) -  5 (31%) 4 (25%) 16 
Ashley.1 1 (11%) - 5 (56%) 2 (22%) 1 (11%) 9 
Ashley.2 1 (14%) - 6 (86%) - - 7 
       
Averages.1 36% 6% 41% 11% 6%  
Averages.2 19% 16% 46% 13% 6%  
       
Mark.1 3 (8%) 14 (40%) 1 (3%) - 17 (49%) 35 
Mark.2 9 (35%) 5 (19%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 9 (35%) 26 
 
Note.  When used after a name, .1 denotes data referring to the first administration and .2 denotes data 
referring to the second administration. 
*Percentages and averages are rounded to the closest integer; thus the sum by row does not necessarily 
equal to 100.   
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level, Table 4.14 shows that, across the two tasks, I found several instances of 
behaviors that may hinder historical thinking (41% and 46% for the first and second 
CRT, respectively).  I also found that participants were usually very aware of the 
question posed by the task (36% and 19%, for the first and second CRT, 
respectively).  Thus, these two codes alone accounted for more than 60% of the total 
codes attributed to features of historical thinking across the two administrations.   
Consistently across the three classes, the instances of behaviors potentially 
hindering historical thinking increased in the second administration, while evidence 
of awareness of the question posed by the task diminished.   Instances of knowledge 
or use of heuristics typifying historical thinking were modest (6% across the two 
administrations), with a different trend across the two age groups.  Specifically, the 
two junior classes showed an increase across the two administrations while the 
freshmen class showed a decrease.  On average, the use of some form of Cut and 
Paste increased across the two administrations (11% and 13%, respectively), but the 
direction of change was different across the three classes.  In particular, it increased in 
the freshmen class and in Class 2, and decreased in Class 3.  Awareness of an author
increased across all three classes (6% and 16%, for the first and second CRT, 
respectively). 
In the sections that follow, I provide descriptions and examples of the features 
of historical thinking emerged while students completed the two Constructed 
Response Tasks. 
Historical Thinking Yes (HTyes).  Unfortunately, the evidence of use or 
knowledge of heuristics signaling historical thinking were scarce across the two 
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Constructed Response Tasks.  When this happened, the kind of historical thinking 
that I observed remained circumscribed to specific occurrences and did not inform the 
overall performance on the task.  Specifically, I found some instances of partial
corroboration across sources and attempts at contextualization and at sourcing.  
Despite the ambiguity that often tended to characterize these instances, I coded them 
as HTyes to acknowledge the pedagogical potential of these attitudes for fostering 
historical thinking.   
I found examples of partial corroboration in a few students’ think-alouds.  For 
example, Kalyna compared her provisional answer to the CRT’s question with 
evidence emerging from new documents (“So, still thinking he is a god.”).  Elizabeth, 
while reading Document 6, referred back to Document 1 (“Yeah, the first 
document…”).  And after reading Augustine’s discussion about the existence of the 
Antipodes, Eric commented: “They say it is round, it’s spherical, pretty much like the 
other one.”  However, these comparisons were occasional and for the most part 
limited to just one instance during the think aloud. 
A few students tried to contextualize the events described in the texts to gain a 
better understanding.  For example, after reading about the bartering occurred 
between captain Cook and the Hawaiians, Chris said that he thought that Captain 
Cook “got more out of it,” because the Hawaiians “didn’t really know what it [iron] 
was, it was a foreign object, it might have looked great, but it didn’t have as many 
uses and instead they gave him fish, coconuts and bananas which, back then, was 
pretty big, because it was sweet, and coconut and bananas were rare food, and took a 
lot of labor to get, like fish.”  Similarly, during the second CRT, Kate commented 
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about the different estimations of the circumference of the earth by saying that “back 
then, […] it would be different, like the people in the Middle Ages compared to 
people during Columbus’s time, the way things were measured early on, like how 
long an inch was.”  Although Chris’ background knowledge about the scarcity of 
coconut and bananas on Hawaii and Kate’s idea about measurement units are 
questionable, I interpreted these occurrences as attempts at contextualization.  I’ll 
further discuss the role played by content knowledge in the section discussing 
instances of Historical Thinking No. 
In terms of sourcing, I found that students did not spontaneously read the 
references nor used ideas from them to interpret the documents.  Chris offered an 
interesting example of the potential effect of directing student attention to the au hor 
of the texts.  Once prompted to consider the references during the first CRT, he 
realized that the first document had been written by Mark Twain.  In his case, this 
“discovery” prompted a process of revision of his prior interpretation and of the way 
in which he answered the CRT’s question. 
I read a lot of Mark Twain and, if you read his Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry 
Finn, if you read those books you wouldn’t get a clear understanding, but if 
you read his other ones, his kind of hate for humanity, he thinks that human 
people are like the worst animals out there, and are eventually going to 
destroy themselves one day, I guess, reading this again, it would probably 
make more sense if you, if I knew that it was him, because it kind of sounded 
like him.  Because, once again, he is pointing out more than other documents 
that the Hawaiians, I don’t want to be mean, but were so stupid to believe that 
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he was a god and that they just kind of gave him everything […].  And Mark 
Twain doesn’t like religion either, so yeah, I guess that would kind of change 
my answer. 
However, since he did not know any of the other authors, Chris was unable to 
use the same heuristic to revise his prior interpretations of the other texts.  Similarly, 
during the second CRT, Chris spontaneously looked at the authors of the documents, 
but, also in this case, he “did not recognize anyone.”  However, once he understood 
Russell’s argument (i.e., nineteenth century historians “projected their own ideals 
upon heroes of the past”), Chris was quick in checking the dates of the prior 
documents to test his thesis and concluded: “All, they were all like that, like this one 
is saying how they lied just flat out and this one is saying that they knew, and another 
one, so...and the reason for saying, these were the nineteenth century writers he was 
talking about.”  Thus, in this case, by looking at the sources and corroborating them, 
he was able to evaluate Russell’s argument, although he did not know any of the 
authors. 
Within this sample, Mark’s performance on the Constructed Response Tasks 
stood out as particularly different, because he demonstrated a higher frequency of use 
of heuristics that may facilitate thinking historically.  On a general l vel, Mark 
interrupted the reading of the documents to interject comments and questions much 
more often than the other participants.  This might have been partially related to his 
remarkable metacognitive awareness, possibly fostered by his personal interest in 
psychology, and especially in understanding why he “thought about certain things the 
way [he] did.”  Nevertheless, his first think-aloud showed a constant dialogue with 
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the authors of the documents, a conversation during which Mark often challenged the 
trustworthiness of the accounts.  For example, in reading that Captain Cook was 
offered a hog in sacrifice, Mark asked: “How do they know it was in sacrifice and not 
just a gift?”  Again, after completing the reading of Document 1, he commented: 
My thoughts here is that when I read ‘these distinguished civilities were never 
offered by the islander to a mere human beings’ […] I question the accuracy 
of that, because if this is the first time that they landed on this island, is there 
really a way that they can know about that?   
In addition, Mark paid close attention to the perspective offered by the 
documents and noted differences between texts.  He mostly used cues provided by the 
language employed by the authors to guess about their point of view and the purpose 
of the account.  For example, after reading Document 5, he said: 
This is completely contrary to the first document I read, that said that they 
received him as a god and took him to the main town.  This seems more 
actual, more didactic, the other seems more of a fictitious story; it sounds like 
a grand jury report […] maybe by Cook to his […] native land to make 
himself, white people, look…  
Yet, like the other students, Mark never looked at the references while working on the
first CRT, although their examination would have provided an answer to a few of his 
questions.  Thus, his consideration of perspective fostered a generalized suspicion 
toward the authors of the texts more than providing a tool for using the documents 
available to address the question asked by the task.  During the second CRT, Mark 
said that he had “paid more attention” to the authors of the sources, trying to find out 
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whether the text was written in someone’s interest or to identify the perspective from 
which the document was written.  However, the think aloud did not show any 
evidence that these considerations affected the interpretation of the texts, since Mark 
seemed to take the documents at their face value.   
Mark was also careful in considering the cultural context in which the events 
took place and, contrary to the other students, he found Document 4 in the first CRT 
particularly useful, in this respect: 
When I read this, I kind of think about how probable it is that the native 
Hawaiians received Captain Cook believing that he was a god, because he 
says that other Polynesian people did the same.  […] [T]his kind of makes me 
think about the Eurocentric view, how the native Hawaiians, the Polynesians 
received them, the kind of European perspective seems a little arrogant, 
obviously. 
This sensitivity may have been related to an experience Mark had in a previous 
history class and that he mentioned in another part of the interview.  In this world 
history class, the teacher challenged the European point of view of the curriculum and 
incorporated alternative views, making the curriculum “less biased,” in Mark’s 
words.  In so doing, she probably challenged the idea of a singular narrative faithfully 
conveyed by the textbook. 
Mark was therefore more critical than his classmates toward the documents he 
read.  However, once he acknowledged the presence of a historian, he had no criteria 
for using this awareness to foster his understanding and evaluation of the sources.  In 
addition, while he tried to empathize with the Hawaiians and imagine how the events 
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may have looked like from their point of view, Mark accepted unquestioningly the 
stereotypical idea of medieval darkness and of its “antiquated level of knowledge.”  
This difference across the two CRTs suggests that exposing students to alternative 
narratives does not necessarily foster historical empathy if, at the same time, it does 
not provide the tools for understanding how a historical narrative comes to be in the 
first place.    
Especially remarkable was Mark’s refraining from rushing to an answer to the 
question posed by the tasks and his willingness to work within the limits set by the 
sources at his disposal, attitudes that he maintained across the two think-alouds.  For 
example, after reading about Kū-‘ohu’s doubts, he said; “I think about what his 
position was and why did he do that? I do not necessarily answer these questions, but 
I just ask them to myself.” Only after he had finished reading all the documents did 
he conclude that he had “kind of brought the idea full circle in [his] mind and 
constructed an opinion, throughout the mix of perspectives on it.”  The answer he 
constructed was expressed in conditional terms and actually kept in consideration 
elements coming from all the different texts.  On the other hand, the lack of 
appropriate heuristics made Mark stop shorter than what the documents would have 
allowed him.  Thus, after reading twice all the documents comprised in the second 
CRT, he concluded: 
It is difficult to answer.  It is really hard to say based on these documents 
what the prevalent idea was from the people, because a lot of these documents 
do not really reference what the people thought, because this is, I mean, a 
document of the Church – Document 2 – Document 1, I guess, is just a book 
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about Columbus, that was published, I am not sure whether it was a text in 
someone else’s interest.  [silence] I don’t really think, from the documents, it 
doesn’t really show that there was a general consensus about the shape of the 
earth at the time of Columbus.  Really the documents, I think, conflict too 
much to, not necessarily conflict, but they paint a picture that does not 
necessarily explain what the general consensus was. 
Historical Thinking No (HTno).  Conversely, the evidence of use of 
heuristics clearly incompatible with historical thinking was abundant.  One of the 
most recurring behavior regarded students introducing in their interpretation of the 
documents or in their constructed response elements extraneous to the sources 
provided.  Although they often formulated these statements as “guesses,” they did not 
treat them as working hypotheses to be checked against the documents available; 
rather, these provisional “guesses” tended to blend with other bits of ideas extracted 
from the readings, often influencing student understanding.  For example, Juliet made 
an analogy with some stories she knew, trying to make sense of Hawaiians’ behavior:  
I think that they just wanted someone that they believed could help them, in a 
way, because those gods, like in the stories I guess, they have a purpose, like 
the money god, the love god, or that he could help them out in some way, and 
so that they  were trying to make him feel welcomed. 
Similarly, Kalyna summarized Document 4 in the second CRT adding ideas 
completely extraneous to the texts: 
Here it is saying that the Greek man who said that the earth was round was 
Ptolemy, and they just denied his hypothesis and they imagine that the earth is 
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a giant turtle standing on a giant snake that is biting its tail and that an 
elephant is standing on the giant turtle and that the earth is standing on the 
elephant.   
Chris tried to gauge individual’s intentions and ventured into guessing, too: 
Captain Cook, in a way, I’m thinking, [was] kind of messing these people up; 
so, on occasions in which they give thanks and celebrate certain holidays he 
led them to believe that he is a god and they don’t have to do this anymore.  
Encourages screw ups in their whole traditions.   
This last quote also illustrates a case in which these additions became influent al 
lenses that colored the overall response.  Chris continued to build on the idea of a 
mean Captain Cook, that “took advantage of the situation,” “got more out of it 
[barter] than the Hawaiians,” and was given “gold, and sacrifice, and lot of stuff, lo  
of great stuff.” 
In a similar fashion, in the second CRT, students often built on several 
misconceptions about the Middle Ages and Columbus.  Ashley, for example, 
remembered “reading about Columbus” and the fact that “he thought that it [the 
earth] was flat,” and that “at the end, [one would] just fall off.”  She kept revisiting 
this idea during the whole think-aloud, compared it only with Document 2, ignored 
all the other texts, and commented that the question was “kind of opinionated,” 
because it didn’t have “a lot of facts.”  In the end, she concluded that “they had no 
way of knowing, unless somebody went round the whole world and that would take a 
very, very long time.”  She also noted that answering the question would have been a 
lot easier “if we had these colonial charts,” and thus we could have a more precise
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idea of Columbus’s knowledge.  Juliet also had the same misconception.  
Immediately after reading the question, she said that she already knew the answer and 
that “they thought that the earth was flat and that you could fall off it.” 
Chris said that his initial confusion stemmed from the fact that he “knew that 
his [Columbus’s] ideas were against what was known back then, that they weren’t 
viewed very kindly, that you were punished if you run against what the Church said.”  
He also asked whether Columbus was killed for his ideas or put into prison.  When I 
told him that this wasn’t the case, Chris reconciled his appreciation for Russell’s 
argument and this new knowledge by stating that “if he [Columbus] didn’t get 
punished, I guess, people did know, he brought back convincing evidence.” 
In building understanding about specific issues, students seemed to weave 
together prior ideas (in the form of prior understandings, guesses, beliefs, prior 
knowledge, or misconceptions) and elements of the texts they were given in such a 
way as to obtain a story that was plausible in their eyes.  Students did not submit any 
of these components, nor the resulting story to any standard of justification; it was 
precisely in this respect that this “default” attitude run against historical thinking, 
making it indeed an “unnatural act” (Wineburg, 1991).   
Another stumbling block for thinking historically regarded a lack of 
appreciation of the authored nature of texts.  In several cases, students seemed to be 
unaware of the importance of taking into account the author of a document in 
building understanding.  Specifically, once prompted to consider the reference 
provided at the end of each document, they acknowledged that it contained “where it 
comes from” (Eric) or that it was “just a little who wrote it” (Rick).  However, when 
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asked whether they read it, they responded in the negative and justified their behavior 
by noting that “they don’t have information in the quote” (Eric) since the task did not 
explicitly ask them any questions about the authors of the sources.  Only Ashley 
admitted that she would use the reference in two cases: “so they know that I am not 
plagiarizing,” and if she used a quote from a document and needed to state the source 
for that quote.   
When asked explicitly, students also dismissed the possibility that references 
could aid in the interpretation of the documents.  For Kate, knowing about the origin 
of a text was not going to affect how she wrote her paper because the reference could 
not dispel the doubt that the account was just a rumor.  Similarly to Eric, Elizabeth 
said that the reference was “just redundant” because, although it reported the author 
of the text, it had nothing “to do with the question.”  Jack summarized this 
widespread behavior: 
I don’t read the author, I kind of sort of glance at it, so I can pretty much 
absorb information, pretty much.  I don’t really use the author, as long as it is 
not in a response or anything. 
As these examples illustrates, not only these students treated these texts as authorless; 
they also positively stated that there was no use in considering the author of a text to 
build understanding.   
Monica offered a further insight into student sourcing (or lack thereof).  Like 
the other participants, Monica ignored all the author references.  However, after 
reading Document 6, she immediately looked at the reference and noted that it was 
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from the Apotheosis of Captain Cook.  This is her explanation for this different 
behavior: 
It was in first person, so it kept saying ‘I’ a lot and it helps to know […] who 
is talking because, if there is a point of view, if he was a native from the island 
or another person, a European, male or female, all different factors. 
Monica’s example highlights the importance for evaluation of having the explicit 
voice of the author easily audible in the text, thus confirming prior research of 
adolescent reading of multiple texts (Paxton, 2002).  However, Monica seemed also 
to imply that only certain texts are “opinionated,” thus deserving a particular scrutiny.  
In fact, when asked why she did not check the other sources, she replied that “they 
didn’t seem as opinionated, so the source didn’t matter as much.”  
I found evidence of this way of thinking also in a few students’ transcripts of 
the second CRT.  These students often referred to the first CRT and reported that they 
had paid more attention to the references; very seldom, however, did they find this 
strategy useful.  For example, when further prompted to explain what criteria she 
followed in evaluating the different documents, Elizabeth said that they seemed 
accurate, because “they pretty much gave people, and place, and the time, Document 
5 gives like statistics; I mean, if you have that, it’s pretty accurate when you have 
stuff like that.  I believe them.”  Also Mark, who read all the references during the 
second CRT and appeared to be especially sensitive to the subtext of the documents, 
seemed to believe that only some documents need close scrutiny, because potentially 
more biased:  
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[T]he source from the Church […] just because it was from the Church and 
during this time period there was, I know for a fact, a lot of corruption things 
in the Church and […] it seems it’s the Catholic Church, which means more 
corruption at that time period […] that shows certain bias in that document so 
that it hasn’t to be taken at face value. 
Issues of chronology aside, the implications of this attitude for the exercise of critical 
thinking in daily circumstances in and out of the school setting is worrisome, 
especially considering that most textbooks and several informational media use an 
“authorless” style, giving the impression that what is conveyed are simply “the facts.”  
Further, this attitude is compatible with the belief in a dichotomous relation between 
facts and opinions, a belief I found quite common across these students and that I 
discussed in the section regarding those epistemic beliefs coded as TR1. 
Students voiced also other criteria to evaluate the trustworthiness of historical 
sources, although the issue of “selective bias” still seemed to lurk behind these 
approaches.  For example, when I prompted Elizabeth to consider the date of the 
documents, she said that she would consider as more accurate the documents written 
at a time closer to the events, because the more recent sources “are more like […] 
people’s opinion right now.”  Applying this rationale, Elizabeth first said that 
Augustine’s text was probably the most accurate to address the questions of beliefs 
about the shape of the earth during Columbus’s time because it was the oldest; when 
prompted again to consider whether it belonged to Columbus’s time, she added also 
Irving’s text [1890] “because they are closer to the time.”  
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These examples also illustrates that students had trouble in using 
chronological ideas meaningfully.  Although they could correctly state that the 
Greeks came before the Middle Ages and Columbus came after, they had problems in 
linking dates to any kind of historical context.  Juliet provided the clearest example, 
in this respect.  When I asked her whether she knew in what century Columbus 
crossed the Atlantic, she initially said that she had no idea, but immediately added: 
“nineteen, isn’t it 1982 that Columbus sailed the ocean blue?”  She responded to my 
puzzled look, asking for confirmation that “there is a two, right?” then venturing a 
1909, and finally concluding that she “was bad with years.”  I believe that what is at 
stake here is much more than remembering dates accurately; if this were the issue, 
cleverer rhymes might even do the trick.  For Juliet, dates were completely 
meaningless, so much so that she did not perceive the unreasonableness of dating 
Columbus’s voyage little more than two decades (or a century) ago.  Under these 
conditions, thinking in terms of historical context and drawing reasonable historical 
inferences became practically impossible. 
Introducing elements completely unrelated to the sources and demonstrating 
serious misunderstandings about sourcing and use of chronological thinking were 
occurrences widespread across all the participants.  Other manifestations of behaviors 
and ideas that seriously hindered historical thinking were more idiosyncratic, but I 
believe not less useful for understanding potential stumbling blocks. 
In the first CRT, several students seemed to have difficulties in reading and 
interpreting Document 4.  Compared to the other texts, its language was probably 
more challenging and its content more abstract.  What did students do when they 
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found sources, or part of texts, that they could not fully understand? Chris offered an 
example.  After reading with some difficulty Document 4, he commented that he did 
not “think that document actually helps with the question.”  He then unsuccessfully 
tried to summarize the text, and concluded that the document was not clear to him, 
although he was actually able to identify a main topic of the text (“I think it just 
discusses the people in their beliefs to their god and I guess I understand tha.”).  
Finally, he confirmed his prior evaluation, saying that: “I just don’t think it really 
helps with the question.”   
In the case of Chris, this dismissal was particularly surprising, since he had 
previously demonstrated consideration for the historical context.  The other student  
usually did not offer any comment after reading this document.  However, their 
constructed response did not refer to this text nor used any part of its content; an 
occurrence compatible with the hypothesis that students simply dismiss what they 
cannot or find hard to understand.   
I began to test this hypothesis during the second CRT.  I asked students who 
appeared to struggle in understanding some of the documents and dismissed them 
from their final response what would they normally do when faced by a similar 
occurrence.  Monica provided a clear rationalization:  
I just ignore it, and not use it in my explanation, especially if they give you a 
lot of documents to use […] I guess, if you had a lot of time, you could go 
through and figure out what it means, but if you don’t have that extra, you just 
like skip it.  If I don’t know something, I rather explain something that I know 
274 
 
what it means than being unsure about something and trying to prove what it 
means.  You know what I’m talking about? 
Considering that historical thinking is characterized by openness to the “other,” this 
attitude of discarding what cannot be easily understood according to one’s present 
measure constitute a grave impediment.  Similarly, after reading all the documents 
and concluding that the Hawaiians needed to believe in a god that could help them, 
Juliet admitted that the whole story was confusing, because “it goes back an forth, 
with some people thinking he isn’t a god and they give all these things to him.”  
However, she remained unable to deal with the issue, did not acknowledge the 
conflict in her final response, and introduced several elements extraneous to the texts. 
Cut and Paste (CP).  Although I coded only a small percentage of the 
utterances as Cut and Paste (10% and 13% in the first and second CRT, respectively), 
nine out of twelve participants in the first CRT and ten out of twelve participants in 
the second CRT used this approach in building their response.  In the first CRT, most 
students focused on some form of worshipping of Captain Cook, on the exchange of 
goods between Cook and the Hawaiians, and on his arrival on a big ship.  Overall, 
students chose a few concrete details offered by the documents, dismissing tho e 
elements that were probably more difficult to understand or that could not be easily 
reconciled with the idea of Hawaiian mistaking Cook for the returning god Lono.  
The preference for this narrative might have been an artifact of the sequence of the 
documents in the task, since the first document strongly supported this idea.  
Unfortunately, the data from this study did not allow me to fully check this 
hypothesis because all participants read the texts in the same order.  However, the 
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transcripts of the second CRT suggest that the order of the documents does not 
always play a major role in how students choose to focus on specific aspects of the 
texts.  In fact, in this case, students more often mentioned the measurements of the 
earth by the ancient Greeks, the denials of the Church, the Bible, and the different 
views of science (and scientists), issues that are discussed mainly in Document 3, 4, 
and 5.  Only one student referred a few times to Document 1 as portraying the beliefs 
that were more common in Spain.   
The process followed by the students in picking and choosing among the texts 
was fairly consistent across the two administrations.  For the most part, student  
briefly stopped after reading each document and identified one or more ideas that 
they found particularly meaningful.  This is how Kate described the process she 
would employ when faced by this kind of task: 
I would do it, like sorting, reading each one and then writing about it 
after […] and when I write I would read it with my last two sentences 
of what I was writing so that I can make it flow in my paper, but so 
that I can understand each one separately and I am not going to get 
stuck. 
While Kate seemed focused on the final outcome of the task (writing a 
flowing paper), Monica highlighted the role of prior knowledge in orienting what s e 
would retain from each text:  
I based on prior knowledge, and then I guess I just went through and read 
every document and looked for what I thought would be helpful to my 
argument.  Like, I came up with an argument and then went into the readings 
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for things to support the argument and I picked up other information to add to 
what I was saying. 
Since intertextual reading was a rare occurrence, students usually tried to 
formulate their overall understanding only after reading all the documents provided.  
At that point, they selectively focused on a few ideas, usually those that they had 
already mentioned while reading, sometimes adding some further element, xtraneous 
to the texts.  Monica’s transcript of the first CRT offers a nice illustration of this 
process: 
So the problem was that they assumed that he was a god, because they 
saw–where is that–Document 3, I think, they saw the big ship and so 
probably they did not usually see, so they made an exception to go out 
and see it, so they thought that he  was a god and worshipped him. 
Although Monica appeared to refer back to the documents, she attributed to 
Document 3 several elements that were not in the text.  For example, Document 3 
referred to a vessel, without mentioning a “big ship” and did not say that the people 
worshipped Captain Cook.  However, Document 2 mentioned a ship and the 
descriptions offered by Document 1 suggested that the Hawaiians worshipped 
Captain Cook.  This sentence seems, thus, to “cut” a few ideas out of the first three 
documents and “paste” them together to obtain a narrative, probably in line with her 
initial argument.   
While conflicting information disappeared (e.g., Kū-‘ohu’s doubts), links with 
prior knowledge did not, as the rest of the quote illustrates: 
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But I also think so because he let them think that, he could have told 
them he wasn’t a god, but he probably wanted to save his own skin, 
like Johnny Depp in Pirates of the Caribbean and he also got things 
from them, like in document, what was it, five, barter iron, because 
they needed it for tools and weapon, so he got food, and fish, and stuff 
like that–I remember this–then they saw he was someone they should 
worship and he turned his back to them.   
Monica mentioned Pirates of the Caribbean while reading Document 1, saying that 
the description of Captain Cook being brought to the temple reminded her of the 
movie.  This connection appeared again in her constructed response, unchecked and 
mixed with other recollections from the documents, bringing her to the conclusion 
that Cook/Depp “turned his back” on the Hawaiians.  In this example, as in other 
several cases discussed as instances of HTno, prior knowledge got also “cut and 
pasted,” whether or not pertinent to the task or accurate in respect to the question 
addressed. 
In a few cases, students realized that the accounts differed; in these cases they 
appeared to abide to a sort of majority rule.  For example, in reading the documents of 
the first CRT, Jack noted that Kū-‘ohu thought that Cook was not a god and that, 
according to Document 6, “the European said that they were gods and the Hawaiians 
believed them and not that the Hawaiians thought of them as gods.”  Although this 
statement suggests that Jack misunderstood Document 6, he interpreted it as rejecing
the idea that the Hawaiians simply mistook Cook for their returning god Lono.  
However, immediately afterwards, in answering the question posed by the task, Jack 
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said that “based on the documents the Hawaiians thought that he was the god Lono 
and that they saw him at Makahiki and went with their ships and gave them things 
from the island.”  When questioned, Jack confirmed that he interpreted Document 6 
as rejecting this view; however, he still considered his answer reasonable because, 
five out of six documents supported it. 
I found even more cases of abiding to a majority rule in the transcripts of the 
second CRT.  Elizabeth, for example, began answering the question by saying that 
“the prevalent belief about the shape [of the earth] was kind of 50/50 back then.”  
When I asked her to explain why she came to this conclusion, Elizabeth reconsidered 
all the documents and assigned each one of them to the “flat” or “round” camp.  At 
this point, she realized that only 2 documents, in her view, supported the idea of a flat 
earth and thus she modified her initial response stating that “most people believed 
that the earth was round.”  
Other students tried to build a chronological narrative to account for 
differences in the texts.  Eric, for example, concluded: 
[P]eople at one time believed that it [the earth] was flat, but like, on the other 
hand, for a while, the Greeks and the Egyptians found out that it was round, 
but then the Greeks lost the information and all that and then Columbus and 
everybody there, back in Spain, go back to think that it was flat and when 
Columbus sailed he found out, and it was round again. 
An alternative approach was offered by Ashley, who noted that some 
documents reported that not all Hawaiians believed that Captain Cook was a god.  In 
cases such as this, she said that she would “usually compare” the documents, “and see 
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how they differ, and then, if there is some that was at the scene” she would “go by 
that.”  Used as the only criteria to evaluate the trustworthiness of sources, the belief 
that eyewitnesses always know best is clearly problematic from an epistemic point of 
view.  However, in terms of historical thinking, this idea did not affect Ashley’s 
performance, since she did not check the sources of these documents.   
I noted this disconnection between students’ rationalization of the strategies 
that should be employed (or that they believed they employed) in this kind of 
situations and their behavior in several cases.  Kate, for example, concluded that 
“Hawaiians believed in any person that looked like gods, and they thought that 
anyone could be god,” although she said that she would consider each document in 
answering the question, as the quote reported at the beginning of this section 
illustrated.  On the other hand, I also found a high degree of consistency between 
students’ performances on the CRT and their rationalization of their behaviors in a 
few other cases.  Monica and Jack were good examples of such consistency. 
Ashley offered a second strategy for dealing with conflicting multiple sources.  
She said that she would “make paragraphs and write down similarities and 
differences,” and if she had two different opinions, she would “write paragraphs on 
the opinions.”  I found the fundamentally passive role attributed to the learner that 
emerged from this quote truly remarkable, as it signaled the cognitive impasse and the 
affective indifference that characterize the “cut and paste” approach.  Laking 
effective criteria to establish a meaningful relations with and across these text , the 
learner’s role is reduced to place snippets of information (or opinions) one beside the 
other.  Even more worrisome is the fact that students did not perceive this outcome as 
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problematic.  Further, the data do not suggest that students would be in a better 
position to make up their mind if they were not constrained by a given set of 
documents.  Mark, for example, said that he “would probably use the internet,” do “a 
vague search,” and then “take different pieces of information from different sources.”  
He also stated that he wouldn’t believe all that he read, but when pressed to elaborate 
on the criteria that he would use to make his decisions, he mentioned only how he 
would detect issues of bias. 
Awareness of the Question (AQ).  Students often demonstrated awareness of 
the question posed by the task, especially during the performance on the first CRT 
task.  These utterances were scattered throughout the think-aloud, suggesting that 
such awareness characterized the whole performance.  For example, after reading
each document, students generally paused, and tried to identify elements that could be
used to answer the question.  If they did not find any, they usually dismissed the 
document; however, not all the elements they identified while focusing on each 
document eventually contributed to their answer.  For example, during the first CRT, 
after reading Document 2, Jack commented: 
So this priest pretty much knew that they were not gods, but to be sure that 
they were not gods he pretended that they were gods.  Most of the other 
people thought that Cook and his men were gods and that their giant ship was 
a floating island.  This is pretty much it for this one. 
However, as I reported in the prior section, Jack built his response applying a 
majority rule and this note about Kū-‘ohu’s doubts was dropped.   
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In other cases, the question was used to dismiss the content of part of a 
document or an entire document from further consideration.  Elizabeth, for example, 
noted that “the fourth document doesn’t really say too much about what the 
Hawaiians thought; a lot of it is just saying that Hawaiians were not the only 
Polynesian people, it’s not talking about Hawaiians and what happened with Cook.”  
Similarly, Kalyna decided that part of Document 3 in the second CRT was “about 
Egyptians’ culture, not so much about the shape of the earth.” 
Awareness of the Author (AA).  Although the second CRT showed an 
increase in such awareness, with the exception of Mark, students treated the texts as
authorless.  This occurrence is even more problematic because I took as evidence of 
such awareness not only the explicit mention of an author but also the use of personal 
pronouns in restating part of the texts, as illustrated in the following examples: “Now 
they are saying that he was, that they imagined him, that someone made up a story” 
(Juliet, after reading Document 6).  “Here, in a way, I think he’s saying that Cook is 
taking advantage of the Hawaiians” (Chris, after reading Document 5).  “Here he is 
saying that it must be foolish to a man to go round the globe and find other lands” 
(Kalyna, after reading Document 2).   
Since the reference to a statement of the text as something mentioned by 
someone (suggested by the use of personal pronouns in lieu of the impersonal “it”) 
did not trigger any kind of sourcing, I remain very cautious in interpreting these
utterances as clear indications that students were looking at texts as communications 
from an author.  Overall, students treated the texts as mere conveyors of information 
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and not as someone’s voice, an occurrence that may concur to explain why students 
did not dialogue with the texts, but “sifted” them. 
Changes in Students’ Historical Thinking 
Table 4.15 summarizes averages of frequencies of features of historical 
thinking emerged across classes and administrations.  As I did in reporting the 
aggregated data, for each student I transformed the frequency of each category in o a 
percentage, calculated as a ratio between the frequency of that category nd the total 
number of historical thinking codes attributed to her or him in a specific 
administration of the CRT.  I based the calculation of the averages reported in th  
table on these percentages.  Also in this case, I treated Mark as an outlier and I did ot 
include his data in the pool. 
 
Table 4.15 
Averages* of Utterances Expressing Features of Student Historical Thinking by Class 
 
Name AQ AA HTno CP HTyes 
 Freq.  (%) Freq.  (%) Freq.  (%) Freq.  (%) Freq.  (%) 
      
Class 1.1 40% 2% 47% 6% 7% 
Class 1.2 23% 14% 53% 12% 2% 
      
Class 2.1 33% 14% 41% 8% 6% 
Class 2.2 12% 23% 43% 15% 7% 
      
Class 3.1 35% 3% 33% 22% 7% 
Class 3.2 24% 15% 38% 13% 11% 
      
Averages.1 36% 6% 41% 11% 6% 
Averages.2 19% 16% 46% 13% 6% 
 
Note.  When used after a name, .1 denotes data referring to the first administration and .2 denotes data 
referring to the second administration. 
*Percentages and averages are rounded to the closest integer; thus the sum by row does not necessarily 
equal to 100.   
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The data reported in Table 4.15 suggest that changes in historical thinking 
were very modest.  In particular, evidence of use of heuristics signaling historical 
thinking (HTyes) remained quite stable across the two administrations, while the use 
of heuristics hindering historical thinking modestly increased.  These trends were 
similar across classes, although HTyes had a modest increase in Class 3 and a modest 
decrease in Class 1.  I compared each student performance on the two CRT tasks in 
order to check whether eventual differences present at the level of individual student 
disappeared in aggregating the data.  Contrary to what I found in the analysis of 
epistemic beliefs, this further analysis confirmed that students did not differ much in 
terms of their ability to think historically across the two administrations, manifesting 
the same traits I described in the prior sections during the two think-alouds. 
Moreover, although students differed in their capacities to understand single 
texts and in the level of interest in the tasks, their performances in terms of historical 
thinking remained fundamentally similar.  Differences across the two administrations 
mainly regarded an increased role of student prior knowledge in building 
understanding and constructing the response, increased attention given to the 
references, and a more widespread use of what I called the “majority rule.” I d scribe 
these changes in the rest of this section, but I omit to report the results of changes at 
the level of each student and each class because they do not add further understanding 
of the features of student historical thinking. 
Students demonstrated to be more familiar (or thought to be more familiar) 
with the topic and the period addressed in the second CRT.  Several participants 
stated the belief that people at the time of Columbus thought that the earth was flat, 
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sometimes adding negative connotations of the “Dark Ages,” the feudal system, and 
the role of the Church.  A few students also thought that Columbus’s voyage 
“proved” the spherical shape of the earth.  These bits of prior (often inaccurate) 
knowledge seemed to play the same role that text’s elaborations played during 
performances on the first CRT.   Specifically, students took these pieces of prior 
knowledge for granted and never questioned them in light of the documents.  Rather, 
these prior ideas were woven into their responses, often acting as filters in d ciding 
what parts of the documents were cut and what parts were pasted into their 
constructed response.   
Activation of prior knowledge is often encouraged as an effective pre-reading 
strategy.  Data from this study suggest that students quite naturally access their prior 
knowledge and use it to build understanding.  However, its influence is not 
unequivocal.  Used unreflectively and uncritically, prior knowledge may also hinder 
understanding.  Another consequence of this attitude was a looser relation with the 
question asked by the task, an instance reflected in the lower percentages of 
utterances coded as AQ (Awareness of the Question). 
During the second CRT, students referred more often to the authors of the 
documents, occasionally reading the references provided at the end of the texts.  Th  
increased percentages of utterances signaling some awareness of the text authors 
reflected this tendency.  A few students also mentioned the prior CRT, remembering 
that at the end I had asked them whether they had read the references.  Yet, this
increased awareness of the presence of an author did not foster the critical evalu tion 
of the texts nor aided intertextual understanding.  Considered as additional details 
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pertaining to the document, this additional information was almost always dismissed 
as useless. 
Finally, in building their responses, students increasingly tended to rely on 
counting how many documents suggested a similar view (i.e., people at Columbus’s 
time believed that the earth was flat).  From these results, they inferred what might 
have been the prevalent beliefs at Columbus’s time (if they thought that one view was 
clearly preponderant among the documents) or how different beliefs might have been 
distributed among the population (if they thought that different views were equally 
represented in the texts).  In either case, they took the claim of a text at face value and 
did not corroborated it with other documents, as if a text’s claim could be considered 
evidence in itself and a majority of texts supporting a similar view could be treated as 
preponderance of evidence.  The different trend in using some form of Cut and Paste 
in class 3 was mainly due to the performance of one student (Ashley), who found the 
second CRT more difficult because the question seemed to her “more opinionated” 
and not based on facts.  Thus, in answering the question, she dismissed any reference 
to the documents. 
Analysis of Students’ Written Responses to the CRTs 
The analysis of the written responses of 23 additional students in Lauren’s 
class confirmed what emerged from the analysis of the think-alouds.  Table 4.16 
summarizes the number of responses that manifested a specific trait of historical 
thinking or suggested a behavior that may inhibit it, for the first and the second CRT, 
respectively.   
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Specifically, I found no evidence that students were giving any consideration 
to the author of a document, or that they were evaluating the sources.  For example, 
they never mentioned the author’s name or the title of the source from which the texts 
were excerpted.  In the few cases in which responses referred to a specific text (6 for 
the first CRT and 3 for the second CRT), they did so by citing the document number.   
Conversely, several students (17 for the first CRT and 11 for the second CRT) built 
their responses by cutting and pasting snippets of ideas from one or more texts, fre ly 
discounting those texts or parts of texts that conflicted with their story line or w re 
perhaps perceived as more difficult (e.g., document 4 in the first CRT).  In a few 
cases, the ideas included were also distorted, suggesting a lack of understanding of 
the texts or unwarranted interpretations (10 for the first CRT and 11 for the second 
CRT).  A few students based their response only on one of the documents included in 
the packets (5 for the first CRT and 1 for the second CRT).   
The inclusion of relevant, direct quotations from the texts was also limited (6 
for the first CRT and 3 for the second CRT) and, in some cases, unrelated to the claim 
that the student was making (3 for the first CRT and 1 for the second CRT).  
Similarly to what observed in student informants, responses also included details, 
conjectures, and additional elements that were not supported by the documents (7 for 
the first CRT and 12 for the second CRT).  Also in this case, increased familiarity 
with the topic of the second CRT seemed to elicit the emergence of misconceptis 
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Only two students for each CRT included in their responses a justification of 
their conclusions that implied comparisons across the sources.  In all these cas , 
students acknowledged that the sources suggested that different beliefs (about C ptain 
Cook or about the shape of the Earth) were probably espoused by different people at 
that particular point in time.  Yet, they came to their conclusion by counting how 
many documents supported a specific beliefs; an approach very similar to what I 









After having described the range of epistemic beliefs and the traits of 
historical thinking expressed by students and teachers, in this section I discuss the 
limits and the contributions of the study to a better understanding of these constructs.  
Then, I focus on the relations between the constructs identified in the theoretical 
model and explored in the study.  What do the results suggest, in this respect?  Within 
the latter line of reasoning, I first focus on teachers and examine relations between 
their epistemic beliefs, traits of historical thinking, goals, and pedagogical practice.  
Then, I consider the data in their entirety and discuss how pedagogical practices may 
have contributed to the epistemic development (or lack thereof) of the students.   
Limits of the Study 
Although I believe that the results of the study contribute to a better and more 
nuanced understanding of the development of epistemic cognition within the history 
classroom, the interpretation and generalization of these results is constrained by 
several limitations.  First, in studying epistemic beliefs and historical thinking within 
the classroom setting, I had to be respectful of the goals and demands of that 
particular learning context.  For example, the choice to limit to four the number of 
informants in each class was dictated by the inopportunity to take students out of the 
class for interviewing if the teachers felt that missing a specific lesson could 
significantly impact their learning experience and success in that class, a concern that 
was especially high at the beginning of the semester.  Thus, the descriptions of 
epistemic beliefs and historical thinking that I obtained are based on data collected 
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from a relatively small, partially self-selected sample of student informants.  The 
timeframe during which I interviewed students had also to be adjusted.  As a result, 
the first set of student interviews took place at the beginning of December and the 
second set towards the middle of January, an occurrence that may concur to explain 
the little change I observed in terms of historical thinking.  Further, only in the case of 
Lauren’s class, students’ willingness to participate in the study allowed me to extend 
the data collection beyond student informants.  Although analyses of students’ written
responses to the BHQ and to the CRTs confirmed the trends emerged from the 
analysis of interviews and think-alouds of student informants, I cannot claim the same 
in the case of Ellen’s and Danielle’s classes.  
Second, as teachers often mentioned, the larger institutional context surely 
played a role on the pedagogical choices that they made.  My own decision of running 
the study in this particular school system was actually based on its policy of 
encouraging the examination of primary sources within the history curriculum.  
Although I appreciate the role of these larger social structures and the influence that 
educational policies have on what happens in the classrooms, the perspective of this 
study is mainly psychological and its main focus remains on students’ and teachers’ 
cognitive processes.  While the study accounts for some of the constraints introduced 
by the larger institutional context, my observations and data collections were limited 
to the classroom contexts and, within these contexts, they were focused on the 
constructs under investigation, limiting the possibility to study the moderating or 
mediating effects of other factors (e.g., social and motivational), which I could only 
access through informal exchanges with teachers and students.  Thus, although I 
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believe that the results of this study suggest several implications in terms of curricula 
development, assessment, teachers’ education, and teachers’ professional 
development, these recommendations are based on the study of individual students 
and teachers and not of the system as such.  These limits also affect the warrants fo  
generalizing the results to other classes since they do not allow comparing cl sses on 
these other variables.   
Last, but not least, my conceptualization of these constructs surely influenced 
my class observations and analysis of the data, drawing some occurrences to the 
forefront and leaving other happenings in the background.  Although I tried to avoid 
or at least control for unjustified subjectivity, the results of the study are clearly 
circumscribed by my own understandings. 
Contributions of the Study 
Keeping in mind the limitations discussed in the prior section, I believe that 
the results of the study enrich extant understanding of history specific epistemic 
beliefs and of the possible structure of epistemic beliefs, in general.  In respect to 
historical thinking, they extend the findings of prior studies (especially Lee & Ashby, 
2003 and VanSledright, 2002) by focusing on high school students and teachers and 
by identifying a set of key ideas characterizing and potentially hindering historical 
thinking within this specific group.  The next sections focus on a few of these key 
understandings. 
Epistemic Consistency 
Within each structured interview and with the exception of one student during 
the first interview, each student voiced ideas belonging to different categories, with 
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one category emerging as clearly preponderant only in very few cases.  In large 
measure, teachers’ interviews reflected the same phenomenon, suggesting that 
epistemic inconsistency may characterize individual’s thinking well beyond the K-12 
school environment. 
Although I found examples of epistemic beliefs described in the epistemic 
cognition and historical thinking literature (King & Kitchener, 2002; Kuhn & 
Weinstock, 2002; Lee, 2004; Lee & Ashby, 2000; Lee & Shemilt, 2003), the same 
individual manifested beliefs that would be considered indicative of different 
developmental levels.  Analyses of students’ written responses to the BHQ also 
evidenced the same phenomenon.  Hence, these findings suggest that individual 
epistemic beliefs may be viewed as a complex system, not necessarily ch acterized 
by a high level of integration.   
In fact, about one third of student utterances reflected beliefs that the literature 
would describe in part as realist and in part as multiplist (TR1), with either label 
clearly inadequate to characterize the epistemic position of the individual.  At the 
same time, the fact that only two adjacent categories (EBCO and TR1) captured the 
majority of the utterances suggests that student epistemic beliefs in history may still 
be conceived as a system characterized by a set of recurring, albeit not necessarily 
well integrated, ideas.  Once again, analysis of written responses to the BHQ 
confirmed these trends, with few students obtaining high consistency scores. It may 
well be the case that high internal consistency of epistemic beliefs is a mark of 
domain expertise, a hypothesis already suggested by prior studies using a similar 
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instrument (Maggioni et al., 2004) and compatible with results of developmental 
studies of epistemological thinking (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002).   
This phenomenon of epistemic inconsistency is not new in the developmental 
literature.  Researchers investigating the development of epistemic cognition through 
the analysis of open or structured interviews reported that they observed it in their 
participants.  For example, Perry (1970) conducted yearly open interviews with 
college undergraduates, during which he aimed at understanding the meaning that 
students gave to their experience.  His study is often cited as pivotal for research in 
epistemic cognition and his scheme is constituted by a sequence of epistemic 
“positions.”  Perry created these positions by ordering along a developmental path the 
stable “forms of those assumptions about knowledge and value with which [the 
student] construed his experience” (p. 47).  Explaining the method that he followed in 
developing his scheme, Perry reported about the emergence of different 
developmental positions in the same individual.  I cite the footnote addressing this 
issue at some length, because I believe that it speaks directly to the point that I am 
discussing and because Perry was very influential in tracing the path followed by 
mainstream research in epistemic cognition in the years that followed: 
Since students often seemed to interpret different sectors of their experience 
through structures of different developmental status [i.e., structures that Perry 
would attribute to different “positions”], the concept of a central tendency or 
dominant structure was essential to the judges’ task of rating student reports as 
“overall” at a single position.  We made only one test of the possibility that 
the judges rated each interview in five content-sectors […] In rating the four 
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interviews of one student’s four-year report, the judges rated each interview in 
five content-sectors (academic, extracurricular, interpersonal, vocational, 
religious), and also “overall.” The judges produced reliable ratings for each of 
the five sectors and these ratings revealed a considerable disparity in the 
student’s development from sector to sector, especially in his outlook toward 
academic work and religion as compared to his outlook toward his career     
(p.  48).   
Why did Perry opt for assigning each individual to an “overall” position, when the 
ratings of the different sectors showed remarkable differences? The footnote provides 
his rationale: 
Nonetheless, the reliability was no greater in the rating of separate sectors 
than in the overall rating of the central tendency among them.  Possibly the 
smaller amount of data available for any one sector counteracted the 
advantages of focus.  Whatever the reason, the expense of rating by sectors 
appeared too great for our purposes, and we settled for the equally reliable 
overall judgment as a workable tool in the first test of our scheme (p.  48). 
In so doing, Perry created a clean description of epistemic development and 
maintained a high interrater reliability.  To be sure, his scheme allows for alternatives 
to a linear growth, and includes the possibility that individuals temporize, retreat, o  
escape the developmental trajectory.  Yet, I believe that something got lost in the 
process of abstraction.  Researchers could now “make sense” of individual epistemic 
development and trace its course.  However, in assigning an “overall score” to each 
individual, this approach probably fostered a conceptual shortcut, in which average or 
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median scores were taken as valid indicators of an individual’s epistemic position at a 
certain moment in time.  With the exception of few studies aiming at capturing cross-
domain epistemological positions (e.g., Buehl, Alexander, & Murphy, 2002; Kuhn, 
Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000), the diversity across contexts got lost.   
Developmental researchers have been aware of this risk.  For example, in 
summarizing their research on the Reflective Judgment Model and reporting that they 
found some degree of epistemic inconsistency also among their participants, King and 
Kitchener (2002) noted that “variability of stage reasoning (that is, evidence of 
reasoning that is characteristic of more than one stage at a time) was the norm”        
(p. 45).  They likened epistemic development to the movement of waves, which 
spread across different stages and tended to change their shape, in time.  For this 
reason, they cautioned against characterizing individuals as being “in” or “at” a single 
stage. 
The results of this study support these findings and suggest that epistemic 
inconsistency may characterize also domain-specific beliefs, especially when 
individuals are still on their way toward expertise.  Yet, how can “inconsistency” be 
assessed?  Besides requiring some degree of creativity on the part of researcher , 
addressing this issue will imply the specification of some normative epistemic 
standard (inconsistent in relation to what?), especially if the goal is tracing epistemic 
development.  The creation of a consistency score to analyze written responses to the 
BHQ is a rough, initial attempt in this direction.   
The decision to assess consistency in relation to the criterialist stance, and 
more generally, to assess individual development in relation to it, depends on the 
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compatibility of this stance with the possibility to think historically and with the goals 
of an education to criticism.  On the other hand, beliefs characterizing the copier 
stance do not foster an awareness of the role of the knower in the generation of 
historical knowledge and thus dissolve the idea of an historical thinker.  Criticism of 
what is handed down as historical knowledge by authorities is reduced to some 
marginal aspects of it or becomes altogether meaningless.  Beliefs characterizing the 
subjectivist stance also do not foster historical thinking or a truly critical attitude, 
because they convey the idea that there is no method or criteria that can help 
individuals to evaluate what is proposed as historical knowledge or to further develop 
their knowledge of the past.  Without such method, the relation with the traces of the 
past is severed, the possibility of evaluating justifications for beliefs about the past 
becomes impossible, and a sterile doubt of any beliefs about the past takes the place 
of criticism.   
The Role of Context and Tasks 
The analyses of participants’ structured interviews may provide a few insights 
about why epistemic inconsistency comes to characterize history-specific epistemic 
beliefs.  For example, in responding to the statements of the BHQ, students and 
teachers often referred to specific occurrences, such as archeologists’ findings, 
dinosaurs’ bones, different perspectives about particular events, school fights, car 
accidents, eyewitnesses’ truthfulness, and research experiences.  In other words, they 
referred to their experiences in school and out of school to justify their beliefs.  The e 
situations guided their reflection on how knowledge is generated.  Thus, in thinking 
about the unexpected discovery of an archeologist, students concluded that historical 
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knowledge was “found,” while, in thinking about the different accounts produced 
after a car accident, they thought of knowledge as hopelessly subjective.  In other 
words, the context suggested by the items or the one that participants envisioned 
when responding to items worded in abstract terms seemed to influence their 
thinking, deeply.   
This instance has consequences for research and for pedagogical practice.  
Specifically, if the effect of context can be so powerful when focusing on domain-
specific epistemic beliefs, can it also contribute to explain the difficulties faced by 
researchers trying to assess general epistemic beliefs?  Research rs have often 
questioned the factor structure of these measures, the low variance explained, and 
especially the low reliability of the scales and tried to ameliorate the problem by 
identifying subsets of highly correlated items for each dimension of epistemic beliefs.  
Yet, in so doing, researchers have assumed epistemic consistency across context and 
tasks.  The results of this study suggest that this may not correspond to the 
phenomenon observed.   
In addition, context may act as a powerful confounder and affect what is 
actually assessed by a scale.  For example, the EBI’s questionnaire (Schraw et al., 
2002, p. 267) infers individual beliefs about the certainty of knowledge from items 
referring to the general applicability of moral rules and to the stability of truth.  
Would individuals respond in the same way if prompted to think about the general 
application of the laws of physics or the stability of biological knowledge? The 
results of this study suggest that this might not be the case, questioning the validity of 
the constructs assessed with these instruments. 
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Hammer and Elby (2002) also challenged the assumption of epistemic 
consistency and argued for a change in the way researchers conceptualize the nature 
of personal epistemology.  They too highlighted the role that context plays in the 
activation of different (epistemic) resources.  For example, they observed that, if 
asked how they know about what will be served for dinner, children may answer that 
they know it because their mom told them so; in so doing, they seem to access the 
idea of “knowledge as propagated stuff.”  However, if asked how they came up with a 
certain story or game, they may say that they “made it up,” suggesting the referenc  
to the idea of “knowledge as free creation.”  The results of this study support the 
hypothesis that individuals can access different ideas about the nature of knowledge 
and knowing and that contexts and tasks influence what idea will be manifested. 
In regard to pedagogical practice, these findings highlight the importance hat 
student prior experiences, tasks choices, and examples or metaphors discussed in 
class may have for the development of epistemic beliefs.  In other words, although 
being mostly correlational in nature, research has usually tended to interpret study 
results in terms of the role that epistemic beliefs may have on how students perform 
on specific cognitive tasks (e.g., text processing; development of arguments).  The 
results of this study highlight the influence that exposure (or lack thereof) to certain 
problems and tasks may have on the development of epistemic beliefs.  Hence, 
acknowledging and critiquing students’ prior ideas and exposing students to the 
problems and practices typical of a certain domain of study become crucial for the 
development of epistemic beliefs compatible with the generation of knowledge in that 
domain.   
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The mere comparison of conflicting sources does not seem to foster the 
development of those criterialist beliefs that tend to characterize experts in history.  
Whenever such activities are not situated within a learning experience in which 
disciplinary criteria are explicitly taught and discussed, individuals tend to rely on 
everyday criteria (e.g., majority rule; reliance on unchecked prior knowledge) that fall 
short of enabling them to build meaningful knowledge in this domain. In this respect, 
acknowledging the role that contexts and tasks play in what kind of epistemic beliefs 
will be more easily prompted might shed some light to why this may be the case.  
Historians’ investigations involve much more than comparing and contrasting 
sources.  Although a serendipitous finding may sometimes prompt a new 
investigation, the historian’s question deeply informs the research process without 
discounting the influence that the results may have on the direction of the inquiry.  
Thus, if students are not helped to recognize that historical knowledge is generated 
not only because of new findings but also because of new questions being asked (an 
experience shared by historians), it will be very unlikely that they become able to 
fully value the subjective aspect of historical knowledge without, at the same time, 
getting stuck in a naïve, helpless relativism.   
Unfortunately, students are often required to produce answers on the basis of 
given data, but they are rarely asked to generate questions.  Specifically, class 
observations and analyses of teachers’ interviews showed that students engaged 
mostly in tasks that did not require a view of historical knowledge as generat d 
through a dynamic relation between a knower and the archive.  They focused 
alternatively on the interpretive aspect of history (e.g., point of views) or on the 
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analysis of sources (e.g., understanding subtext, identifying the author) and gathering 
of “information”.   
When the interpretive component was addressed, the task mainly solicited the 
opinion of the students; to respond to this kind of tasks, multiplist beliefs may be 
adaptive.  Conversely, when the “evidence” component was addressed, the task 
usually presupposed a fixed answer, which the students had to identify in the source 
or that they had to remember from prior readings and lectures; in this case, reali t 
beliefs may serve the students well.   
Since epistemic beliefs were rarely openly addressed, students could entertain 
sets of inconsistent beliefs without feeling the need to come to a more integrated 
epistemic position.  In this respect, for a few students like Juliet and Chris, the 
structured interviews and the work on the CRT tasks seemed to set off the need for 
such change, potentially transforming observational tools into intervention 
instruments.  More generally, these instances indicate that prompting students to think
about epistemological issues may affect their beliefs.  In fact, in several cases, once 
prompted to reflect on the interpretive nature of history, students and teachers tended 
to move toward subjectivist positions.  At the same time, Juliet’s case indicates th , 
although change of specific epistemic beliefs may be stimulated quite easily by their 
direct discussion, the shift to a new epistemic stance probably requires repeated and 
purposefully designed exposure to these ideas and occasions to consider their 
implications for one’s overall beliefs system. 
In line with findings from the conceptual change and persuasion literature 
(Alexander, Murphy, Buehl, & Sperl, 1998; Chinn & Brewer, 1993), interventions 
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aiming at fostering epistemic change need to address prior ideas that may hinder 
epistemic development and provide convincing alternative ways of thinking about the 
issues that students perceive as problematic (e.g., need to rely on eyewitnesses’ 
accounts and awareness that they may not tell the truth).  Failure to do so might likely 
result in students espousing conflicting ideas, an occurrence that I found reflected in 
several utterances coded as TR1.  In this respect, the descriptions of key ideas 
characterizing different epistemic positions offered by this study may be particularly 
useful for educators that aim at fostering epistemic development.   
Finally, the role that context and task may play in the development of 
epistemic beliefs is also suggested by the differences in the range of and in the 
changes in epistemic beliefs and behaviors indicative of historical thinking.  
Specifically, students tended to differ much more markedly in terms of epistemic 
beliefs than in regard to historical thinking.  Although the statements of the BHQ 
referred to beliefs about the nature of historical knowledge, students referred multiple 
times to out of school occurrences.  Conversely, they tended to refer to tasks and 
strategies acquired in school in working on the CRT tasks.  In other words, it seems 
that a more diversified array of contexts (including out of school contexts) tends to 
play a role in the development of epistemic beliefs, while historical thinking is ma nly 
influenced by what happens within the academic setting, a finding in line with 
research exploring the influence of sociocultural factors on epistemic beliefs (Tabak 
& Weinstock, 2008).   
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Ideas Hindering Historical Thinking 
In examining the epistemic ideas voiced by the participants in this study and 
their written responses to the CRTs, I found that the results confirm and extend the 
progression proposed by Lee and Shemilt (2003); specifically, the idea of evidence as 
granting direct access to the past, the identification of evidence with informati n, the 
issue of witnesses’ reliability and the consequent necessity of coming to an 
understanding by putting together the most convincing pieces of their testimonies, 
and the helplessness in front of irremediably biased sources that justifies the view of
history as opinion.   
The results of the study also indicate that the relation between history specific 
epistemic beliefs and historical thinking is a complex one.  On one hand, some 
students seemed to progress differently in terms of epistemic beliefs and historical 
thinking.  For example, in discussing the statements of the BQH, most of them 
acknowledged the subjective component of historical knowledge, yet, while working 
on the CRT tasks, only rarely did they seem to be aware that texts have authors.  
More generally, as discussed in the prior section, the range of their beliefs was 
broader and the changes more evident and varied than their behaviors in terms of 
historical thinking.  The different context in which students were used to encounter 
these ideas and tasks may contribute to explain this difference.   
Teachers’ data further caution from assuming a neat parallelism between 
progression in epistemic beliefs and in historical thinking.  For example, in working 
on the CRT task, Ellen demonstrated several traits that typify historical thinking; 
confronted with a specific task, she was able to use the sources provided to build 
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evidence.  Yet, this approach did not completely align with the rationalization of 
historical knowledge that Ellen provided during the structured interview.  By contrast, 
Danielle often voiced criterialist beliefs, but seemed unable to fully take advantage of 
those criteria in working on the CRT task.  At the same time, Danielle demonstrated 
being capable of identifying and using primary sources to build the historical 
narratives that she shared with her students during her lectures.   
These occurrences suggest that full consistency not only across beliefs but 
also between epistemic beliefs and their implication for generating historical 
knowledge remains a mark of expertise.  They also support the hypothesis that 
context plays a role in the activation of epistemic resources (Louca et al., 2004).  
Thus, the beliefs that individuals verbalize while pondering hypothetical situations 
may not necessarily be the same that guide their thinking when confronted by specific 
tasks.  Measurement issues aside, the low amount of variance usually explained by 
epistemological variables in terms of various learning outcomes may further support 
this hypothesis (Wood & Kardash, 2002).    
On the other hand, the majority of the epistemic beliefs voiced by the 
participants in this study seem congruent with the ideas that shaped their ability (or 
lack thereof) of thinking historically while they completed the CRTs.  The rest of this 
section will specifically discuss these ideas, since they appeared to influence, and 
often hinder, students’ ability to think historically.    
The first of these ideas regards the conceptualization of texts as 
communications from an author.  In terms of historical thinking, such 
conceptualization prompted Chris’s revision of his interpretation of the document 
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authored by Mark Twain and encouraged Mark’s considerations of different 
perspectives.  I also found that it was triggered for Monica when the text was written 
in first person.  Conversely, lack of such awareness was at the root of using 
references merely for answering ad hoc questions.  The idea of an authorless text is 
congruent with the view of knowing described by the Copier category and also by the 
Transition 1 category, in as much as the historian is conceived as a chronicler (or 
“wannabe” chronicler). 
Epistemologically related to the idea of an authorless text and similarly 
problematic is the conceptualization of historical fact as something established 
independently from a historian, or of text as information.  Approached in this way, 
texts are not invitations to participate in a conversation, but, at best, they are tickets to 
a lecture.  The prevalence of copier and transition 1 beliefs among the participants 
may thus explain why students appeared overall passive in front of the texts they read 
while working on the CRTs.  Their behavior strongly resembles what was described 
by Penrose and Geisler (1994) in a study comparing college freshmen, Janet, and a 
graduate student, Roger.  Asked to write a paper summarizing and explaining 
different views of paternalism after having read a set of diverse contributions on the 
topic, these researchers noted that, similarly to the students in this study, Janet rarely 
referred to the authors of the texts, read the texts as together making up a single
source of information, and saw her task as one of extracting true facts from the texts, 
although, in her case, several of the texts presented their claims in argumentative 
form.  Although reflective and able to state her stance on the topic of the readings, 
Janet didn’t ascribe to herself any kind of authority in testing the authors’ claims; she 
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faced the texts as an outsider and was therefore very uncomfortable when confro ted 
by disagreement among the authors.  Again, similarly to several students in this study, 
her strategies to face conflict comprised reporting the different views, borrowing one 
of the stances available, or dropping those aspects of the issue for which she was 
unable to reach a determination about the “correct” position. 
Another idea that emerged when analyzing the data is a conceptualization of 
opinion as personal belief devoid of any grounding in evidence.  A characteristic of 
the Subjectivist category of epistemic beliefs, this idea was also preent in Transition 
1 (TR1), whenever the remnants of the past became debatable or problematic.  From 
the historical thinking point of view, this idea may legitimate the intrusion of external 
elements in the form of unhelpful elaboration of the texts that I found quite often and 
interpreted as instances of Historical Thinking No (HTno).  This idea may also foster 
a distorted conceptualization of perspective as inherently biased and thus favor an 
attitude of generalized suspicion that may at times be mistaken and encouraged as  
critical stance (Wineburg, 2007).  Taken together, an authorless view of text and a 
dichotomous view of knowledge as either fact or opinion seem congruent with the 
Cut and Paste approach that I observed so often across participant students and that 
misses the mark of historical thinking in so many respects. 
Finally, the lack of powerful heuristics and of reading strategies appropriate 
for dealing with multiple texts constrained the ability to think historically even when 
the students demonstrated some instances of beliefs compatible with the criterialist 
stance (e.g., Mark).  I believe that this occurrence highlights the key role that schools 
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are called to play in this respect, as it is quite unlikely that these abilities dev lop 
independently from formal education.    
Conversely, in a few cases, familiarity with some of the heuristics 
characterizing experts’ thinking did not necessarily correlate with views of history 
suggesting expertise.  For example, some students and teachers demonstrated 
understanding of some of the disciplinary tools and criteria for historical inquiry (e.g., 
sourcing and contextualization), but they still seemed to equate history and chronicle.  
They “questioned” the sources to discriminate between facts and opinions and to 
corroborate across them, but I found little evidence that students (and teachers, for the 
most part) were aware of the role that the historian’s question may play in the 
generation of historical knowledge; a result in line with the findings of prior resea ch 
with high-school students and teachers (e.g., Wineburg, 2001a).   
Relations among Teachers’ Variables 
Teachers’ pedagogical practices were overall consistent with their s ated 
goals, which seemed to play a key role in teachers’ decisions.  Ellen strove to make 
history “real” for her students by making them reflect upon the conditions in which 
people lived at a certain time and in a certain place, by showing video clips, and by 
assigning tasks that fostered empathy and contextualization.  Lauren underscored 
connections between events and similarities across time, providing her students with a 
clear narrative, but also integrating it with several anecdotes and particulars.  Danielle 
tried to foster a personal connection between the students and the past and a clear 
awareness that history tends to repeat itself.  She did so by prompting the sharing of 
personal experiences and by highlighting connections across time. 
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Yet, these goals seem often at odds with the nature of historical knowledge as 
perceived by the disciplinary community.  Let’s take, for example, the idea of mking 
history “real,” a goal mentioned in one fashion or another by all teachers.  For 
historians (and this tradition goes as far back as Thucydides) history aims at 
understanding the past and not at reliving it; it does so with the benefit of hindsight 
that comes from living in the present.  Although empathy may keep presentist 
temptations at bay, knowledge of what happened in-between the “real” past and the 
present is bound to affect our perception of the past (Lowenthal, 2000, p. 78).  Even 
an historian like von Ranke, who wrote in his famous preface to the Histories of the 
Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494-1514 that the purpose of his work was “to 
show what actually happened (wie es eigentlich gewesen),” stated in the same preface 
that “[t]he purpose of a historian depends on his point of view” (Stern, 1956/1973, pp. 
55-58).  Even more clearly, Marrou (1954/1988) observed that when it was “real”, 
what we today call “the past” was something different for those who experienc d it.  
For them it was the present, characterized by the same confusion, multiplicity, and 
unintelligibility that characterizes our present (pp. 35-38).           
By comparison, introducing students to the analysis of primary sources 
appears a goal well in line with disciplinary practice.  All participant teachers 
included this goal, often adding that introducing students to the use of primary 
sources was very important for them.  On a personal level, all teachers were also 
interested in historical investigations and had carried out some form of historical 
inquiry in pursuing their personal interests.  Yet, none of them listed the development 
of historical thinking among her goals.  Consistently with the teachers’ stated goals,
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primary sources were mainly mentioned as potential aid for fostering interest, 
personal connections, and, more generally, to convey a sense of the “reality” of 
history.  Several of the practices that teachers used in working with primary source  
were also similar and probably a reflection of the common way in which they 
conceptualized their potential benefit for pedagogical practice.   
Another practice with important pedagogical implications for the development 
of student epistemic cognition in history is the introduction of multiple perspectives 
(through lectures or tasks).  As in the use of primary sources, the goal that teac ers 
explicitly or implicitly tended to achieve shaped the meaning of this practice.  For 
example, all teachers assigned tasks that exposed students to multiple perspectiv s.  
These tasks usually aimed at fostering student ability to take a side and provide 
factual support for their choice; they might also have prompted student analysis and 
elaboration of the texts, and thus facilitated retention of information.  Yet, these tasks 
also introduced the false perception that there are always (and only) two sides of 
every issue.  When illustrating different perspectives (in their lectures or by assigning 
different texts), teachers tended to reinforce this perception by usually bringing to the 
students’ attention only two points of view.  This choice might have been prompted 
by lack of time; yet, it often seemed to become the default way of taking perspective 
into account, an approach again at odds with disciplinary practices.  In addition, it 
fostered a very specific kind of argumentation: dispute. 
Felton (2009) defined dispute as a kind of argumentation whose “goal is to 
win the argument.” In this respect, this kind of arguing is compatible with the goals 
that teachers articulated in explaining the criteria they would use in evaluating student 
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essays and with the conceptualization of perspective as “taking sides” that is 
epitomized by the use of T-charts as graphic organizers for summarizing multiple 
sources.  Yet, once again, this way of thinking is quite contrary to historical thinking 
because it promotes the use of criteria that conflict with the ones that guide the 
generation of historical knowledge.  Felton’s definition aids understanding of how 
teachers’ conceptualization of the role of multiple perspectives in history might have 
influenced their use and their students’ use of evidence.  In disputes, alternative 
claims and evidence that do not serve one’s argument need to be explained away or 
ignored.  From an epistemic point of view, this approach is compatible with beliefs 
often emerging in the interviews and characterizing a transition 1 stance.  On one 
hand, dispute highlights the need of grounding one’s claim in evidence, yet, on the 
other hand, personal opinions decide which evidence should be picked, and which 
discarded.  In terms of historical thinking, it is well illustrated in the Cut and Paste 
approach that so often characterized student performances on the CRT task.   
Yet, as researchers exploring other kinds of argumentations pointed out, 
dispute is far from being the only way of arguing, nor it is necessarily the most 
effective one to address complex issues (Felton, 2009; Kroll, 2005; Makau & Marty, 
2001).  In particular, the latter consideration suggests that dispute is unlikely to foster 
that consideration of the evidence and that process of evaluation particularly desirable 
for thinking historically.  Other approaches to argumentation would seem more 
promising, in this respect.  For example, deliberation focuses on the problem 
addressed, and examines all claims and evidence that pertain to the issue with the 
goal of building a consensus view able to deal with the problem at hand.  Within this 
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approach, claims need to be based on a disciplinary use of evidence, which means 
that claims are advanced and evaluated according to the criteria specific to the 
discipline; a process that seems better aligned with the goals of promoting the 
development of historical thinking and criterialist epistemic beliefs.  It is probably not 
by chance that this was the approach followed by Vansledright (2002) with his fift 
graders.  Although theoretically promising, I did not find evidence of this goal (nor of 
this practice) in these case studies and thus, I cannot test this hypothesis, which I need 
to defer to future research.   
The instance that teachers differed in several respects, including their 
epistemic beliefs and their ability of thinking historically as demonstrated on the CRT 
task, suggests that the school-system—the one in which the teachers worked, but also 
their prior and, in the case of Lauren, current experiences as learners—may be a 
strong influence in the development of these ideas.  In this respect, Lauren offerd the 
clearest example.  Although she was aware of the interpretive nature of history, a  
demonstrated during her evaluation of the BHQ’s statements, history became a fixed 
narrative in the high-school classroom context and she did not mind to concentrate on 
the “bare bones” of factual information.  In Lauren’s specific case, it is also possible 
that this impression was corroborated by the style used in her graduate history 
program.  This sort of “epistemic double standard” is not new in the literature and has 
been reported both in the sciences and in history (Hartzler-Miller, 2001; Kang & 
Wallace, 2004; Laplante, 1996).  The fact that all teachers tended to focus more 
squarely on substantive knowledge toward the end of the semester also lends support 
to this hypothesis. 
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Yet, considered in its entirety and in comparison to Ellen’s and Danielle’s 
data, Lauren’s interview suggests an additional factor that might strengthen the 
influence of context.  Specifically, in evaluating the BHQ’s statements, Lauren 
acknowledged the interpretive nature of history and the role of evidence, but she also 
showed an overall lack of clarity about how the historical method could facilitate the 
integration between objective and subjective aspects of historical knowledge.  
Performance on the CRT also suggested the lack of such method.  Similarly to many 
students, Lauren approached the documents as independent texts.  Thus her prior, 
unchecked knowledge became the main interpretive tool for picking and choosing 
among the “information” offered by the texts.  It is in this situation (shared by many 
novices) that the perception of knowledge favored by the specific context (generated 
vs. transmitted) comes to play a major role in determining what view of knowledge 
gets activated (Louca et al., 2004).  Danielle also seemed to refer to different vi ws of 
historical knowledge, according to whether she was the reader of somebody else’s 
historical accounts or whether she was the historical inquirer. 
Finally, teachers’ responses to the interest questionnaire also suggest that 
teachers perceived themselves more as consumers of histories written by others than 
as participants in its construction.  In this respect, Ellen was an exception, reporting a 
relatively high degree of involvement also in activities that presupposed active
participation in the process of historical inquiry.  In particular, she was the only 
teacher who perceived herself as serving as a historical authority or resource very 
often, thus challenging the separation between history as a discipline practiced by 
professional historians and history as subject matter taught in schools.  Her freedom 
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in sharing her point of views on the topic examined in class may be a reflection of 
this understanding.  Yet, Ellen’s overall attitude toward history and her capacity to 
think historically were not enough to make her give priority to the development of 
historical thinking in her goals and in her pedagogical practice.  When I asked her 
about the degree of freedom or the constraints she felt in her practice, she mentioned 
the need of “playing catch up” with other classes, which apparently were ahead in 
terms of “coverage”:  
So, the huge constraint is, right now, I should be probably in the 1920s and 
getting into the Great Depression and the New Deal; and we are racing now 
to get to the ‘20s.  We are trying now to do WWI in two days: “Hey, sum it up, 
four years of war, two days, we can do it”’ [laughing].   
At the same time, Ellen was also willing to take her time and slow down with 
her plans if she had the impression that her students looked lost or uninterested, 
because it was very important to her that “the kids are getting it.”  Yet, for Ellen, 
“getting it,” meant  
that they are making the connections, that they understand what I am saying, 
that I am presenting it clear enough for them to understand.  That something 
clicked inside and they are going: “Oh, I’m getting it now, I see why the U.S. 
did this,’ or ‘I see what was happening and I understand that there are 
problems in Europe, to put it mildly, that’s why the whole idea of nationalism 
and the fact that it became having alliances that could support each other.” 
That they can make those connections: that if your friend gets attacked, you 
are gonna go after the person who attacked your friend.  
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Her sensitivity toward the specific needs of her students notwithstanding, also in 
Ellen’s case the main goal remained expressed in terms of internalizing someone 
else’s story.   
Overall, the results strongly suggest that the goals that teachers set and 
especially the way in which they conceptualized them played a major role in the 
decisions they made and in the pedagogical meaning they attributed to specific tasks.  
School-system’s specific constraints aside, the way in which teachers conceptualized 
the nature and the justification of historical knowledge, but, more precisely, of history 
as a subject matter taught in schools seemed to be a major influence in teachers’ goal 
setting.  I will further discuss this connection in the next section, in the context of the
relations between teachers’ practices and students’ epistemic development.  
Relations among Teachers’ Practices, Students’ Epistemic Beliefs, and Students’ 
Capacity to Think Historically 
On one hand, the analyses of the findings suggest that the history classroom 
played an important role in shaping some of these students’ epistemic beliefs and 
their approach to the study of the past.  In the following sections, I identify a few of 
these ideas and attitudes and suggest potential connections with practices I observed 
in these classrooms.  Table 5.1 summarizes a few of these connections and compares 
ideas emerged in the context of these three classes with ideas widely shared by th  
disciplinary community.  On the other hand, the same analyses also indicate that other 
contexts, beside the school, may play an influential role, especially in regard to the 
development of epistemic beliefs.  For example, students referred to what they 




Relations between Pedagogical Practices and Teachers’ and Students’ Ideas about History and Its Justifications—Comparisons with 
Experts  
 
 Teachers’ Beliefs and 
Criteria 
Pedagogical Practices Students’ Beliefs and 
Criteria 
Experts’ Beliefs and 
Criteria 
     
Purpose of history History makes the past 
“real”.  
Use primary sources or 
videos of those “who were 
there”. 
Seeing is believing  
Videos and technology  
“produce” historical 
knowledge 
Primary sources can show 
the past. 
 
Understanding the past with 
the benefit of hindsight. 
The content of 
historical knowledge 
History makes connections 
across time (“rescuing” the 
best narrative)  
Transmission of a single, 
clean narrative through 
lectures, recitation, notes, 
graphic organizers. 
Questions as rhetorical (or 
rehearsing) devices. 
“Being good” at history 
means knowing information 
about the past and learning 
logical connections among 
events 
Understanding complex 
relations of cause and effect, 
continuity and change 
(multiple narratives). 
Questions as springboard and 





History is in the sources; 
the problem lies in 
interpreting them well. 
Identification of perspective 
and subtext to discriminate 
between facts (to be 
retained) and opinions (to 
be discarded). 
Once a narrative has been 
derived, the problem is that 
students “get it”. 
Texts are perceived as 
authorless. Surface level 
reading strategies are used 
to get at the “information” 
or at the main idea. 
Information from different 
sources can simply be 
pasted together. 
Eventually, subtext is used 
to identify and reject biased 
sources. 
 
History begins with a 
question (asked in the 
present), addressed through 
the remnants of the past, and 
is generated through the 
reciprocal influence of the 






Arguments are decided a-
priori and evidence is 
selected to buttress them. 
Argumentation as dispute. 
Perspective is equated to 
taking a side (usually 
between two different ones). 
Reliance on unchecked 
prior knowledge. 
Majority rule. 
Arguments are framed after 
critical evaluation of all the 




Inasmuch as possible, prior 
beliefs are suspended while 
the historian “listens” to the 
source. 
Singularity in perspective is a 
value and not a reason for 
dismissal. 
 
Reliability Reliability is an intrinsic 
property of a source. 
Discriminate between 
biased and unbiased 
sources. 
Take sides – T-charts. 
Reference to unchecked 
prior knowledge or 
authority to evaluate the 
credibility of a source. 
Dismissal of sources 
perceived as difficult, 
biased, or expressing a view 
not compatible with the 
majority of sources. 
 
Reliability established in 





discussions about the validity and certainty of knowledge within their families, in 
connection with cultural and religious issues.  The design of the study does not allow 
me to deepen further this (fascinating) line of inquiry; the following considerations 
are thus limited to the context of the history classroom. 
Seeing is believing.  In expressing the idea that history and the past coincided, 
several students concluded that evidence was generated directly by some remnants of 
the past, leaving no role to the knower.  In these cases, they especially referred to 
videos and the potential role of technology in providing a seemingly inexhaustible 
flow of evidence, able to show us the past.  This belief might have been prompted by 
prior experiences, both in and out of school; in fact, together with videos, students 
cited dinosaur bones and Egyptian mummies.  Yet, videos, pictures, and texts were 
used in the classes that I observed to convey a narrative that was left unchallenged.  
More or less explicitly, these media were also treated as a primary source that did not 
need any interpretation.   
To be sure, Ellen, Lauren, and Danielle used videos in their respective classes
in a different way and with a different frequency (e.g., Ellen tended to sparingly use 
short video clips, while Lauren and Danielle tended to show long sections of 
documentaries and, in some cases, an entire episode).  Yet, for the most part, these 
media were treated as conveyors of information.  The questionnaires (or list of facts) 
that students were asked to complete while watching documentaries are an example 
of this approach.  In addition, during lectures, primary sources tended to be used to 
illustrate (prove?) a narrative.  Numerous activities and tasks asked students to use 
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primary and secondary sources (quite indifferently) to extract information, or rehea se 
information.   
Although with different tones, all teachers expressed a desire to make the past 
meaningful for their students and saw in the introduction of primary sources a 
potential venue “to make it real” for them.  This approach may have fostered the 
ability of the students to contextualize their thinking, as exemplified by their 
responses to tasks that asked them to imagine the conditions of a particular individual 
at a particular time and place (e.g., write a letter home, describing your homestead on 
the prairie).  Yet, it also reinforced epistemic beliefs that were not conducive to 
thinking historically, as the student performance on the CRT tasks illustrated (e.g., 
taking potential documentary evidence at face value; extract and link together 
snippets of texts). 
Bias.  During the structured interviews, students often referred to the 
possibility that sources were biased and witnesses and historians may be biased. 
They endowed this word with a morally negative connotation and tended to associate 
its presence with the impossibility of knowing the past as it really was.  More
generally, students were often unable to assign a positive role to the knower in the 
generation of knowledge and generally clung to the belief that, ideally, truth should 
be reached with no mediation (“the facts”).  Further, they tended to oscillate betwen 
a conception of an absolutely passive knower (e.g., by taking authorless texts at heir 
face value) and a conception of knower as arbitrarily subjective (e.g., by constructing 
answers based on first impressions, unchecked prior beliefs, and free elaborations).   
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A misconceived understanding of the issue of perspective seemed to play a 
fundamental role in this struggle.  The words bias and perspective (or points of view) 
were often used as synonyms in the classes that I observed.  Similarly, facts and 
opinions were presented as dichotomous terms.  When different accounts were 
compared, the problem tended to be cast in terms of identifying the less biased and 
thus “better” source (e.g., comparison between two historians’ account about the 
Pullman Strike, in Danielle’s class).  Finally, respect for student opinions tended to 
mean granting a space free from the need of providing warrants for one’s reasoning 
(e.g., discussion about the war in Iraq, in Lauren’s class). 
From an epistemic point of view, talking about bias as a necessary evil (at 
best) or as an evil tout court (at worst) implies the idea that knowledge should be 
somehow impersonal, a position well compatible with the two stances (Copier and 
Transition 1) that emerged as prevalent across the student participants.  Similarly, 
stressing the dichotomy between facts and opinions implies the existence of some 
core knowledge independent from any knower, an epistemic position that likely leads 
to a cognitive impasse whenever the sources at one’s disposal are eventually 
perceived as biased.   
Authorless texts.  In terms of building understanding, students mainly treated 
the texts they encountered as authorless data banks.  Although they sometimes used 
personal pronouns (e.g., he or they) in paraphrasing their content or even when they 
questioned repeatedly the trustworthiness of the documents, they seemed to lack 
appropriate, domain-specific heuristics, such as sourcing and corroborating, to 
address the questions they raised.   
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This attitude toward text is especially problematic in history, because most 
testimonies about the past come in the form of written texts and the outcome of 
historical inquiry is usually conveyed in writing, too.  Thus, considering the content 
of a historical account detached from its author impeded the possibility of evaluating 
it critically and thus using it for building knowledge and understanding.  Yet, when 
compared to the tasks and activities that students performed in their classes, their 
overall attitude toward texts is not surprising.   
In most cases, students were asked to read texts with the purpose of gaining 
information, “getting the content,” or otherwise “covering” the topics in the 
curriculum.  In the junior classes, teachers expected students to read the texts quickly 
and to find answers to questions in a short amount of time.  In the freshmen class, 
additional support was offered.  However, texts tended to be taken at face value and 
the focus was on fostering the acquisition of various strategies to gather, connect, and 
elaborate information from texts.  To be sure, teachers sometimes asked students to 
analyze a particular source (e.g., using the APPARTS strategy, in Danielle’s class).  
Yet, the impact that these analyses might have had on the overall understanding of the 
content of the source was not made explicit.  Conversely, the overwhelming 
preponderance of class discourse implied a view of texts as conveyors of information, 
a view repeatedly reinforced by the assignments that students completed and by the 
kind of historical knowledge assessed by quizzes and tests.   
Reduced heuristics.  Considering the little practice students had in 
investigating historical questions on the basis of multiple texts, I was impressed by 
the effort that most students were willing to place in struggling with the texts
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provided for the CRT tasks.  In a few cases, they also demonstrated to be mindful of 
the context in which the events took place, a result that I found encouraging, 
considering that teachers dedicated a particular attention to fostering this attitude.  
Yet, an overall shallow conceptualization of the heuristics that can aid historical 
inquiry prevented students from gaining a full understanding of these texts.  For 
example, most students demonstrated to be aware of the “information” provided by 
the various parts of a reference, probably because, when reading primary sources in 
class, they were often prompted to report in their analysis worksheet the name of the 
author.  However, despite the good intentions of their teachers in introducing primary 
sources in the curriculum, for these students considering the source of a text fulfilled 
mainly the function to fill in a column in a worksheet.   
In few cases, knowledge of an author affected student interpretation of a 
specific text.  Yet, even when students questioned the trustworthiness of texts (e.g., 
Mark), they remained for the most part unable to use the clues contained in the 
references to address these issues and to move beyond a straight acceptance or 
rejection of an entire text (e.g., Chris).  A possible justification of this behavior was 
suggested by Mark, who, alone among these participants, during the think aloud kept 
questioning how these authors knew what they were affirming in the documents.  
Once he completed the task, I asked him why, although he kept posing these 
questions about the trustworthiness of the documents, he never looked at the 
references.  Here is his answer: 
I don’t know, there is really never an emphasis placed on checking your 
sources, because in high school there is a textbook.  Obviously, I mean, once 
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in a while you run across a teacher that says maybe the textbook is wrong, but 
that’s still a maybe, so… 
Students also demonstrated to be aware of the need of comparing different 
texts.  However, applied as single strategies, without students’ understanding of their 
role in fostering historical understanding on the basis of multiple texts, these 
procedures bore little resemblance to the sourcing and corroboration used by more 
competent or expert historical thinkers.  Rather, these strategies became useful only to 
answer ad hoc questions on tasks that specifically directed students to date or to name 
the author of a source, or asked to compare and contrast the information provided by 
different texts (e.g., Eric).  As prior research pointed out (e.g., Wineburg, 2001b), 
students seemed to expect that the answer to the question proposed by the task would 
emerge directly from the texts and not from the interaction between their questions 
and the texts.   
Students also approached the reading of these texts as a set of independent 
sources, adding (at best) what they understood from one source to what they 
understood from another, but failing to read them as multiple texts (Afflerbach & 
Cho, 2009).  To be sure, they interpreted these texts in light of ideas and prior 
understandings, which, often left unchecked, did not prove especially helpful.  Yet, 
students did not bring to bear understandings built while reading one of the 
documents on the reading of another text.  Thus, as a result of comparing and 
contrasting these texts, they needed to leave some parts out in order to build a 
common story (or remained unable to build a story, as Mark’s second CRT 
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illustrated).  With the exception of Ellen, teachers also seemed to use a similar
approach in completing the CRT task.   
This approach is compatible to the way in which students used multiple 
sources in class to address a specific question.  In these cases, teachers tnded to 
divide them in groups and used a jigsaw approach.  As a result, each student read only 
one of the sources and relied on the report of other students to complete the task.  
Despite teachers asking students to talk to each other and share their understanding  
of the source assigned to them, most of the time students simply copied from each 
other the conclusion that each one of them drew after reading a specific source.  The 
structure provided by the worksheets that usually accompanied these kinds of tasks 
seemed to hinder an actual corroboration of the sources, because students tended to 
focus on filling in the boxes, rather than carefully reading and comparing the tex s.  
In addition, even when students were exposed to multiple perspectives and 
guided in the analysis of primary sources, they were not prompted to reflect on the 
meaning of these experiences.  In other words, metacognitive awareness was rarely 
modeled or prompted, an approach in stark contrast with what suggested in the 
literature as promoting epistemic development and fostering historical thinking (Bain, 
2000; Elby, 2001)  
Cutting, pasting, and adding.  In completing the CRT tasks, students felt 
quite free to retain certain parts of the texts and ignore others, while adding 
elaborations and bits of unchecked prior beliefs.  The difference between this 
approach and the historical method is abysmal.  However, students reported that they 
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applied this heuristic to complete similar tasks assigned in school and achieved 
success.   
Why was this the case, when, with the exception of Lauren, participant 
teachers approached the CRT task very differently? One reason might have been 
embedded in the curriculum implemented in the school system in which I conducted 
the study.  Although none of the classes that participated in the study were AP 
classes, one of the major goals of this school system was preparing students to take 
AP US History courses.  Thus, the skills needed to successfully complete the AP 
classes were fostered throughout the curriculum (hence, the push for introducing 
primary sources).  Unfortunately, the guidelines for completing the Document Based 
Question in the US History AP Exam seem to foster the approach to the texts that 
emerged from the data  In fact, in this test, students are required to demonstrate thei  
knowledge of the topic beyond what can be gathered from the documents provided 
and they are not required to use all the sources in their answer (nor to justify why they 
chose to ignore some of them).   
Moreover, in their daily experience, students were often encouraged to make 
connections to their prior knowledge and to make guesses (about the content of a text, 
about what they will read in the next paragraph or section, about “what will happen” 
in the narrative).  These strategies were usually taught and reinforced with the 
purpose of educating active readers and learners and to foster logical inferenci g.  
The results of this study suggest that adolescents quite naturally made connections 
with what they knew and what they were.  However, not all connections acted as 
facilitators, nor was particularly helpful that students had been previously exposed to 
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a certain topic or period (e.g., the Middle Ages or the colonization of the Americas).  
As suggested by former studies, students’ prior historical narratives tended to act as 
decoders and encoders of new knowledge (Létourneau & Moisan, 2004).  Thus, when 
prior understandings were left unchecked, they gravely hindered the learning 
experience, as several examples included in the section describing Historical 
Thinking No illustrated. 
Questioning.  Though students clearly addressed the questions asked by the 
CRT tasks, the role that these questions played in shaping the reading of the 
documents seemed significantly different from the one that historical questions play 
in the work of experts.  Specifically, the interplay between the original historical 
question and the texts, interplay that, in the case of historians, tends to generate 
further questions that may broaden, qualify, or refine the search was missing in the 
case of the students.  Instead of a springboard, students seemed to use the question as 
a sieve, to sift useful from useless or confusing information.  A profound difference 
between historians’ and students’ experiences may contribute to these results.  
Historians usually set for themselves what questions to investigate and so it is n t 
surprising that awareness of the goal of their inquiry permeates their reading of the 
texts.  Although they may be assigned a specific question for the purposes of a study
(Wineburg, 2001c), historians bring to the task the experience gained in their 
professional career.  In their classes, students more typically addressed hearsal or 
comprehension questions that often presupposed a specific answer buried in the texts.  
The way in which participants addressed the questions in the CRTs seemed in line 
with this kind of prior experiences. 
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Epistemic responsibility.  In responding to the BHQ statements, several 
students expressed discomfort in facing the possibility of being unable to reach a 
single, full knowledge of the past.  Often, they clung to the idea that, with enough 
effort and perhaps a bit of luck, historians could “discover” the past.  In addition, 
although they were quick in acknowledging the existence of different points of view 
and bias, students rarely expressed the idea that historical questions often do not 
regard matter of facts (when something happened, who did it, and so on), but issues 
of interpretation and identification of trends, causes, and significance. 
In their classes, the latter kind of questions was often addressed in lectures and 
in readings from the textbooks.  In these cases, students were expected to take notes, 
understand the relations identified by their teachers or their textbooks, and be able to 
reproduce them in some form or another.  For the most part, their role was passive, 
and very much in line with the attitude characterizing the good consumers’ approach 
described by VanSledright (2008) as one of the mark of school history courses 
dedicated to facilitating the sharing of the young generations into a common 
collective memory of the past. 
In addition, several of the questions that they were asked to answer in their 
homework or in class were factual, in nature; as Ellen rightly observed, the focus 
tended to be on the “what,” “who,” and “when,” but seldom on the why.  In asking 
students to reflect on the issues examined, teachers mainly required them to be 
mindful of the historical context, but did not expose students to the work of building 
arguments based on evidence.  Thus, the refusal of epistemic responsibility voiced by 
a few students takes on the contours of a coached choice and, as such, becomes more 
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comprehensible: lectures, tests, and exams seemed to establish quite clearly what 
could be considered acceptable historical knowledge.  Why should students take the 






Knowledge of the human being by the human being, history is 
perception of the past through a living, effortful, human thought; it is a 
synthesis, an unbreakable union of subjects and object. To those who 
are concerned or irritated by this necessity, I cannot but repeat: this is 
the human condition and this is its nature. 
(Marrou, 1954/1988) 
 
In this last chapter, I revisit the theoretical model and discuss what relations 
seem to be compatible with the results of this study.  Figure 6 represents the results of 
these understandings.  Then, I propose a few broader questions emerging from this 
overview and suggest a few pedagogical implications in light of these results. 
The results of the study suggest that the relation between teacher epistemic 
beliefs and teacher capacity to think historically is complex.  For example, Ellen 
demonstrated several traits typical of expertise during her performance on th  CRT 
task; yet, analysis of her structured interview suggested, at times, epistemic 
inconsistency.  The opposite seemed to happen in the case of Danielle.  In contrast, 
Lauren’s epistemic beliefs and her performance on the CRT task seemed to fit the 
developmental trajectory identified in the literature (e.g., Lee & Shemilt, 2003).  For 
this reason, I added a question mark to the arrow that links these constructs in Figure 
6.  
In the case of students, I found several relations between their epistemic 
beliefs and their capacity to think historically.  In particular, several of the impasses 



















































 Figure 6: Theoretical Model Revisited 
 
historical knowledge (e.g., the facts speak for themselves) seemed to be rooted in 
practices that hindered their capacity to think historically (e.g., treating texts as 
authorless; sharply discriminating between facts and opinions).  Conversely, their 
epistemic beliefs, although for the most part compatible with their reasoning in 
history, tended to be more diversified and complex.  In addition, even students 
manifesting a higher degree of agreement with statements reflecting a criterialist 
stance during the structured interviews appeared unable to refer to powerful criteria to 
build understanding during the CRT.  This occurrence suggests that agreement with 
several criterialist beliefs, especially when not accompanied by an overall epistemic 
consistency, may be a facilitating, but not sufficient condition to think historically.  
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With this caveat, the double arrow that symbolizes a reciprocal influence betw en 
these constructs is confirmed in Figure 6.  
Teachers’ epistemic beliefs seemed aligned and compatible with teachers’ 
goals; hence, I confirmed the arrow in Figure 6.  Results of the study do not suggest 
that the same was necessarily true for teachers’ capacity to think historically.  For 
example, Ellen’s capacity to think historically was not reflected in her pedagogical 
goals.   
The influence of teachers’ interest was ambiguous.  While class observations 
suggested that teachers’ general interest tended to inform their pedagogical practice 
(e.g., use of preferred documentaries or movies), their differences in terms of 
professional interest did not seem reflected in their goals.  Yet, I found some 
moderate indication that teachers’ professional interests might have influenced their 
ability to think historically, a result in line with the expertise literau e (Alexander, 
2003).  After all, compared to the other two teachers, Ellen had the highest score on 
professional interest and had better performance on the CRT task.  The dashed arrows 
signal these tentative, possible relations. 
Teachers’ goals emerged as the variable that most directly influenced 
teachers’ pedagogical practice.  What factors may have contributed to the 
development of these teachers’ goal structure?  When explicitly asked about 
constraints that they felt in their practice, teachers often mentioned factors related to 
the school system’s context (symbolized by the light blue oval in Figure 6), such a 
issues of curriculum coverage, pacing guides and testing, and priorities given to push 
students into AP classes  In the case of Ellen, the composition of her class (i.e., 
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freshmen who had been signaled by their middle school as challenged readers) aimed 
at postponing the State’s government assessment for these students.   
However, these more evident constraints may be only part of the story, 
because these three teachers demonstrated different sensitivities to th ir influence.  
For example, while Lauren and Danielle tried hard to follow the pacing guide, Ellen 
was willing to take the responsibility to sacrifice “coverage” in order to provide her 
students the time they needed to master a certain topic.  Yet, for all three teach rs, the 
final result in terms of goals was not historical thinking, but, as Ellen’s put it, “ge ting 
it,” which meant that students understood and remembered the connections among 
ideas and events emphasized in the narratives presented in class.   
In this respect, I believe that the culture of the school-system at large pl yed 
an even more influential role on teachers’ goals than its specific constraint .  In 
particular, I believe that system’s culture constrained teachers’ conceptualizations of 
what history in schools might look like, even in the case of teachers that had a few 
insights into disciplinary history.  The language used by teachers was telling in this 
respect.  Even when lamenting external constraints, they still framed the problm in 
terms of breadth of coverage (e.g., need “to do” WWI in two days), not in terms of 
the kind of thinking that the extant curriculum tended to foster.  To be sure, teachers 
would have preferred to have more time to delve deeper into fewer historical issues;
yet, for what purpose?   
In respect to the purpose of history in the curriculum, controversy abounds 
even within the research community and, in a way, it is fostered by the very nature 
and power of historical knowledge (e.g., Miller, 2010; Seixas, 2000; VanSledright, 
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2008).  Should history be used to foster a specific sense of identity?  Should it be used 
to foster social justice?  Although supporters of these two approaches tend to 
sympathize with different sides of the political spectrum, the views of history implied 
by these purposes may be more similar than it appears.  Deeply engrained in 
American public education, the echo of this conceptualization of history often 
surfaced in this study participants’ responses.  Dewey (1916, p. 210) epitomized it in 
Democracy and Education:   
[H]istory as a formulated study is but the body of known facts about the 
activities and sufferings of the social groups with which our own lives are 
continuous, and through reference to which our own customs and institutions 
are illuminated. 
Few would dispute that developing students’ identity and fostering social 
justice are worthy educational goals.  However, translating these goals int  practice 
turns out to be very problematic.  For example, in an increasingly multicultural 
society, the groups with which students’ lives are continuous may be widely different.  
Should curricula try to “cover” them all, while keeping an eye on the traditional 
narrative, which may illuminate our own customs and institutions?  Unfortunately, 
this seems the road that school-systems often choose to take, although the percentage 
of students who reach a proficient “understanding of the development of America’s 
democratic institutions and ideals” (as measured by the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress U.S. history assessment) continues to remain very low, reaching 
its minimum in 12th grade (Lee & Weiss, 2007).   
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Moreover, and in my view more importantly, should students be cajoled into 
believing that history is “the body of known facts” that someone has selected, albeit 
in the pursuit of laudable goals, as worthy of their learning?  Is the epistemic 
inconsistency that often ensues less detrimental for a democratic citizenry tha  the 
lack of familiarity with often abstract notions of democratic institutions and ideals?   
This study illustrated how this pedagogical and epistemic choice implies heavy
cognitive costs.  In particular, it fosters ideas and habits of mind that actively h nder 
students’ capacity to think historically, impedes historical understanding, and 
hampers the development of epistemic beliefs that correlate to important components 
of critical thinking.  In summary, it seems to me that students do not adequately learn 
what the educational system envisions as the “right facts” while, at the same time, 
they fail to develop those cognitive tools and criteria that might enable them to 
participate in the historical discourse as actors and critical readers.  
Similar to students, teachers also pay the cost of not being educated in this 
kind of thinking while experiencing the frustration of juggling the demands of 
coverage of increasingly long curricula, of bearing the lack of interest and 
understanding that often characterize the climate of their classrooms, and of 
witnessing the failure of several of their students.  The fact that these ar  the 
outcomes of a system financed with public money makes taxpayers also bear the cost 
of such failure since society, as long as it defines itself as a free, democratic society, 
is not served well by a school system unable to educate a critical citizenry.     
Analyses of the reasons that allow this “lose/lose” situation to perpetuate are 
beyond the scope of this study since they would probably require the investigation of 
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whom this state of affairs benefits, an investigation that is not possible with the data 
currently collected.  However, I do believe that the evidence gathered here provides 
educators with several reasons for concern and a few reasons for hope.  Several 
reasons for concern have been detailed in the prior chapters.  Here, I focus on the 
level of influence that the school context and the culture at large (symbolized by the
darker background of Figure 6) may play on students’ epistemic development and on 
their capacity to think historically.   
In terms of historical thinking, school seems to play a determinant role, 
because students were so similar, in this respect.  Hence, it is unlikely that students 
develop the capacity to think historically without a sustained commitment on the part 
of the school system that encourages teachers to focus on this goal (Bain 2000, 2005; 
Husbands, et al., 2003; VanSledright, 2002).  This might be bad news, indeed, since 
the students of today are likely to be tomorrow’s teachers and administrators.  A  
what point should we expect change to take place?  The later we move the target 
(e.g., college education programs or teacher professional development programs) the 
tougher it may be to challenge ideas and cognitive habits reinforced during a life-long 
academic career.  On the other hand, how can someone teach historical thinking 
without having, in turn, being taught to do so?   
In contrast, the larger difference across students I found in terms of epistemic 
beliefs may suggest that the culture at large and the specific culture in which each 
student lives play an important role in epistemic development.  Mark was a very 
telling example in this respect, articulating beliefs that suggested a level of 
competence much greater than his peers. Yet, contemporary culture may not foster 
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epistemic consistency if, as some philosophers claim, multiculturalism is 
characterized by two apparently alternative, but in reality intertwined undercurr nts 
that shape the religious, social, philosophical, and cultural horizon.  On one hand, 
fundamentalism affirms a truth independent from a knower and, on the other hand, 
relativism affirms a knower unable to attain any truth (Esposito, 2008).   
I found an echo of these positions in the participants’ desire to access the past 
“as it really was.”  Historiographers are familiar with this attempt and some may 
interpret it as the mark of the positivist school and perhaps dismiss it as epistemic 
naïveté.  Yet, as psychologists, we cannot avoid acknowledging that the desire for 
truth played an important role in these participants’ conceptions of knowledge.  At the
same time, in so doing, participants seemed to consider the knower as the weakest
link, at best, or as an unyielding enemy, at worst, in respect to pursuing this goal.  In 
fact, when voicing ideas typical of the copier stance, participants seemed to wish for a 
direct, unmediated access to the past.  They seemed to hope to discover a repository 
of historical knowledge undefiled by biases and by the inevitable perspective and 
inaccuracies that come with human intervention.  On the other hand, when 
participants acknowledged the inevitability of the human role in the generation of 
knowledge, they were quick in concluding that the knower can never reach a reliable 
knowledge about the past, thus casting the object of historical knowledge in an 
unreachable distance.  Hence, the alternative typical of many utterances I clas ified as 
Transitional was between an absent knower and an unknowable object. 
It is precisely in this respect that I believe that, for its very nature, history, as it 
is defined and practiced within the disciplinary community, may offer a distinct 
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contribution to overcome the cognitive impasses suggested in this study.  In this 
respect, the desire for truth voiced by participants and especially their willingness to 
discuss epistemic issues are, in my view, good news for history educators, because 
they suggest that what history education has to offer addresses a fundamental human 
need.  First, history can clearly (and perhaps even proudly) exemplify the key role 
that human reason is called to play in the generation of knowledge, thus proposing a 
way around both fundamentalism and relativism.  Second, it can show that reason’s 
proper field of application extends well beyond the realm of the so called “exact 
sciences,” as long as it doesn’t self-constrain within the boundaries of mathe atical 
logic.  For this reason, and not for the purpose of training mini-historians, I believe 
that much can be gained by looking at the criteria that historians seem to follow in 
generating historical knowledge, beyond their disagreements about the nature and 
sometimes even the possibility of history.   
As a case in point, let’s consider how historians face one of the impasses that 
most often emerged from this study’s participants.  In reacting to the BHQ’s 
statements, participants were prompted to reflect on the problem of building reliable 
knowledge about the past while having to rely on fallible human witnesses.  When the 
problem was cast as a pursuit of an unattainable “objectivity,” they often concluded 
that history is an impossible enterprise.  Yet, the consideration that knowledge of the 
past is built upon an act of faith in the trustworthiness of the witness (usually 
mediated by a document) does not prevent historical inquiry if, as Marrou 
(1954/1988) argues, such faith is based upon a rational effort.  Far from being an 
arbitrary or irrational act, this effort entails the critical analysis of the documents, 
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illuminated by knowledge of the specific historical context in which they originated 
and of the human being and human life, in general (Marrou, 1954/1988, pp. 119-120). 
Marrou’s rational effort bears the marks of historical thinking, which so often 
emerged in studies of history experts, but was seldom present in their less competent 
counterparts (Wineburg, 2001a).  These attitudes also presuppose a set of beliefs 
compatible with what we have named criterialist stance (Maggioni et al., 2004), to 
highlight the central role that domain-specific criteria play in the epist mic definition 
of historical knowledge.   
Marrou’s reference to “an act of faith” may sound unpalatable or irrational to 
modern tastes.  Yet, daily life is replete of situations in which this method serves us 
well.  When the traffic light turns green, we cross the road, trusting that traffic in the 
opposite direction will not attempt to do the same.  Granted, accidents happen 
because drivers occasionally do cross the road on a red light and, under certain 
conditions, we would do well to be cautious in crossing even on a green light.  Yet, 
should we decide that it is impossible to trust anyone and anything, including our own 
judgment, immobility and paralysis would be the consequence.  Analogously, we may 
decide that human witnesses are all too unreliable and human reason too weak to 
understand anything about the human experience of those that came before us.  
Regrettably, the consequence would be cognitive impasse.  How to decide the best 
course of action or what to believe under conditions of uncertainty is certainly a 
familiar problem in human history and in daily life.  Yet, as Simmias suggested in his 
dialogue with Socrates in Plato’s Phaedo, “the best and most irrefragable of human 
theories” may serve as “the raft” to sustain the quest for knowledge, albeit “not 
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without risk” (trans. 1953, 85).  I believe that the greatness of an educator consists in 
accepting the risk to entrust this raft to her students’ reason and freedom.  
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Evaluation of Students’ Essays 
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EVALUATION OF STUDENT ESSAY 
 
Please take some time to review these papers written by high school students in 
response to the following prompt:  
How and why did technological developments play an important part in 
twentieth century wars?  
As you read through these papers, please grade each essay, and include comments 
that may be useful to the student. 
 
Once you have finished, I will ask you to share your thoughts on the following issues. 
a.   What criteria did you use to grade these papers?  
b.   What is the apparent level of knowledge of this group of students? 
c.   What potential misconceptions and limitations remain in their understandings?  











STUDENT PAPER # 1 
Technological developments were an important part in the twentieth century 
wars, especially in WWII. In WWII, technological developments enabled better war 
weapons and equipment for effective fighting. The British and the U.S. victories and 
experiences with the new technological developments explain to us their effectiv n ss 
and significance in war. The two major areas of technology that has drastically 
developed in WWII are the weapons: aircraft, bombs, and naval vehicles; and 
intelligence devices: radar, and decoding of secret messages. Thus, the technological 
developments played an important role in WWII by creating quicker and efficient 
methods to disable enemies and because they helped in ending the war. 
 The most important area of technology is the weaponry. The new weapons that 
were created during WWII changed the face of the earth. The most impacting 
development was the new air warfare that began in WWII with new aircraft, jets, and 
bombs dropped from the aircraft. WWII began with cavalry, trenches, and old age 
battleships but in about six years, missiles and dangerous aircraft were created. 
Through the development of deadly atomic and biochemical weapons, the U.S. 
created one powerful atomic bomb that would be used to effectively put an end to 
war. When U.S. bombed Hiroshima in Japan, it led to thousands of civilians’ deaths 
as well as the complete surrender of Japan. These deadly aerial bombings were an 
effective way of getting the country’s attention, because so much and so many were 
destroyed. Every country would create better, lighter, more efficient aircraft to fight 
in the air and to effectively target their bombs to the desired regions.  This 
development of the atomic bomb which was effectively used on Hiroshima and 
344 
 
Nagasaki was called the Manhattan Project. These nuclear weapons and the 
development of new aircraft created a new kind of warfare: air warfare.  
In addition to these developments, land vehicles were created to be faster, and 
lighter. For example, between the battle of France and Germany, France had cruiser 
tanks and Germany had light tanks thus enabling Germany to win in “mechanized 
battles”. In addition, Germany’s new Panther tanks helped them in the Battle of 
Kursk. Compared to WWI, there was now better tanks and better organization during 
the war. In addition to air warfare, naval warfare had many newtechnological 
developments also such as new aircraft carriers, that were used in the Battle of the 
Coral Sea and submarines that were all used effectively when Germany used 
submarines to stop U.S. and Canada’s resources from getting to the Allies. During 
these major weapon developments, there were also many electronic devices that were 
created. 
 Another major technological development would be the intelligence and its 
electronics. Prior to the war, electronic devices were not seen as essential, but in 
WWII, they were significant. For example, the air assault on Britain in 1940 by 
Germany, the Germans were unable to get control over the air in the ba tle, because 
the British Royal Air Force was able to fight off the bombers with the help of new 
radar devices that helped them detect the approaching enemy planes. In addition, the 
British intelligence operation, Ultra, was able to break the code of German 
communications device called the enigma which was used for high government 
military officials. Similarly to Britain’s interception, U.S was able to prevent the 
invasion of Midway Island because they were able to decode secret Japanese 
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messages that stated their desired target was Midway, thus the U.S. naval leaders 
were alerted before the Japanese even got there, therefore, making the battle faster 
and easier to deal with. The increase in electronics and increase in computer 
technology all were helpful in many ways to inform countries of the enemies’ 
whereabouts and plans of invasion. 
 Thus, all of these technological developments were useful in helping the countries 
have effective equipment to fight against their enemies. The technological 
advancements of weapons such as tanks, submarines, and atomic bombs, including 
new radar devices and better electronics to detect enemy ships and troops enabled the 
enemies to have a powerful impact during battles as well as quickly bringing an end 
to the war. All of these developments no matter which country, helped v ry country, 
and newer and enhanced technological weaponry and intelligence enabled the Allied 
powers to win after all.  
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STUDENT PAPER #2 
Up to and during the Second World War there were a great many technological 
developments. The advent of these new technologies allowed both for the creation of 
newer, more devastating tactics and practices, increasing the number of deaths on  
scale never before seen, and new healing capabilities that cured numerous otherwi e 
fatal wounds. Tactics that developed out of new technology included Blitzkrieg, 
fighting for the control of airspace, and the bombing of cities. 
From the start of the war, the Germans utilized Blitzkrieg. New or improved 
technologies such as Panzer tanks, motor vehicles, and fighter planes allowed the 
Germans engage in this rapid warfare tactic. Concentrated armor divisions would 
break through enemy lines. They would be followed by mobile troops who penetrated 
enemy territory as far in as possible. All through this thrust, the land units would be 
supported by Dive Bombers. Tom Wintringham in his book The New Ways of 
War(1940) describes the armored and mobile divisions as the “finger-nails” where
“each separate claw seeks a weak spot” in the enemies lines. Other nations such a  
France and Poland anticipated World War I style trench warfare where it had been 
nearly impossible and very costly to break through an enemy’s lines. They were 
totally unprepared. It’s no wonder that Poland was overrun in a month, and France 
surrendered 43 days after the invasion began. Blitzkrieg allowed the Germans to 
overrun large expanses of land in a relatively short span of time. 
The developments in airplane technology had a lot of implications for the war. 
Airspace, like land and water, became strategic to control. Airplanes could be used to 
support advancing troops, sink transports, or drop off troops behind enemy lines. 
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Thus when the Germans had subdued most of Europe and looked to Great Britain, the 
strategic value of planes made it impossible for them to launch an invasion with 
control of the airspace over Britain first. Thus ensued the Battle of Britain, in which 
the British were able to maintain control of the airspace and thus prevent a future 
invasion.  
Airplanes also allowed for the bombing of enemy targets. This had huge 
implications. When attempting to do maximum damage to an enemy both sides found 
it more efficient to bomb the area of a city at night rather than precision bomb during 
the day. This meant that civilians would be targeted on a scale never before seen. In 
London 20,000 citizens died in bombings. The city of Coventry was mostly destroyed 
by German bombing just as Dresden was devastated after the fire bombings by the 
Allies. The Japanese used planes as bombs and attempted to fly into U.S. ship in a 
tactic known as Kamikaze. The most advanced and devastating technology was a 
bomb, the atomic bomb. The United States dropped it on Hiroshima killing 78,000 in 
the blast. Another was dropped on Nagasaki. 
Also there were new and improved weapons. The Germans drove in Panzer tanks 
while the Americans had Sherman tanks. All could unleash carnage like nothing 
before. Infantry arms like the MP40 or M1 Garand were more precise or rapid than 
arms used in previous wars 
All this new technology lead to greater killing. However, there were also 
technologies used to save lives. The widespread use of Penicillin and plasma 
transfusion saved many. Historian R. R. Palmer states that “one of every two of those 
wounded was saved” by the new medical technology. 
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In conclusion, each side used technology as a means to gain an edge, whether it 
meant killing more of the enemy or saving more of their own. Mostly however, 
technology led to death on a larger scale and made World War II the most bloody 
conflict in history. 
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STUDENT PAPER #3 
Twentieth century warfare saw for the first time the massive destruction made 
possible with tanks, airplanes, submarines, and nuclear weapons.  Although tactics 
were always the deciding factor, a battle was seriously tilted towards the more mobile 
and advanced army.  Technology turned World War II into a contest, over which side 
could develop better arms, and put enormous killing power into the hands of ruthless 
and desperate leaders, leading to more barbarism than progress.  
 The battles of World War II were decided most prevalently by the technology of 
the opposing armies.  The Germans were so feared at the start of the war because they 
had the most prepared military at the time.  The Blitzkrieg, lightning fast potent 
attacks at specific points, was a military tactic that originated in World War I’s 
Schileffen Plan but made possibly by the development of the more mobile German 
Panzer tanks and the air force as a supporting and disorienting unit.  The Maginot line 
may have been made up of the sophisticated defenses from the latest developments, 
but the technology was immobile and therefore ineffective when the Germans just 
skirted around the fortifications.  The French were ordered to expand their defenses, 
only to find that the German Panzers had already passed the places they were 
supposed to fortify.  The Germans, however, were foiled at times like in the Battle of 
Britain and in Russia in which the Allied forces had better technology.  The German 
goal in the battle was to destroy the Royal Air Force and the industry behind it, but 
the German’s main fighters (the Me-109 and the Me-110) were operating from fa -
away bases and lacked the range to effectively support the bombers against a well-
equipped air force such as Great Britain’s.  The Royal Air Force’s Supermarine 
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Spitfire could easily shoot down the German bombers, and the Germans had not yet 
developed a heavy bomber to match those of the Allies.  The British has also 
developed a radar system to detect enemy aircraft and therefore could locate the 
German craft as they flew over Britain.  Thus the Germans could not dominate over 
the RAF or properly disrupt the aircraft industry. Throughout the Russian campaign, 
the German equipment was not properly prepared for the harsh Russian weather 
conditions, for German overconfidence believed the invasion would be successfully 
completed before the winter set in.  The Germans had to waste fuel leaving their tanks 
on for twenty four hours a day so that the engines would not be damaged by the cold 
weather.  Their vehicles had wheels as opposed to tracked bottoms and got stuck in 
the mud.  In the battle of Stalingrad, the Russians had the superior tanks, with better 
mobility and firing power, which gave them the advantage in surrounding the German 
Sixth Army.  In fact as the war with Russia progressed, the Russian military improved 
and gained more as Stalin mobilized the economy toward war production in order to 
develop new technologies, such as the Russian tank. 
 Aerial bombing and other technologies made enormous death counts frighteningly 
easy to achieve.  Aerial warfare was fairly new in World War II, but the Germans did 
not waste time in dropping bombs over Allied arms factories and civilian populations.  
The British and the US also fought a psychological war with their aircrafts, 
destroying cities such as Berlin to destroy the morale of the people.  In Dresden, the 
city was obliterated and hundreds of thousands were killed by aerial bombs.  Japan 
used its greatly superior technology to overrun China and brutally conquer its people, 
in the Rape of Nanking where helpless woman were raped and civilians cut down.  
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Germany used the mobility given by railroads and developed the science of killing 
and working the body to death to build highly efficient concentration camps, in which 
they could wage a cultural war, utilizing their enemies and conquered peoples to work 
the labor jobs needed during war.   The height of technology in World War II was the 
deadliest:  the atomic bomb.  The US had developed five nuclear warheads in the 
Manhattan Project and dropped the first on Hiroshima, Japan.  The US claims to have 
done this because the Japanese refused to surrender, and although this is not clear, the 
US achieved their goal in quickly ending the Pacific war with the second bomb over 
Nagasaki.  Hundreds of thousands of ordinary civilians were killed with the drop of 
two bombs, and more would feel the effects for years after.   
 Thus, while technology meant a huge advantage in battle, in World War II it also
created more effective killing, in which each side competed against the other and the 
innocent civilians lost the most.  World War II tallied the highest death toll of any 




STUDENT PAPER #4 
The technologies developed during World War II increased the war’s 
casualties, prolonged the war, and also laid the foundation for long-term strife 
between nations.  Two major technologies that had this effect are submarines and 
atomic bombs. 
During World War II Germany had the largest fleet of submarines.  This is 
mostly due to the limitation of the Treaty of Versailles on the size of Germany’s 
surface navy.  They were permitted to have a very small surface navy, and had 
subsequently built up a large fleet of submarines.  Also, submarines took a relatively 
short time to be built.  When war finally broke out, Germany realized that their 
surface navy would never be able to defeat the Royal Navy in a battle.  This drove 
Hitler to switch all of Germany’s shipbuilding completely to the construction of 
submarines.  By the end of World War II, Germany’s submarine fleet was almo t one 
thousand strong.  Use of submarines prolonged the war.  During World War II, the 
way submarines communicated became much more effective with the help of 
Enigma, the German encoder.  The use of Enigma allowed detailed attack plans to be 
sent between submarines, making “wolf-pack” attacks on Allied convoys easier.  
Germany used submarines mainly to attack ships supplying Great Britain with food 
for their population and raw materials for their industry.  This was effective because 
Great Britain is an island.  The use of submarines also prolonged the war in that it 
allowed German dominance of the Atlantic Ocean.  This made large Allied shipments 
of troops and supplies almost impossible, so the Allies could not execute major land 
offensives until after 1943, when they had started to retake the Atlantic with the help 
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of radar to locate German submarines.  The use of submarines also helped lay the 
foundation for long-term strife between nations.  The delay in Allied assistance to 
Russia caused Russia to once again feel isolated by them, which was a factorin the 
Cold War. 
World War II was also the first war in which nuclear weapons, namely atomic 
bombs, were used.  The use of the atomic bombs led to increased casualties and the 
laying of the foundation for long-term bitterness between nations.  The atomic bomb 
was created in America by Allied scientists under the name of “Manhattan Project.”  
The atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where they devastated 
the entire cities, reducing them to nothingness.  Over 120,000 casualties resulted from 
these two bombs alone, 95% of which were civilian casualties.  The main purpose 
behind the use of the atomic bombs was forcing the unconditional surrender of Japan.  
Some historians say that the use of the atomic bombs is what forced the Japanese to 
surrender less than a week after the bombings, but other historians, namely Japanese 
historians, claim that the atomic bombs were unnecessary since Japan was supposedly 
planning to surrender anyway.  Either way, the use of the atomic bombs in Japan 
contributed to the laying of the foundation of international strife in that many 
countries considered the United States’ decision unethical and unnecessary.  Also, the 
long-term effects of the radiation that resulted from the atomic bombs killed almost as 
many as the initial explosion.  Never before had such brute force been used in a war.  
In the years after World War II, the development of nuclear weapons continued and 
the United States and Russia became involved in somewhat of a nuclear arms race.  
Further development of rocket propulsion as a method of delivery for nuclear 
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weapons allowed nuclear warfare to be used anywhere in the world from anywhere in 
the world, which instilled mutual fear in the United States and Russia, which was part 
of the lead up to the Cold War.  This is another way that the use of atomic bombs led 
to long-term conflict between nations. 
In conclusion, the technologies developed during World War II increased the 
war’s casualties, prolonged the war, and also laid the foundation for long-term strife 
between nations.  Two major technologies that had this effect are submarines and 
atomic bombs.  Submarine use prolonged the war in that it gave Germany time to 
establish their dominance over the European continent.  Submarine use helped lay the 
foundation for long-term strife between countries in that it prevented the Alliesfrom 
sending aid to Russia, which made them feel isolated.  The use of the atomic bomb 
caused unprecedented casualties in Japan from its instant explosion and long-term 
radiation effects.  The use of the atomic bomb also helped lay the foundation for long-
term strife between countries in that it started the arms race between Russia and the 





















Directions: For the items below, please CIRCLE the 
number that best reflects your level of disagreement/ 



























1.   It is fundamental that students are taught to support their 
      reasoning with evidence.  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.   History is simply a matter of interpretation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3.   A historical account is the product of a disciplined method 
      of inquiry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4.   Students who read many history books learn that the past 
      is what the historian makes it to be. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5.   Disagreement about the same event in the past is lways 
      due to lack of evidence. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6.   Good students know that history is basically a matter of 
      opinion. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7.   Students need to be taught to deal with conflicting 
evidence. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
8.   Historical claims cannot be justified, since th y are simply 
      a matter of interpretation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9.   Good general reading and comprehension skills are 
      enough to learn history well. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
10. Since there is no way to know what really happened in the 
      past, students can believe whatever story they c oose. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
11. History is a critical inquiry about the past. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
12. The past is what the historian makes it to be. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
13. Comparing sources and understanding author perspective  
      are essential components of the process of learning history. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
14. It is impossible to know anything for sure about the past, 
      since no one of us was there. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
15. Knowledge of the historical method is fundamental for 
      historians and students alike. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
16. The facts speak for themselves. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17. Students need to be aware that history is essentially a  
      matter of interpretation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18. Reasonable accounts can be constructed even in the  
      presence of conflicting evidence. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
19. Even eyewitnesses do not always agree with each other, 
      so there is no way to know what happened. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20. Teachers should not question students’ historical opinions, 
      only check that they know the facts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
21. History is the reasonable reconstruction of past
occurrences 
      based on the available evidence. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
22. There is no evidence in history. 






















Question: Based on the documents provided, what was the prevalent belief about the 

























Columbus Before the Council at Salamanca 
Columbus appeared in a most unfavorable light before a scholastic body: an obscure 
navigator, a member of no learned institution, destitute of all the trappings and circumstances 
which sometimes give oracular authority to dullness, and depending upon the mere force of 
natural genius. .... 
Bewildered in a maze of religious controversy, mankind had retraced their steps, and receded 
from the boundary of ancient knowledge...... To his simplest proposition, the spherical form 
of the earth, were opposed figurative texts of Scripture........ 
Objections of a graver nature were advanced on the authority of St. Augustine. He 
pronounces the doctrine of Antipodes to be incompatible with the historical foundations of 
our faith; since, to assert that there were inhabited lands on the opposite side of the globe 
would be to maintain that there were nations not descended from Adam...... 
Others more versed in science admitted the globular form of the earth; but......they observed 
that the circumference of the earth must be so great as to require at least thr e years to the  
voyage, and those who should undertake it must perish of hunger and thirst. 





But as to the fable that there are Antipodes, that is to say, men on the opposite side of the 
earth, where the sun rises when it sets to us, men who walk with their feet opposi e ours, that 
is on no ground credible. And, indeed, it is not affirmed that this has been learned by 
historical knowledge, but by scientific conjecture, on the ground that the earth is suspended 
within the concavity of the sky, and that it has as much room on the one side of it as n the 
other: hence they say that the part which is beneath must also be inhabited. But they do not 
remark that, although it be supposed or scientifically demonstrated that the world is of a 
round and spherical form, yet it does not follow that the other side of the eart  is bare of 
water; nor even, though it be bare, does it immediately follow that it is peopled. ...And it is 
too absurd to say, that some men might have taken ship and traversed the whole wide cean, 
and crossed from this side of the world to the other, and that thus even the inhabitants of that 
distant region are descended from that one first man.  




In the sixth century, this development culminated in what was nothing less than a complete 
and detailed system of the universe, claiming to be based upon Scripture, its author being the 
Egyptian monk Cosmas Indicopleustes.......Nothing can be more touching in its simplicity 
than Cosmas’s summing up of his great argument. He declares, “We say therefore with Isaiah 
that the heaven embracing the universe is a vault, with Job that it is joined to the earth, and 
with Moses that the length of the earth is greater than its breadth.” 
White, A.D. (1955). A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom. New 





The maps of Ptolemy......were forgotten in the West for a thousand years, and replced by 
imaginary constructions based on the supposed teaching of Holy Writ [the Bible]. The 
sphericity of the earth was, in fact, formally denied by the Church, and the mind of Western 
man, so far as it moved in this matter at all, moved back to the old confused notion of a 
modulated “flatland,” with the kingdoms of the world surrounding Jerusalem, the divinely 
chosen center of the terrestrial disk. 
Marvin, F.S. (1921). Science and the Unity of Mankind. In Singer, C. (Ed). Studies in the 




It is now clear that nearly all medieval scholars conceived of the earth as a globe. Its size was 
estimated according to one of two measurements of its circumference inherited from the 
Greeks, either 180,000 stades according to Posidonius and Ptolemy, or 252,000 stades 
according to Erastosthenes. A stade, six hundred Greek feet, is variously estimated to be 
equivalent to 517 to 607 feet by modern authors. If the former, Erastosthenes’ figure for the 
earth’s circumference is only 50 miles off from the modern one. These two numbers survived 
side by side throughout the Middle Ages and were still coexistent in Columbus’s day. The 
smaller figure drastically overestimated the size of the inhabited known world, or ecumene, in 
relation to the whole, and was greatly preferred by Columbus, who set out to cross a  
correspondingly smaller ocean. 
Edson, E. (1997). Mapping Time and Space: How Medieval Mapmakers Viewed Their World. 




The untruth of the Flat Error lies in its incoherence as well as in its violation of facts. First 
there is the flat-out Flat Error that never before Columbus did anyone know that the world 
was round. This dismisses the careful calculations of the Greek geographers along with their 
medieval successors. [...] 
Another version of the Error is that the ancient Greeks may have known that the world was 
round, but the knowledge was lost (or suppressed) in medieval darkness.  
[...] Nineteenth- and twentieth-century writers flattened the medieval globe. [...] 
Throughout the nineteenth century, middle-class liberal progressives proj cted their own 
ideals upon heroes of the past, among them Columbus. This Columbus existed only in the 
minds of amiable progressives whose disdain for the Catholic Revival and the Romantics of  
the early nineteenth century colored the way they viewed the Middle Ages. 




































Directions:  Please indicate how often 
you participate in each of the described 
activities by CIRCLING  the number 
that best reflects your participation. 
 
    








      








1. Read a scholarly history book.  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2. Visit a museum and/or travel to historical sites. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
3. Search for primary source material. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
4. Read a historical novel. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5. Engage in historical inquiry. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
6. Watch a historical documentary. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
7. Write a history-related paper. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
8. Collect historical memorabilia. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9. Construct a history curriculum.  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10. Participate in activities/events dealing with 
historical issues. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
11. Serve as a historical authority or resource. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
12. Give a talk about a history topic at a public 
meeting.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 






















Please, let me know a bit about you. 
• Name _________________________________ 
• Grade:  9th [     ]             10th [    ]             11th [    ]             12th [    ] 
• Age: _____________ 
• Gender:  Male [     ]      Female  [    ] 
• Please list the history classes you have taken in high school. Please indicate if 





• Last year’s GPA (approximate as best as you can) 
_________________________ 
• Last year’s final grade in English 
______________________________________ 
• Last year’s reading score on the MSA test (approximate) 
___________________ 
 
































Question: Based on the documents provided, what was the prevalent belief about 




























When he [Captain Cook] landed at Kealakekua Bay, a multitude of natives, variously 
estimated at from ten to fifteen thousand, flocked about him and conducted him to the 
principal temple with more than royal honors―with honors suited to their chiefest god, for 
such they took him to be. They called him Lono―a deity who had resided at that place in a 
former age, but who had gone away and had ever since been anxiously expected back by the 
people. 
When Cook approached the awe-stricken people, they prostrated themselves and hid their 
faces. His coming was announced in a loud voice by heralds...Arrived at the templ, he was 
taken into the most sacred part and placed before the principal idol...Ten men, bearing a large 
hog and bundles of red cloth, then entered the temple and prostrated themselves before him. 
The cloth was taken from them by the priest, who encircled Cook with its numerous folds, 
and afterward offered the hog to him in sacrifice...He was anointed by the high priest―that is 
to say, his arms, hands, and face, were slimed over with the chewed meat of a cocoa-nut; as 
the last most delicate attention, he was fed with swine-meat which had been masticated for 
him by a filthy old man. 
These distinguished civilities were never offered by the islanders to mere human beings. 
Cook 
was mistaken for their absent god; he accepted the situation and helped the natives to deceive 
themselves.  
Twain, M. (1938). Letters from the Sandwic Islands. California: Stanford University Press.  
 
Document 2 
The next morning, the strange object lay outside Ka‘ahe at Waimea. Those w  saw it 
understood that is was a ship they were looking at, with tall masts and sails shaped like a 
giant manta ray. Some spectators were terrified. Their first thought was that the god Lono, as 
he had promised, was returning on a floating island. Every one was excited, and Waimea 
echoed with their shouts and exclamations. 
The high priest, Kū-‘ohu, declared, “That can be nothing else than the heiau [temple] of the 
god Lono. In the center is the tower of the demigod Ke-o-lewa, and there in the back is the 
place of sacrifice at the altar.” Coming from such a reliable source as the chief priest, the 
rumor grew that the leader of this ship was indeed the god Lono. 
Kū-‘ohu, however, after several days of close observation, had doubts that this was Lono. He 
consulted the sacred cup and concluded that these were not gods but men. But, until they 
were 
absolutely sure, it was safer to be prudent. 




At the time Lono [Cook] arrived the people could not go out to sea in their canoes becau e it 
was the time for the annual gift giving ceremonies called the Makahiki. But because Lono 
had arrived by sea the people assumed it was perfectly proper for them to go out to sea in 
their 
canoes. The people were convinced Lono was really a god and his vessel was a temple. 
Kahananui, D. (1984). Ka Mooolelo Hawaii. [Translation from the oral histories collected by 






At every level of the social order [in Hawai‘i], there is a potential interchange of being 
between humanity and divinity...The greater akua [gods] are realized in chiefs, priests, 
prophets, and specific ritual figures...[It] is just the opposite of Western distinctions of God, 
man, and nature, each occupying a separate kingdom of being. Empirically, then, never the 
three shall meet, or at least not until the last judgment; whereas, for Hawaiians, the 
appearance of Lonomakua (the god Lono) at the Makahiki [religious festival celebrating the 
Hawaiian New Year] of 1778-79 could be substantiated by perceptual evidence... 
Hawaiians were not the only Polynesian people to interpret the advent of Captain Cook or 
other early Europeans as a spiritual visitation. The phenomenon is still les  unusual if one 
considers other Pacific island peoples, notably New Guineans, of whom the like is well  
documented due to the recency in some areas of “first contact.”  
Sahlins, M. (1995). How “Natives” think about Captain Cook, for example. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago. 
 
Document 5 
As he [Cook] approached the southeastern coast of Kauai he beheld a party of ntive 
fishermen, and, holding out some brass medals on bits of string, with some pieces of iron, he 
was gratified to see that they understood the art of barter. They at once came off in boats, 
bringing fish, cocoanuts and bananas, which they proceed to exchange for iron. Iron, he 
learned, both then and later, was most precious in the native eyes, on accountof its usefulness 
for tools and weapons.  
Gowen, H. (1919). The Napoleon of the Pacific: Kamehameha the Great. New York: 
Fleming H. Revell Company. 
 
Document 6 
When the great navigator and “discoverer” of Polynesia James Cook landed on the shores of 
Hawai‘i on Sunday, 17 January 1779, during the festival of Makahiki [religious festival 
celebrating the New Hawaiian Year], he was greeted as the returning god Lono. I question 
this “fact,” which I show was created in the European imagination of the eig te nth century 
and after.....To put it bluntly, I doubt that the natives created their European god; the 
Europeans created him for them. This “European god” is a myth of conquest, imperialism, 
and civilization. (82) 























CODE CODE DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE  
EB EBCO Evidence is seen as detached from argument. 
In other words, there is no overall awareness of 
the role of the knower.   
 
Two main components were identified: 
a) H=P:  History and the past are used as 
synonyms.  What is available from the past 
(remnants of the past) becomes history and 
history is only that 
(historian is not present).  
b) NoHist:  The historian is a chronicler or a 
serendipitous finder who does not select nor 
interpret sources.  Evidence is found ready 
made. 
At best, the historian discriminates between what 
is true and what is false. 
 
[T]here shouldn’t be some method of inquiry for history it should just 
be what it is and method could skew the result.  
 
 





[H]istorians are just humans, they do not make history, other people 
make it, he can just go and tell you how it goes. 
 
I disagree with that [There is no evidence in history], because we have 
documents, and buildings, and monuments and stuff about the past.   
TR1 Ideally, history should coincide with the past.  
However, since we cannot know all of it, 
whenever the evidence is debatable or simply 
cannot be found, it remains a matter of opinions 
(historian as “wanna be” or “should be” 
chronicler). 
 
Another manifestation is the dichotomy facts vs.  
opinion.  Facts are objective, while opinions 
cannot be challenged. 
[T]hey [the historians] are not sure, so they interpr t what they think 
happened long time ago.   
 
[I]f you learn about early 19 hundreds, no one is around, no one is 
really around anymore, that was there, so what all you really have to 
base it on is what historians say it was, like books that were written 
then, but they may still be fabricated on it, so I guess, it might not all 
be true if you are going to read a bunch of books about it, I think all 
you have depends on what historians say was going on.  
 
Opinions are just their opinions you can’t really change them, yeah, 
they need to check their facts on it. 
 
I kind of agree in history with that [Historical claims cannot be 
justified, since they are simply a matter of interpr tation].  No, they 




EBSUB Clear predominance of the subject; history is 
unjustified and biased.   
Focus is mainly on the knower. 
History depends on one’s opinions that color 
how one judges it and how one selects it (like in 
facts vs.  opinions; political opinions). 
Historian is seen as unbound opinionist; there is 
no evidence or it does not really matter. 
 
[H]istory is basically what you make of it depending on what you have 
got to know, what your background is, like democrati , republican, 
because history, especially like that, people see it differently depending 
on whether you are republican or democratic. 
It is [History is simply a matter of interpretation], like to  different, 
like, historians about everything it is interpretation because they 
recognize different opinions about things and different artifacts about 
everything  
TR2 History is the interpretive work of the historian 
based on evidence; the existence of a method is 
acknowledged, but there is no clarity about how 
it may look like. 
The dynamic subject/object may be 
acknowledged, but there is no specific reference 
to a method; in these cases, I called this stance 
TR2 (weak) 
 
[T]here is some evidence on something, so they can’t just choose, they 
have to actually research the evidence, what other theories there are out 
there, so, and there are ways of knowing, it just takes a while.  
EBCR History is the interpretive work of the historian 
based on evidence; interpretation relies on 
specific disciplinary criteria 
Students are aware of what these criteria are 
about; they do not necessarily know how to use 
them. 
 
[W]hen you read something, like an historical document that was 
written by some of the historian, you need to understand and read 
between the lines to understand what he is saying and to understand 
what he or she is trying to do. 
EB Epistemic ideas that do not fit previous 
categorizations. 
[S]ome people have beliefs and so, kinda, sometimes there is proof 
about it, sometimes there is not.   
 
HT Statements 
dealing with how 
to know about the 
past (or make sense 
about evidence 
from the past). 
HTYes Evidence of use or knowledge of heuristics 
signaling historical thinking. 
[Y]ou have to know where a source is coming from to understand that 
it’s biased. 
 
HTNo Evidence of use or knowledge of heuristics 
clearly incompatible with historical thinking. 
 
I don’t even know what the historical method is and I can know history 
well, kind of.   
I didn’t read it [the source of the document].  I don’t know, it just it 
doesn’t seem, it’s not just like the same distance and font, and it’s all 
together and that’s separate, so like kind of, it is where it came from, I 
guess, it has the cite, so to me, where it came from, it could be a rumor 
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or not, so to me it does not affect how I wrote my paper or anything 
like that, so I just never read that.  
CP Copy and paste: selecting parts from different 
documents in order to build a more or less 
coherent story (no intertextual comparison; 
dismissal of conflicting evidence) 
They believed that they, he was Lono, their great god that had 
promised to return and finally returned on his floating island and they 
believed it so much that they worshiped him as an actual god and not 
as a men, because as he said in document they wouldn’t have done it 
for another human being, but what they gave him, gold, and sacrifice, 
and lot of stuff, lot of a great stuff.   
AQ Building an answer to the task question  
AA Awareness of author (in the text).  Signaled by 




responding to the 
task that are not 
typical of thinking 
historically, 









meaning of words; 
visualizing 
   
OTHER MOT Reasons supporting the use of arguments based 
on evidence.   
May be intrinsic (INTR), i.e., the use of evidence 
and argumentation is important for the 
respondent himself/herself, or extrinsic 
(EXTR),i.e.,  the use of evidence and 
argumentation is important only in relation to 
others. 
 
[Students need to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence] because 
they just go into big arguments and not get anywhere. 
 
[I]n schools you always need to support your answer to get the best 




PED Mention of pedagogical practices potentially 
influencing epistemic ideas or historical 
thinking. 
I learn better by playing games, like the jeopardy she did, but some 
people can just read a book, I can’t do that, just pick up information, I 
need to have hands-on, I can’t just read the book. 
[W]e have the textbooks and everything, different peo le wrote it and 
so they have different opinions about things, some do have the same 
ones, so if we don’t understand what they are talking about we don’t 
get their viewpoint of it, then we don’t understand what is going on.   
 
[I]t is easier if someone explain to you what happened, it’s easier to 
picture things happening and what happens, the reasoning behind why 
it happens than just read about that and understand it. 
 
T Statements dealing with the correspondence of 
history to the truth about the past (the word truth 
or true has to be used) 
In the context of the curriculum, I believe there is a certain amount of 
truth that is set in stone, like the events that happened, but the only way 
to, I guess, to come upon this truth is by reading a d learning from 
different interpretation of it. 
 
CER Statements dealing with the certainty of 
historical knowledge (the word certain, sure, or 
some close synonym has to be used) 
[Y]ou didn’t know this person and so you cannot sayfor sure was he 
good or was he bad, just some evidence supports it, and you cannot 
find all the evidence and then, well, it’s just, for example if you take 
this time of period that happened long, long ago and  lot of evidence 
is destroyed or lost, in this town, you cannot be sure about things.   
 
I believe that there is a certain amount of doubt, there is, very small 
shred of doubt that can always exists because none of us was there, but 
there’re I believe fairly reliable ways to recreate, or gaining knowledge 
about historical event.   
 
NC No code (not understandable; comment not 
pertinent to the research; just a repetition of the 
prompt; the participant says too little to interpret 
the meaning of the comment) 
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